Abstract:

In recent years, the European Union has experienced a myriad of changes, which have motivated Member States to pay attention to traditionally ignored European policy areas, such as the Common Security and Defence Policy. The launch of the Global Strategy in 2016 signified a turning point in the stagnation of this policy area, and several European defense initiatives have resulted from it. These novel developments arise as a result not only of internal but also as a result of external dynamics of the European Union, such as Brexit, instability in neighboring regions, or relations with traditional security allies.

Keywords:

European Union, Common Security and Defense Policy, Global Strategy of the European Union, Defense, Security, United States, Russia, Brexit, NATO.

*NOTE: The ideas contained in the Opinion Papers shall be responsibility of their authors, without necessarily reflecting the thinking of the IEEE or the Ministry of Defense*
Introduction

Jean Monnet once declared that the European Union would be shaped by the multiple crises that it would survive, and since the outset of the European project, the EU has certainly endured certain dilemmas, which have in turn deepened integration in multiple fields. However, the field of security and defence has been an exception to this rule, despite being an early objective of the Union, and it has - leaving out a few timid ideas - remained stagnant for years. Nonetheless, in recent years we have observed an increase of developments in the field of security and defence, which resulted into further shaping of the Common Security and Defence Policy and furthering defence integration. Most notably, in the summer of 2016 the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, released the European Union Global Strategy (EUGS), a document which would review priorities and capabilities of the Union in defence matters, and adapt them to the current challenges that the EU faces. Progress seemed immediate and agile, and within the first revision of the Strategy’s accomplishments in 2017, the report argued that in the field of defence and security “more has been achieved in the last ten months than in the last ten years”. What triggered such sudden developments in this policy field? There are a myriad of articles outlining different theories and possible individual trigger events that could have sparked the change, yet this article compiles the main factors that influenced the renewed concern for European Security and Defence Policy.

Although defence integration was part of the European project since its inception - as illustrated by the first proposal for a European Defence Community put forward as soon as 1950 or the two main military powers of the EU (UK and France) aiming to establish a

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common course of action in the late 90’s-, attempts until recently were “less bold, incremental and advanced slowly”\textsuperscript{4}. The various attempts would never materialise, or at least to its full potential, due to repeated lack of commitment and divergent perspectives. As a result, the second decade of the twenty first century with its multiple proposals and initiatives, including the EUGS, has hence represented a considerable turning point in the traditionally stagnant nature of this field. The presentation of the European Union Global Strategy has put forward a variety of notions and initiatives that, although not new to the Union in theory, are new in practice.

Although the priorities set out in the EUGS go further than security and defence into foreign policy areas – including societal resilience or regional cooperation- this article particularly focuses on the security and defence guidelines of the EUGS, as well as the initiatives that derived from these aims. In order to dive into the potential factors that could have sparked this change, we will firstly analyse the hints about Security and Defence that the EU institutions, as well as official documents, have given throughout the past years. Then we will analyse the factors that could have led to these developments and concerns. Lastly, we will link the analysis of these factors in the conclusion with the famous prediction made by Monnet.

\textbf{The European Union Global Strategy and its initiatives (2016-2018)}

In a letter to the Council of the European Union in 2016, the High Representative of the European Union concluded that the new European Union Global Strategy was necessary in order to adapt the priorities and set new ambitions to the “challenging times” and in the wake of a “changed security environment”\textsuperscript{5}. Later in 2017, at the G7 Summit, the tension between European countries with their traditional security partner USA shun through when Chancellor Merkel declared that “the times in which we can fully count on others


are somewhat over, [...] we Europeans must really take our destiny into our own hands”\textsuperscript{6}.
It seemed as if the EU was coming to terms with its security condition, both due to the challenges set by outside world as well as the tensions with its traditional partners. This was further evidenced by certain hints included in the European Global Strategy.

