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WOLVES**

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GLOBAL TERRORISM AND LONE WOLVES

Abstract:

Global terrorism has failed because a global space has not been established and, consequently, a global agenda does not exist. Global terrorism has not been transformed in local terrorism mainly due to the lack of cultural gearing and because it represents an Islam different from the one of the populations in which it is installed. The result has been that has squandered the initial social support, losing the initiative and being geographically encapsulated. The phenomenon of “lone wolf” is an example of this failure because it prioritizes the logistical and operational issues over the political ones. The terrorism commitment of fighting against the West is questioned both by lack of resources and results.

Keywords:

Global terrorism, lone wolves, Al Qaeda, globalization.

1. GLOBALIZATION AND ENCOUNTER

Globalization is the great phenomenon of the century. A phenomenon that, if on the one hand has maximized the benefits, on the other has led to the disappearance of the watertight compartments of companies increasing their vulnerability and interdependence. The world has closed itself, and local issues, agendas, have globalized themselves when the pre-modern world and postmodern one meet.

Worlds living in different times come into direct contact without agents. The other inspires distrust, which always covers-up fear. A real fear to the extent where globalization can lead to the destruction of the weaker cultural forms.

The direct relationship is beneficial but it is also a source of conflict. And the reason is that globalization promotes a horizontal distribution of power, its automatization; geographic distances are reduced and many processes are simplified, but simultaneously, political governance also becomes more difficult; it involves interconnections and interdependencies, but not agreements, in fact, not even the confluence of views with which, in practice, the reaction, localism, the definition against another being are promoted.

As a result, the world of globalization is a highly fragmented world forced to live in diversity, a diversity yet unresolved. Globalization does not mean a single thought, the end of the process, streamlining, but actually confrontation of views.

Globalization has put the West in contact with other worlds. But it has also placed these worlds in touch with themselves and made them partakers of their diversity. Such is the case, for example, of Islam, that is far from a homogeneous world. There is no one and only Islam but several, each associated with the culture in which it is implanted. That is the reason for its extraordinary expansion, its capacity of adaptability which is a result of the primacy of preaching on dogma, as well as the lack of unity of doctrine and hierarchy that impose rigidities.

As a result of globalization, Islam is streamlining himself while it seems to be forced to converge on one version presented as orthodoxy, the Wahhabi or Salafi formulation.

2. THE END OF GLOBAL TERRORISM

Terrorism, until practically the XXI century, was a specific phenomenon of a particular frame, of a unique culture. Global terrorism is the one with an agenda for the world, and it is also developed around the globe.

Globalization has made intercultural terrorism an increasingly common phenomenon, and understanding that intercultural terrorism is even more difficult to the extent that its effects must take into account their societies and their target audience. Because of that, it discards the companies it acts enabling indiscriminate attacks.

Thus, the 11-S attacks appear to have been designed by a publicist providing Al Qaeda visibility a visibility that is not consistent with its actual "military" capabilities. It became the bait flag of the reply, of dissatisfaction with the system.

However, although from the beginning it has the sympathy of broad sectors of the Muslim world that saw in them their avengers, they failed to pass this point. They failed to generate the effect of mobilization they sought to spread worldwide.

The organization was a kind of global franchise that took its legitimacy from local forces, while maintaining a core of professionals, that were defined as part of the organization and, in turn, saw its legitimacy reinforced by the halo of the images of the Twin Towers. Their behaviour is based on attacks that blaze the trail for various independent organizations, even for individuals who can carry them out.

But the Islam it was representing was unshakable and did not match with the specific culture of many Muslim countries. It could represent their desires, their hatreds or be their executioners, but

it could not represent them. Their Islam was a particular extreme, intolerant Islam. It could be argued that even globalization has made Islam find itself and has sparked an intense process of rationalization where Salafism is a response.

In fact its violence, in part, was aimed at transforming society. And not a few of their victims, perhaps the majority of them, have been Muslims. This position eventually harm them, to the point of being fought by those who, as in Iraq, had previously benefited them.

The point is that if other parties may make concessions, ideologies don't and a rigid and stickler worldview as pointed out by Al Qaeda much less. Without commitment, nor harmonization, there is no place for a encounter, a structuring process, nor a incorporation into the critical mass. The lack of radicals political care prevented the aggregation to the body of dissatisfaction of a group not that small.

If we add it, as we have seen, an incomplete globalization process, which so far prevents the existence itself of a global political agenda, we understand that global terrorism never ceased to be local, because its agenda was local and always existed in a country, or at least in a subculture and always for the same aim, to take power at the level of interest.

Moreover, terrorism is not power but fiction, power is potency, it is not act, it has to be exercised and to act as such requires a specific framework. And the overall framework is not defined because globalization as a process is not over, there is a local, provincial framework ... but a global framework does not exist as a structured space for the power projection. Although objective conditions in this area did not happen, and are not happening.

As a consequence, they did not have capacities no ways of undertaking their policies, the framework they had chosen was not only excessive but incomplete, and, moreover, their Islam did not represent every Muslim's Islam.

