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**THE 2012 NATIONAL DEFENCE
DIRECTIVE**

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Abstract:

The new National Defence Directive 1/2012 has just been released by the Prime Minister. Therefore, it is time to analyze the evolution of subsequent directives issued since 2000.

Keywords: National Defence Directive 1/2012.

INTRODUCTION

The prime minister introduced the National Defence Directive¹ 1/2012 on July 31 in the meeting of the National Defence Council chaired by His Majesty the King in the Palace of Zarzuela.

Given the importance of the document, which starts the usually four-years-cycle of the National Defence's planning and is repeated regularly since 1992, it is convenient to compare the last documents and to include a brief examination of the different directives developed during this century. This year marks 20 years of perfect regularity. This long experience makes possible a stable planning with well-defined goals. These goals are constantly progressing in a variable geopolitical picture that has accelerated the tempo in the last years, and is characterized by its uncertainty.

STUDY ON THE EVOLUTION OF THE 2000-2012 NATIONAL DEFENCE DIRECTIVES

Regarding the Directives' structure, in the following table the different epigraphs in which they are divided are compiled and compared:

Table 1: Structure by epigraphs of the DDN

DDN-2000	DDN-2004	DDN-2008	
Preamble	Background	Introduction	
	The strategic scenario	Strategic approaches	The strategic scenario
	Spain's security and defence framework		Frames of action and decision
	The Spanish response		Principles of Spanish security and defence
Purpose	The directive's purpose	The directive's purpose	
Basic lines of the defence policy	General lines of action	General lines of action	
	Guidelines for the development of the defence policy	Guidelines	
Concluding provisions	Concluding provision	Concluding provisions	

¹ or DDN from the Spanish *Directiva de Defensa Nacional*

As you can see, the structure of the Directives from 2004 and 2008 is very similar, and they result in documents of much greater length and depth than the Directive from 2000. A possible explanation is that the DDN-2000, in practice, followed and updated the DDN-1996 (the year when the government changed its political sign), therefore, its goal was especially to continue the DDN-1996.

In contrast, we can appreciate differences between the directives from 2008 and 2012 in this section, even concerning the length (the 14 pages of 2008 are reduced to a little more than 7). Then, we are facing a more concise document in line with the Directives from the governments of the people's party (in Spanish: *partido popular*).

There are less differences of structure, giving the document a clearer sense of continuity and renewal while there is an effort to summarize it. This way, the brief chapters of the document are reduced from 5 to 4. In the DDN-2012, they are reduced to:

1. Introduction
2. Development of the Strategic outlook and its repercussion for Spain
3. Defence Policy goals
4. Guidelines to follow in the current term

The previous chapters appear with no subsections, except chapter 4, in which the guidelines established by the prime minister are introduced—the essence of the document and its purpose—in a more schematic and sometimes almost telegraphic way.

In any case, the content of the 2008 and 2012 directives is equivalent concerning their organization and structure, except for the elimination, in the one from 2012, of the chapter "The directive's purpose". Actually, this chapter, after the numerous and consecutive editions, is not necessary, because it is a consolidated and perfectly known document (at least by the most important actors in the defence field).

INTRODUCTIONS TO THE DIRECTIVES

The Preamble of the DDN-2000 highlights the character of continuity of the DDN-1996, which *"marked the beginning of a renovation phase in the Spanish defence and security policy"*. In the preamble, there is a small summary of the strategic scenario, in which the courage of the Armed Forces as an instrument of the State's foreign action is highlighted, against *"asymmetric threats, crisis and conflicts which jeopardize peace, security and stability in several regions of the world and can affect our own security and, consequently, require a response from Spain"*.

That meant having forces different from the ones of the traditional defence concept, with joint capabilities of projection and capable of contributing to the Atlantic Alliance and the European Union. Within this transformation, the adoption of a model of fully professional Armed Forces was emphasized, as well as the implementation of a "Foreign Policy Council".

The background to the DDN-2004 underlines the evolution of the Spanish defence policy, expressed in the subsequent National Defence Directives, and highlights that abroad these were used for the full incorporation to the security and defence occidental organizations, and, in Spain, to modernize the Armed Forces. The introduction of the DDN-2008 is more significant, because it highlights the adoption of the Organic Law on National Defence in 2005 (in Spanish: *Ley Orgánica de la Defensa Nacional*), and states that *"the DDN must be in line with a National Security Strategy"*. And this National Security Strategy must integrate, under the leadership of the prime minister, the different sectoral policies, with a wider and complete approach. As it is well known, in 2011 the first "Spanish Security Strategy"(in Spanish: *Estrategia Española de Seguridad*) was approved.