The EUGS conveyed a certain urgency to achieve strategic autonomy due to the unstable environment and ‘fragile world’ which imposes ‘challenges with both internal and external dimensions’ on the EU and undermines the peace and stability in the continent\textsuperscript{7}. It further stated that the EU should “play a major role (in the world) including as a global security provider”\textsuperscript{8}. Similarly, other EU official documents mention that the “deterioration of the security environment” has produced a “challenging geopolitical environment”\textsuperscript{9}, and they identify a security nexus between events taking place outside out borders – terrorism, civil wars and migration- and their direct impact on the EU’s security\textsuperscript{10}. In order to address these challenges, the EUGS strongly focuses on achieving “strategic autonomy” for the Union, a concept that implies the ability to cooperate with international and regional partners where possible, while being able to operate autonomously with credibility when and where necessary\textsuperscript{11}. The documents including this aim denoted a certain urgency in having the capacity to act autonomously, although states differed in the aims to achieve it: some would rather continue relying on the NATO partnership for European security matters, while some others prefer to complement it with a gradual buildup of own


\textsuperscript{8} Ibid, Page 6


capabilities\textsuperscript{12}. Nonetheless, one thing was certain, the EUGS finally recognized that “in this fragile world, soft power is not enough; we must enhance our credibility in security and defence”\textsuperscript{13}.

In order to achieve the above-mentioned objectives, the implementation of the EU ambitions was structured around a threefold scheme put forward by various EU institutions: the EEAS’ Implementation Plan on Security and Defence, the NATO-EU Joint Declaration, and the Commission’s European Defence Action Plan. Although the official documents continued to regard NATO as the primary security actor, they did not not mitigate the ambitions of strategic autonomy, at least rhetorically, and aimed for much more independence from external security actors, without rejecting cooperation\textsuperscript{14}.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure1.png}
\caption{Main initiatives to achieve the EUGS objectives in defense and security\textsuperscript{15}}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{12} Besch, S. (2016). EU defence, Brexit and Trump. The good, the bad and the ugly. Center for European Reform. Pages 4-9


\textsuperscript{14} Howorth, J. (2017a). European defence policy between dependence and autonomy: a challenge of sisyphian dimensions. The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, Pag. 2

The threefold scheme resulted into the implementation of various tangible initiatives. On the one hand, a Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) was established in order to make the response to external conflicts and crises quicker and more efficient by creating a military chain of command\textsuperscript{16}. Despite the interest in the MPCC proposal, it has “for the time being, been restricted to ‘non-executive’ missions (i.e. training missions in Somalia, Central Africa and Mali)”\textsuperscript{17}. However, from 2020 onwards, it could apply as well to executive missions\textsuperscript{18}.

Additionally, the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) constituted a significant organ to further defence integration in the Union, since it aimed to examine Member States defence budgets in order to later identify challenges and to determine capabilities development priorities\textsuperscript{19}, hence gradually synchronizing defence planning cycles of EU Member States\textsuperscript{20}. Furthermore, the European Defence Fund (EDF) was developed in order for “the European defence industrial base [to be able to] to meet Europe’s current and future security needs”\textsuperscript{21}. In order to address the pressing current lack of cooperation in areas of defence research and development between Member States, the EDF would support and invest in joint research and development of defence equipment and


technologies, thus reinforcing the EU single market for defence. 

![Figure 2: Projects started under the EDF Initiative](image)

Lastly, the initiative which drew most attention from media and the public, and directly addressed the ambition to become a more autonomous security player, was the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). PESCO was an old ambition, long buried in the Lisbon Treaty, which finally resurfaced as a framework to possibly increase cooperation in defence matters for demanding EU military operations and potentially

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improve the Union’s “hard power” by creating multinational forces in the future. Although the exact amount of progress towards a “European Defence Union can be debated, since most of the results so far are at a political level and have yet to be translated into real cooperation and capabilities”, in comparison to the stagnant past of European security and defence policy, these new projects represent a turning point in the area of EU security.

Traditionally, EU security and defence developments were framed into neo liberal institutional and constructivist perspectives. These developments, no matter how timid, were interpreted as the next logical step in the European integration process, either due to the construction of a common identity or a gradual increase in institutional cooperation. However, the reiteration of external factors as worrying elements throughout the EUGS and other official documents suggests that the new EU developments are rather a reactionary phenomenon to a series of factors and the security environment, as suggested by the realist line of thought. The following pages will explore the main factors, both internal and external, that could have sparked the renewed sense of urgency for progress in the field of EU security and defence. By examining external factors and internal processes influencing CSDP policy, the conclusion of this article may offer further insight into the areas of focus of these new defence initiatives, their nature and the future role of EU in the world.