It is thought that terrorist attacks are raised over the world as if they were held worldwide, but the truth is that they are encapsulated in different regions without much connection to each other (south of the Maghreb, Afghanistan ...) and they also attend to other reasons (ethnic ones, tribal ones, economic ones ...); they cannot all be read as religious. There has been no union between different terrorist groups, there has been a continued and effective coordination, and concerted action beyond rituals as beia (a traditional act of homage and subordination). Global terrorism has not become locally as a way to circumvent the lack of structuring of the global space.

The effort expended in global terms was diluted in a world that was too big for their real "military" capacities that did not conform to a group of vague and too broad political objectives.

As a result, they lost the initiative, their performances started to deteriorate and its media intensity as well, the "military" stagnated, and, finally, the organization remained inoperative and the only things that survive are the name and the past. But that does not mean the organization is not active and cannot continue to beat even with nuclear fury, which does not deny any of the above.

3. NARRATIVE AS THE MAIN SPINE OF GLOBAL TERRORISM

The jihadist movements arising at its wake are a call to the community to their intervention and mobilization in the lines proposed by Mao in his great works of military thinking. The final endpoint is not the effectiveness of the actions, but the spirit and dynamics that generate in their group.

Violence is a form of communication. As Ben Laden said: *"It is obvious that the media war in this century is one of the most powerful methods of combat, in fact, its ratio may reach 90% of the total preparation for battle."*

The fact is that terrorism is not just violence, in fact, the most important part of it is not violence, that is their most visible manifestation, but his speech. The key terrorist action, their spine, is in their narrative, in which we find action, message and cause; a characteristic that is part of the message and is used to group around it the group object and real object of the fight.

Narratives are not rational but emotional; they are constructed and based on perceptions, shared places and plot leaps pretending to express an intuited reality on the promise of a better world, in this case, the strength of a religion is added.

A narrative is always a selection of events that leads to a preset imaginary, a balance between reality and fiction a basting set of ideas that are not false but incomplete. They are not neutral or objective. Their function is to make reality intelligible through a deliberate simplification despite that is strongly biased and has an extravagant reference point it is a world view.

Narrative are also characterized by the management of silences, the deliberate ignorance of that which contradicts or does not support them. Hence its illustrious consistency, which from most of human acts remain absent.

Actually, an unattractive prose or set of data less than suggestive are not the definitive valuation endpoint but the exciting and exhilarating proposal no matter how unrealistic that may be. It is an act of creation, of will, that incorporates rational and irrational elements. They are a mechanism for identity construction, an instrument of socialization that occurs when industrial societies have removed local communities integrating all its members in urban communities. The narratives provide anonymous multitudes a new form of integration.

And the thing is that narratives do not describe reality, they create it, generating ethical space for violence: Terrorists require ethics to live with the violence they carry. If the narrative did not exist, they would have incorporated (instead of being violence managers) violence into their lives while degrading themselves in front of the group and also in front of themselves, to the status of criminals, or even worse, to psychopaths.

4. LONE WOLVES

People do not become radicalized alone. Rarely, the so-called "lone wolf" comes from isolated places, after being independent of a social group, a support group, and when that happens it is

usually a psychopath. Narratives are central to the dynamics of radicalization since they are the backbone that organizes disagreements and structures the radicalized group.

Such groups do not necessarily practice or support violence, but they incorporate a contradiction to the extent where they approve and sympathize with it. Of those groups, some ideological subgroups endowed with their own dynamics, they enter a extreme quasi schizoid spiral when demanding purity, they are the radicals. But that does not make all radicals terrorists: they support violence and illegal acts can perform some, but they do not necessarily practice it. It is the next quantum leap, a transcendent high jump, a not forced jump, the result of continuous development, which makes them terrorists, usually helped by people who have already spilled blood.

The problem of combating radical groups is that they are formed around moral imperatives, morality in the West being a space in which the state has no jurisdiction until the principles that they promote are materialized in an illegal activity, and when that happens, repression has its limits, it should not and cannot be preventive. Moreover, these groups can develop an independent living apart from the State to which they belong because they follow their laws, the issue is that their moral demand separates them from the host society.

It can be deduced that the way to act against such terrorists is acting against the whole group and not just teaching police and repressive measures (which is also effective) but aimed at ending the discourse that legitimates them. It is easier and more effective statistically to reduce the size of the potential groups that persecuting individuals already radicalized.

The local-global link makes the Umma, the great imaginary space with a universal definition, being built from the mosque, from rejection to any Western construct; but it is also possible within the virtual space of the network. Internet has allowed the creation of an Islamic space that fits the deterritorialized nature of their political commitment and allows the fusion of souls, disaggregation, exchange, sharing and indoctrination.

A good example of these dynamics are electronic jihadist publications like the magazine "Inspire", with an attractive design and a good distribution in the radical group that combines the narrative design with tactical and political aspects. It diffuses, then, political orientation, makes an approximation to reality and justifies the actions, while disclose terrorism techniques, popularizing those practices, which is a form of "arming the people" and promoting anarchy.