Following the same line but introducing some changes, in 2012 more content is added to the introduction as the main ideas describing the document are included. This way, it is important to highlight that, among the reasons that justify the need to create a new DDN, the changes undergone in the security and defence field *in particular in our most immediate*

environment are especially emphasized, as well as the economic crisis which constitutes a *threat to security*.

Then, the concept of responsible defence is introduced, which is divided into two areas that complement each other. The first area, on the one hand, makes reference to the responsibility to give an appropriate response to the multiple challenges of security, and the second one, on the other, emphasizes the need to achieve it by optimizing the scarce economic resources available "*with the lowest possible social cost*". This last reference, due to the budgetary situation, is as inevitable as necessary.

Another remarkable element in the introduction is the necessary solidarity and loyalty in the alliances' environment, when the geopolitical changes and the global challenges tend to result in divisions rather than in the more and more necessary cohesion and responsibility in both directions.

Lastly, in the introduction, the emphasis on "*the necessity to develop a deep reflexion about the way Spain is facing the risks and threats that the country will undergo during the rest of the first half of the 21st century*" deserves to be pointed out. It stresses that the best thing Spain can add in the security field is its own strength.

EVOLUTION OF THE STRATEGIC OUTLOOK AND ITS REPERCUSSION FOR SPAIN

In the following table, the main features of the strategic environment, in which the principals of Spanish security and defence are developed, are summarized and compared, according to the Directives from 2004 and 2008:

Table 2: Strategic scenarios of the DDN

DDN-2004	DDN-2008
Traditional risks and threats, together with new ones like international terrorism	Complex scenario and potentially dangerous, which requires the combined use of every tool
Military superiority is not a factor of effective deterrence against terrorism and proliferation	Increasing number of actors, public and private, governmental and non-governmental, cultural, ethnic, and religious factors
The European security requires more determination, resources, and an effective use of every instrument	The new non-conventional risks have not the destructive capacity of the traditional ones, but they weigh down development
Essential Responsibility of the UN Security Council, the Atlantic Alliance in the process of transformation	Terrorism, organized crime, proliferation, failed States, regional conflicts, fight for basic resources, climate change, cyberspace

In general, both Directives reflect with detail the strategic scenario of the period in which they were made. And in both Directives, the strategic scenario is influenced by the September 11 attacks in the USA, after a period of strategic uncertainty since the end of the Cold War. The weight of the international organizations and the new actors of security is taken into account, and the list of risks and threats coincides with the one of the EU, both in the European Security Strategy of 2003 and in the Follow-up Report of 2008.

With regard to the policy framework, the DDN-2004 highlights questions like the one stating that Europe is the vital area of interest. Therefore, Spain will boost: the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), the acquisition of civilian and military capabilities in order to act autonomously; as well as a strong and balanced transatlantic relation, with a solid engagement with the Atlantic Alliance and a bilateral relation with the USA; and a special interest on the Mediterranean and Latin America. In the DDN-2008 the same points are analyzed, but mentions to other scenarios are added, like Sub-Saharan Africa (in a strong phase of immigration by sea) and Asia-Pacific (with the deployment in Afghanistan), as well as a mention to the defence national framework through two aspects: the maintenance of a traditional dissuasive capacity, and the contribution of the Armed Forces to manage

emergency situations (when the Military Emergencies Unit² was being implemented).

Lastly, regarding the Spanish response, the DDN-2004 established the action criteria of the Armed Forces abroad: a previous decision from the UN or the multinational organizations to which Spain belongs, and an agreement on the participation in the Parliament, all this done notwithstanding the right of legitimate defence. The strategic concept in Spain is based on maintaining Spain's own defensive capacity as a factor of deterrence, and on a collective defence and shared security with partners and allies. Besides, the DDN-2008 mentions the essential interests to be defended, sometimes acting beyond the national territory, the values in line with the protection of the interests, and the necessary multidisciplinary approaches and integral action.

Regarding this subject the DDN-2012 follows the same points with some distinguished elements that show the evolution of the strategic outlook. Probably, the most important point is the explicit reference to the US leadership in *the fight against global risks and threats*. It also declares that *the Atlantic Alliance remains the most adequate link of security and collective defence for Spain*.