31 Ibid
External Factors Analysis

In the last decades, the EU has faced multiple crises that have directly or indirectly affected its security and, subsequently, its security policies\(^{32}\). As previously mentioned, the EUGS gives certain hints of the need to respond to a “fragile world” and an increasingly unstable environment that brings “challenges with both internal and external dimensions”\(^{33}\). However, there is not a consolidated consensus on what precisely precipitated this reaction from the European Union\(^{34}\). While certain authors believe that this refers to the Crimean Annexation and Russian increasing assertiveness\(^{35}\), other authors point at the increasing reluctance of the Trump administration to provide for EU security\(^{36}\), the consequences of the Arab spring\(^{37}\) or at the institutional crisis sparked by Brexit\(^{38}\). This section compiles the main external factors studied by scholars and experts, and will subsequently study other internal dynamics that could have reinforced the perceived need for more strategic autonomy.

**Russia and the Ukraine Conflict**

The Ukrainian conflict in 2014, despite beginning as a political and economic conflict, soon became a geostrategic and security issue, for it brought insecurity and a military conflict at the EU’s doorstep\(^{39}\). In addition, some of the EU countries neighbouring the

\(^{32}\) *Ibid* Page 39


\(^{36}\) Besch, S. (2016). EU defence, Brexit and Trump. The good, the bad and the ugly. Center for European Reform.


Russian Federation were reminded of their vulnerability to potential Russian aggressions, who continued to increase its military presence in the Baltic and Black Seas despite the Minsk II processes\(^\text{40}\). The situation compelled the Union to realize that war and conflict were not matters of the past\(^\text{41}\), thus pressuring the Union into developing its own security apparatus, with capabilities to react and become a global security actor.

Nonetheless, it would be wrong assuming that the Crimean annexation has been the only source of friction between the European Union and the Russian Federation, for the situation had declined since the USA started negotiating the establishment of an anti-ballistic missile in Poland and Czech Republic - former sphere of influence of the Russian Federation\(^\text{42}\) - and further exacerbated by Russia’s opposition to EU Association and NATO Membership agreements with former USSR satellite states, such as Croatia and Albania joining the NATO Alliance in 2009 and Ukraine and Georgia submitting their accession pleas\(^\text{43}\). The displeasure of the Russian Federation was also evident during the international negotiations on Syria. As a result, in the previous years to the Ukraine conflict, Russia had been already having a clear counter balancing attitude and aimed to play a geostrategic role in the region\(^\text{44}\). However, only during the Ukraine Conflict, when the situation escalated into a military conflict in Ukraine, the EU learned its lesson: my “neighbours and my partner’s weaknesses are my own weaknesses”\(^\text{45}\). In 2015, even the president of the European Commission, Jean Claude Juncker, mentioned the need to “strengthen Europe’s role in the world, especially against Russia”\(^\text{46}\).

\(^{40}\) Ibid


\(^{42}\) Ibid, page 208

\(^{43}\) Ibid, page 201 -204


\(^{45}\) Ibid, Page 5-7

United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

An additional factor in postponing European self-sufficiency in the area of defence and security is the parallel existence of NATO, since there was an almost “instinctive reliance on the Alliance as a security guarantor since the end of the Cold War”\textsuperscript{47}. The collapse of the Soviet Union and demise of the Warsaw Treaty sparked pressures in the EU-US relation, since it questioned the new role of NATO. Although it was concluded that the alliance was meant as a temporary security assurance, it eventually become engrained in the European security system, and thus independent EU security organs were not developed, or with a civilian rather than a military character.\textsuperscript{48} Even nowadays, certain EU states continue to express concerns about the pursue of an autonomous European Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), for it is considered to weaken the NATO alliance\textsuperscript{49}.