The aim is to take the fight to Western societies helped by those who usually reside in them, thus overcoming the logistical and preparation difficulties of terrorists, while any security measure overflows at the same time the community is fractured and requires members to decide. It is not based on large and complex attacks (of which there are multiple failures registered, paid off even with the death of those preparing it because of the previous lack of training) aimed at the screen but simpler and homemade actions as abuse, stabbings... emotional impact acts performed by people inspired, broken off from the group, and therefore, very difficult for the police to control. It thus gives vent to individual initiative and it also provides with examples of people who, from their daily work, can act in the service of religion. Once again, it is an inspiration to the group.

On many occasions the acts are executed by people with identity definition problems (second generation migrants-such as the ones in the London bombings of 2005 , converts, people integrated into a counter-culture...) who do not end up matching the host societies and do not identify themselves or feel part of them.

For them violence, as Fanon pointed out, is presented as a sort of liberating activity, a definitive commitment to one of the cultures that come together in their lives. Abdenabid Kunja one of the suicide terrorist of Leganes, in a farewell letter to his children held "I do not stand living in this world as a weak and humiliated person in the eyes of the infidels."

What seem to be the last acts of jihadist violence in Boston (committed by the Tsarnaev brothers with pressure cookers), London (car hit and slaughter) and Paris (stabbing) follow a pattern of terrorism that has chosen to confront the West to reduce the role of its central-core, decimated by international harassment, and illuminate the direction the members of the community have to

follow, so that they are conveniently oriented to commit the attacks with all the means at its disposal.

This is an anarcho-personalist terrorism with which Al Qaeda is trying to overcome the progressive decrease in the number of jihadist attacks in the West and the even greater decrease in their effectiveness, which has come to take this organization out of the media.

Theologically they justify their actions by appealing to a defensive jihad, which means an individual obligation for all Muslims. The appeal of the radicals to the faith of the faithful and their commitment is the most compulsive arguments, especially if you need to have an external reflection of a society called to the activism for the action, the word or thought.

This atomization of terrorism shows the vulnerability of societies that suffer, creates uncertainty, fractures the community, makes religious keys the necessary referent, separating believers and sowing mistrust towards Muslims, in the hope that an overreaction of the State or of the society itself, definitely align Muslims living it with their story.

Precedents of those patterns of action on "targets of opportunity" had been detected years ago in North Africa on tourists; the methodology also included abuse, stabbings and an attempt to blow up a bus with a gas cylinder. In the West, we have the antecedents of the stabbings of Theo Van Gogh in 2004, the British MP Stephen Timms in 2010 or the murders committed by Arid Uka Mohammed Merah with a firearm in 2010 and in 2011 (the latter especially gruesome and disgusting, because among the seven people killed there were three Jewish children). The case of lone wolves does not include only members of Al Qaeda, and it is important to remember that, but other examples such as the Norwegian Breivik.

5. CONCLUSION

The evolution of Al Qaeda to high levels of decentralization is an important expression of the operational capacity suffered by the organization at least in the West. There is an obvious

disconnect between the agenda of Al Qaeda and its real "military" capacities, between the objectives and the ways available to achieve them. Moreover, it could be said that Al Qaeda has not defined or sincerely expressed the political goal of their struggle.

Besides, global terrorism has not been translated locally, the process has failed. Populations do not feel like themselves the Islamic principles supporting Al Qaeda not even at a regional scale. The failure of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb when being able to sustain a whole Maghreb identity can be a good proof of that.

In line with this, it would even be good to question the relevance, on the agenda of Al Qaeda, of their strategies against the West, instead of looking for a way to search visibility and legitimacy to act in other operating theaters where the real interests are important.

Its commitment to limited and disjointed individual performances, when it barely takes up space in the media (in relation to the one it took before), can disable the Muslim community in the West, and even further, in the logic of Mao, it can vaccinate it against future actions, since 2001 or much less now, the objective conditions exist for such a movement succeed in the Islamic world, globally or even locally.

A stark analysis of reality, would demonstrate that terrorism is an instrument of collective action, an (illegitimate) policy tool, in which the personal touch has its place but cannot become the hub of all action, if the real aim is to get somewhere and not becoming a zero-sum game; the operative part in terrorism cannot become the place of the political leadership, nor that being inhibited to allow the survival of an organization.

At the operational level, Von Moltke already pointed straight to the Franco-Prussian war, the results of "arming the people" guaranteed a certain failure, to which a needless bloodshed was added. The vanguard of the community, that pretends to represent all terrorist organizations, has given in the case of Al Qaeda, a step back for the community to continue alone; this does not seem to have much future, although just one determined man can cause much damage.

The truth is that preventing the actions of the radicals is difficult, and it inevitably involves a pedagogy that neutralizes the narrative and stops the traffic of the largest possible number of radicalized group members that will become activists. But definitively ending with an organization like Al Qaeda that works on a franchisee system is complex, there will always be someone using its name to claim, the question is whether that claim will mean something.

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