In the same sense that the DDN-2008 in the subject 2b referring to "Frames of action and decision", the United Nations, the European Security and the Atlantic Alliance, although in reverse order, constitute these frameworks in the DDN-2012. Although, in theory, this order is not a priority, it could lead to think that the new directive, without forgetting about the European construction of defence and the umbrella of legality and legitimacy given by the UN, claims for a greater participation of the Atlantic Alliance in Defence than the one reflected in the DDN-2008.

Also, the new directive highlights two essential features of the "Responsible defence". The first one is the agility in the decision-making process, in the new environment of security where rapidity and determination will be one of the key elements in the prevention and

² In Spanish: *Unidad Militar de Emergencias (UME)*

management of the crisis, and the second one is the reinforcement of the projection abroad because *"in the security terrain, restraining its ambition to its own territory is not an option"*. The last paragraphs of the chapter focus on defining the geographical fields of security which are considered a priority by the government, with a special mention to the Mediterranean, with the Sahel and the Middle East as key points, as well as to the political processes in which many Arab countries are involved and the piracy in the occidental and eastern coasts of Africa and Latin America, in order to conclude that *"the conditions of security have significantly been disrupted during the last years. And Spain must, consequently, guarantee the continuity of the values enshrined in the Constitution, its geostrategic security, as well as the security of its citizens, its companies, its primary resources which sustain its life style..."*.

DEFENCE POLICY GOALS AND GUIDELINES

Under the common goal of every DDN, which is to establish the basic lines of the defence policy for the starting term, the DDN-2000 set as priority targets: guaranteeing the Spanish citizens' security and defence in the framework of shared security and collective defence with partners and allies; contributing to the missions of humanitarian help and to the peace and crisis management operations of the organizations to which Spain belongs; and promoting the national defence conscience in society through the culture of defence. Below, the previous three Directives enumerate in detail the lines of action and the guidelines for the defence policy in the term, as it is shown in the following table.

Table 3: Lines of action and guidelines

DDN-2000	DDN-2004	DDN-2008
Dealing with a Defence Strategic Revision (approved in 2003)	Lines	Lines
Complementing the State's action abroad	<p>The Armed Forces as an important element of the State's foreign action.</p> <p>Constant transformation of the Armed Forces.</p> <p>Supportive action with partners and allies.</p> <p>Strong support to multilateralism, concerning the UN Security Council Resolutions.</p> <p>Active participation of the Parliament in the defence policy.</p>	Single action of the State in security and defence.
Encouraging, definitely, the culture of defence in the society		Engagement with the defence of peace and security, respect to legality.
Consolidating the model of professional Armed Forces		Social and parliamentary support, State Policy, identification of the society with the Armed Forces.
Developing the modernisation programs in process		Supportive Assumption of engagements, collective security and shared defence. Constant transformation of the Armed Forces.
Rationalizing structures to respond to the current conflicts	Guidelines	Guidelines
Joint action as a basic principle of action, integration of specific capabilities	<p>International</p> <p>Promoting the EU CSDP: Goal capabilities Helsinki 2010, Combat groups, the European Defence Agency.</p> <p>An enlarged and strengthen NATO, Prague's Engagement Capabilities and Response Strength.</p> <p>Improving EU-NATO relations.</p> <p>Mediterranean Security, the Barcelona Process (EU), Mediterranean Dialogue (NATO).</p> <p>Convention for the collaboration for defence with the US.</p> <p>Relations of security and military cooperation with the Latin American Community of Nations.</p> <p>Intensifying the defence diplomacy</p> <p>National</p> <p>Drafting the Organic Law of National Defence (which was approved on 2005)</p> <p>Restructuration of the EMAD³: creation of the CIFAS⁴, the operations Command, and the Transformation Body.</p> <p>Creation of the Joint Force Rapid Action.</p> <p>Several transformation measures of the Armed Forces</p>	<p>General</p> <p>Collaborating in the creation of the National Security Strategy.</p> <p>Keeping the Parliament informed.</p> <p>Promoting the National Defence Council.</p> <p>Encouraging the culture of security and defence.</p> <p>Defence contribution to national security</p> <p>Modernization of the National System of Crisis Management</p> <p>Armed Forces' support to other State's institutions</p> <p>Full integration of the Military Emergencies Unit (UME) in the Civil Protection system.</p> <p>International</p> <p>The same ones as in 2004: UN, CSDP, NATO, defence diplomacy, Mediterranean, Latin America.</p> <p>Promoting peace, development, prosperity and stability of Africa.</p> <p>Afghanistan's stability and reconstruction.</p> <p>Disarmament, armaments control, non-proliferation.</p> <p>Several Measures of defence and Armed Forces' organisation</p>
Adjusting the budgetary resources to the requirements of the Government's economic policy		