As a result of this long-standing reliance, the latest decisions and opinions of the US administration have increased the sense of insecurity in the European continent. In the last few years, the Trump administration has disregarded the Alliance in various occasions, not only publicly characterizing it as obsolete, but also demanding the EU to assume leadership in NATO, as well as greater responsibility for their security environment and neighbourhood\textsuperscript{50}. These comments caused tensions to arise between the allies, put great stress on the transatlantic security relationship\textsuperscript{51} and brought the European allies to revise the conditionality of the US security guarantee.\textsuperscript{52} These uncertainties materialised when the German Chancellor declared that “the times in which

\textsuperscript{47} Maull, H. (2018, June 05). Interview with Ada Bonilla.
\textsuperscript{51} Smith, M. (2018). Transatlantic security relations since the European security strategy: what role for the EU in its pursuit of strategic autonomy? Journal of European Integration, Page 605
we can fully count on others are somewhat over, “[…] in 201753. However, similarly to the
Russian conflict, the tensions between the transatlantic partners had been intensifying in
the previous years, due to different decision making structures of the EU and NATO54, as
well as gradual divergences on security priorities and mechanisms to combat them55.
Hence, the new US administration and uncertain NATO relationship have also been
contributing factors to the general insecurity felt in the EU, as a result of the different
perspectives on the future of European Security, as well as the persisting tensions
between NATO and EU. Nonetheless, the EU and NATO have maintained cooperation
in realms such as cyber security, hybrid warfare, maritime security and other transatlantic
security matters, as encouraged by the Joint Declaration on EU – NATO cooperation
signed in July 2016, a month after the EUGS was released56.

Neighbouring Regions

In addition to traditional security alliance and existent tensions with other states, the
EUGS also extensively focuses on the need for stability and peace in the neighbouring
regions as a precondition for peace and stability in the Union.

There is a stark contrast in the manner that the EU addressed neighbouring regions
between the former 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS), its review in 2008 and the
most recent EUGS in 2016. While the first one admitted that a well governed periphery
was desirable yet it did not perceive that it would substantially affect the EU57, the review
tried to raise concerns about the increasingly troubling situations in Syria and Libya but

54 Garcia, J. (2016). La Union Europea y la OTAN en el marco de la nueva estrategia global de la Union
security future. European Security, Page 456
55 Smith, M. (2018). Transatlantic security relations since the European security strategy: what role for the
EU in its pursuit of strategic autonomy? Journal of European Integration, Pages 609 – 612.
57 Johansson-Nogues, E. (2018). The EU’s ontological insecurity: stabilising the ENP and the EU’s self?
was ignored due to more pressing issues – such as war in Georgia and treaty reforms. Later on, the EUGS would specifically acknowledges that there are “a set of concurrent and heightened crises”, which have created an “arc of instability” that will have implications for the Union. The attempt to update the strategy after the unsuccessful 2008 revision derived from the perception that the southern and eastern neighbourhoods had gone from one crisis to another since 2011, with reports from the European Commission claiming even that 2013 had been a “year of crises due to political instability” in the neighbouring regions, the increasingly assertive Russian policy, rising extremisms and economic upheaval across North Africa and Middle East. The Commissioner for Neighbourhood, Johannes Hahn, would later also describe the neighbouring regions to the EU as a “ring of fire”.

To conclude, the EU only began to truly understand the impact of events occurring in the neighbouring regions on the Union’s security after the first revision of the ESS, not only due to the spill over effect that the crises would have – which created a very present sense of insecurity with its migration flows and imminent military threats-, but also due to the basic resources it provided, basic for the Member States subsistence, namely the energy supplies and natural resources. Lastly, these neighbouring regions and their crises also profoundly impacted internal public opinion of most European States, as will be later discussed.

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The combination of the external factors increased the sense of insecurity in the EU, since the threats and challenges at its border now directly affected its internal politics. Furthermore, the faltering of traditional security alliances strengthened the EU’s aims for more strategic autonomy in the area of security of defence. However, even if exogenous factors like US abandonment, NATO tensions and the ring of fire played “a trend towards EU Security actions, endogenous factors also explain the path that the EU has decided to take”\textsuperscript{64}.

**Internal Factor Analysis**

Throughout the past decade, while the European Union kept on trying to define guidelines for foreign policy, security and defence policies, the internal dynamics of the European Union further stirred the sense of uncertainty and insecurity in the Union, thus increasing the interest of citizens in furthering the fields of security and defence. The main factors impacting the perception of EU security policies were: Brexit and Domestic Pressures.

**Brexit: a challenge or an opportunity?**\textsuperscript{65}

The withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union is considered a failure of the European integration process, yet it has also been an opportunity for more integration in the field of defence and security. This paradox derives from the fact that the United Kingdom has traditionally been one of the main opponents to more defence integration, yet it is also one of the two serious military players of the European Union\textsuperscript{66}.

The United Kingdom has traditionally played a rather obstructive role in the field of European Defence and Security, and has in rare occasions supported more integration in EU defence, such as with the initial launch of the CSDP in 1999, when it feared that the USA would disengage from NATO if Europe did not develop some credible military

\textsuperscript{64} Smith, M. (2018). Transatlantic security relations since the European security strategy: what role for the EU in its pursuit of strategic autonomy? Journal of European Integration, Page 608


The UK has thus kept a traditional focus and continued prioritising NATO and its relationship with the US rather than fostering European Defence integration. Instead, the UK has preferred “a balance of NATO multilateral frameworks and ex-EU bilateral defence relations”. As a result of the increasing Euroscepticism and in the aftermath of the Brexit referendum—which implied that the traditional obstructionist state no longer could block policies—various member states, such as France, Germany, Italy and Spain, saw an opportunity to promote further integration in CSDP, increasing strategic economy and fostering the sense of common identity. Thus, while some consider that Brexit is a failure of European integration, others have chosen to consider it as an opportunity to develop areas of policy traditionally stalled by the UK. This is also illustrated by the fact that two days after the Brexit Referendum, the EUGS was adopted, both in June 2016.

In the aftermath of the referendum, both the EU and the UK have reaffirmed their intention to continue working together: the UK has an interest in EU platforms such as the Schengen Information System or the EU defence funding opportunities, and the EU is losing between 20 to 30% of EU military capabilities with the departure of the UK. However, the details on possible future cooperation are still unclear, as third countries have restricted decision making in CSDP missions, for example, which could change severely the role of the UK in CSDP missions to date. According to Pontijas Calderón, the types of agreements and participation that other third countries have had in previous CSDP missions would not be valid for the United Kingdom, who probably wishes for special relationship with a more relevant role in decision making in the missions.

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67 Ibid
71 (The Times, 2018)
72 (Oppennheim, 2018, pág. 3)
However, it remains to be seen, after the Brexit negotiations end, how this fits Brussels’ wish to preserve their autonomy in decision-making\textsuperscript{74}.

**Domestic Insecurity and Pressure/New Challenges to Democracy**

In light of the mentioned factors, new perils – such as EU scepticism, political radicalisation and populism - have arisen within the Member States, which challenge the EU democratic processes as well as the Union’s existence as a regional organism\textsuperscript{75}. For example, the regional insecurity has triggered a migration crisis, which coincidentally became in May 2015 one of “the two most important issues facing the EU”\textsuperscript{76}. These developments have brought perceived physical insecurity, at times exacerbated by political fractions, to citizens and generated a renewed sense of urgency. The sense of urgency and insecurity have been further aggravated with the succession of terrorist attacks in France, Germany and Belgium, as well as the refugee crisis reaching its peak migratory flows in 2014 and 2015\textsuperscript{77}. The uncertainty, at the same time, has favoured the perceived need for a stronger common security defence policy.\textsuperscript{78} This was especially visible during the French presidential elections, UK parliamentary elections and German elections in 2017, when the views of the leading and successful candidates on defence matters had a more substantial role than in past elections\textsuperscript{79}. Furthermore, not only member states have realised the increasing importance of security and defence in the future of the EU, but also prominent figures and EU civil servants such as new pro-

\textsuperscript{74} Ibid, Page 12


European leadership figures in the Commission –Jean Claude Juncker- and External Action Service –Federica Mogherini- as of 2014, who reinforced the perception that there was a need for further integration in defence 80.

Despite the rising interest of citizens and Member states on security and defence policies, it is important to add that throughout the negotiations there have also been some discrepancies between the Member, which focus mainly on the geographical focus and the security and defence mechanisms. On the one hand, while member states in Easter and Central Europe would prefer to focus on Russia’s threat to territorial integrity in the Eastern flank of the continent, the Southern members are rather worried about the instability in the MENA region and consequent migratory flows 81. These discrepancies are also noticeable when the future of the European security system is discussed, for the Member States are mainly divided into Atlanticists -those who would rather rely on NATO structures – and Europeanists – who promote more autonomic European defence mechanisms 82. While the first – states such as Latvia or Lithuania- worry about complementarity with and non-duplication of NATO structures, the second ones – such as France and Germany- support more autonomous EU structures, while still furthering NATO-EU collaboration in areas of common interest, such as hybrid threats and cyber security 83.

The extraordinary developments in the second half of 2016 and 2017 in the area of defence and security at a European level may have been facilitated by the referendum result, and general strategic environment, but there seems to also be pressure from a “existential crisis” about its purposes and capability to achieve it84. This is evidenced by

High Representative Mogherini’s announcement in the presentation of the EUGS that “the purpose, even existence, of our Union is being questioned”\textsuperscript{85}. The brief discussion of external and internal factors that could have affected the rise of European security and defence policies reveals the buildup of insecurity and uncertainty in the European Union over the years. While external factors mainly created a perspective of helplessness and incapacity to react to external crises, internal factors further exacerbate uncertainty and allow the European Union to take innovative steps.

**Final Conclusion**

After the Cold War, as exemplified by some 90’s initiatives, the EU must have interpreted the new security landscape as one manageable, and thought that it could handle the considerably smaller risks characteristic of the time\textsuperscript{86}. This led to rather unambitious, unsuccessful and timid defence and security initiatives. However, throughout the years, the succession of crises (Yugoslavia, Libya, Mali …) have forced the EU to acknowledge that it may not have the necessary capabilities to react to nearby crises. As a result, a more serious revision of priorities began in 2013, which would be later encompassed in the current European Union Global Strategy.

The latest developments in EU defence seem to have a reactionary nature to the Union’s circumstances. More concretely, the EUGS seems to firstly, acknowledge the contemporary complex European security environment – an “arc of fire” – and the challenges that it has brought, to then respond to these matters. As concluded in the analysis of factors of this article, the emergence of EU defence policies results from a dual dynamic of external and internal actors. On the one hand, external factors made the EU acknowledge its lack of ability to react to events in its neighbourhood and spread a sense of instability, while internal factors such as the impact of migration and terrorism increased the perception of insecurity, which led to the EU citizens becoming increasingly worried about security and defence matters\textsuperscript{87}.

\textsuperscript{85} Ibid

\textsuperscript{86} Howorth, J. (2017). European defence policy between dependence and autonomy: a challenge of sisyphean dimensions. The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, Page 21 - 23

External actors made EU citizens realize that conflict is not a matter of the past and the Union must be able to defend its core values\textsuperscript{88}. While the Crimean annexation has threatened territorial integrity at the EU’s doorstep spreading a feeling of insecurity, the challenges to the European traditional security assurances (namely NATO) by the latest US administration have brought back old uncertainties and helpless feelings, which have only been further exacerbated by the recent realization that regional instability and its multiple impacts affect the citizen’s perception of EU stability. In addition to these vulnerability and uncertainty, internal aspects have increased support for defence and security policies, due to new levels of perceived insecurity at both a national and regional level\textsuperscript{89}. The combination of these factors with the challenges posed by Brexit and other societal dynamics at a Member State level have sent the EU “into emergency mode”\textsuperscript{90}.

In the past years, various EU figures and leading Member States have listened to this emergency call and reacted with urgency to the security environment by pushing for more security and defence developments, as well as further integration in the field at an EU level, which explains the increase in security and defence policies in recent years. As Jean Monet, one of the fathers of the European Union, had anticipated: the European Union’s is being shaped by the most recent crises faced by the Union, and these security lessons have been encapsulated in the European Union Global Strategy.

Ada Bonilla Duarte
Degree in European Studies,
Master in Security and Crisis Management