³ EMAD: *Estado Mayor de la Defensa* (Defence Staff)

⁴ The Spanish Armed Forces Intelligence Centre

In general, we can see a line of continuity in the three Directives with variations in the emphasis of their application depending on the degree of consolidation of the established goals; while in 2000 they insisted on the consolidation of the fully professional Armed Forces' new model, in the other two that goal was already achieved and they insisted on the transformation and modernization of defence. Probably, the DDN-2004 was the most innovative Directive, in the interior plan, because it detailed far-reaching measures like to draft a law on National Defence, which has not been updated since the eighties of the last century, and a full restructuration of the Defence Staff, in order to favour the reinforcement of the joint action against the specific action of the Army.

In that sense the DDN-2012, which, as it was mentioned previously, places goals and guidelines in two different points, stresses the internal aspects of cohesion, will and determination to (as it is highlighted in its first paragraph) state that: *"the first contribution of Spain to peace and international security can only be to guarantee its own with strength and decision, and, to do so, it must acquire the capabilities that ensure the deterrence against the traditionally called non-shared threats"*.

In this sense, it is interesting to stress point 4.2 of the DDN-2012, in which the new directive clearly defines how the referred deterrence will not be achieved if the necessary capabilities are not combined with the will to use them if *"that became necessary"*. Consequently, it indicates how the conservation and availability degree of the FAS⁵'s capabilities will be prioritized, in a way that this attempted deterrence is believable.

Likewise, there are three guidelines. In the first one, and despite the previous emphasis on specific national aspects, the Spanish commitment to the essential international security organizations, NATO and EU (again in this order), is recognized.

The second one refers to the need imposed by the economic context to *"rethink"* defence, which includes to redefine the current design of the FAS's structures. In order to perform

⁵ *Las Fuerzas Armadas Españolas* (The Spanish Armed Forces)

this difficult task a Strategic Revision of Defence is announced. This position is extended to the reference to the Spanish Strategy of Security, which has to pass the *documental phase and envisage its practical sustainability*. This last words bring forward its updating and development along the term, and such as it is indicated later in the text, this is one of the guidelines aimed at rationalizing the structures. To do so, the government pretends to place particular emphasis on the aspects related to the coordination between the different departments, and, in particular, on the actors operating in the intelligence field.

And the third one, which ends the document, considers the requirement of boosting the national defence industry, both as the main provider of the FAS and in its international projection, and as one of the possible motors of the economic recovery.

Finally, as it was expected and thinking along the same lines as its predecessors, the new Directive stresses the importance of citizen's participation in security. And to allow this participation it is essential to increase the culture and conscience of defence among the population, pointing out this time that in order to achieve it *"the effort in the development of a defence strategic communication will be emphasized"*.

CONCLUSIONS

The DDN-2012, following the line of the previous directives regarding the structure, the purpose of the document and many concepts included in both, makes an effort to use a more concise and direct language.

As any document, it is a reflection of its time and of the situation in which it is written and approved. Consequently, and as it is appreciated in its formulation, both the uncertainty degree of the security situation in our immediate environment and the expected budgetary restrictions for the current term are the fundamental reasons of the main differences observed between the DDN already in force and its predecessors.

Probably, the most notable point is the one saying that we cannot renounce to the necessary national security levels despite the fact that we are facing a current scenario of serious economic crisis. In order to keep the national security levels, we must place an important emphasis on deterrence, based on national cohesion, collective will and the determination to preserve the values of our society. Consequently, the main ideas are to maintain the capabilities of the FAS and the will to use them if it is necessary. The Spanish contribution to peace and international stability must be based on our own strength, and in which the Alliances will play an essential role, but always keeping in mind that the responsibility and loyalty in both directions are essential aspects.

Therefore, we are facing a realistic attitude, which has more strength to act, in a security situation of greater uncertainty in our immediate environment, in what can be considered like a perception of withdrawal from the occidental countries in their will to acquire new engagements of international security. Most likely due to, in particular, the negative effects of the economic crisis.

Now, it is necessary, as it is said in the Concluding Provision of the Directive and despite the difficult economic situation in Spain, to make all the necessary efforts in order to end as soon as possible the documental phase of the document and to develop the guidelines indicated for the achievement of the established goals.

*IEEE*⁶

⁶ Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos (Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies)