ARMED FORCES AS A WAR FACTOR

Abstract:

Armed Forces are the result of a need. Therefore, its oversized or reduced size can cause conflict. The balance of security among members of a community as well as their mutual understanding must be searched to avoid any confrontation. Western societies must face the democratic accountability of having armies acting on their behalf.

Keywords:

Constitution, Security, military, war, civic military relations.

INTRODUCTION

It is a fact that the Armed Forces can be a **belligerent factor**. However, as we will see, this statement is quite different from affirming that wars exist because Armies exist. In fact, wars existed prior to Armies as such. Their birth took place as a result of a need and once wars had appeared, Armies were then born when production surpluses allowed for their maintenance.

Armies exist because wars exist and wars exist because there are interests that bear their cost; war is just a rational means that serves a political purpose. And the same is true for armies of instrumental nature, which serve the societies to which they belong. Thus, trying to separate them from these societies is a fallacy which aims to release them from their responsibility.

This is a relatively common phenomenon in representative democracies because of the shortfall associated with the mediation nature characteristic of the representation of the people: people who many times do not see themselves as being primarily responsible for the decisions made on their behalf when their democratic participation to vote is reduced de facto.

Indeed, some authors point out that the existence of professional armies reduces the sense of popular responsibility to a greater extent, as people distance themselves from their armies and even criticize them, without feeling neither concerned nor represented. Bada, for instance, argues that:

"it is easier to have the courage of a soldier, who is willing to die in defense of a just cause, even though he has to kill, than the courage of a saint ready to die for everyone without killing nobody... it is easier to have an army of good soldiers than a people of good citizens... Some are even convinced that soon there will be an army of robots programmed to defend us without love of the homeland and to kill enemies without hatred. This, in fact, will not make patriots and citizens more peaceful, but less responsible and much less supportive instead. In fact, this process of evolution has already begun with professional armies, mercenary soldiers, and ranged attacks with increasingly sophisticated weapons. It is a process in which citizens, civil society, move away from the defensive wall, withdrawing from the defense, and war becomes to them a screen show once again. Were it not for terrorism that looks for our bodies and brings the conflict to the streets, in Western democracies there are those who think that we could live in peace."[1]

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[1] Bada Panillo, José. "Más *allá de una cultura del miedo y del odio, de la guerra preventiva y del terrorismo.*" Mira Editores. Zaragoza 2000, p. 361.

Nietzsche said that every State defends that its army serves defensive purposes and thus *"this morality, which justifies self-defense, is called in as the government's advocate. This means, however, reserving morality for ourselves and immorality for our neighbor(…)They presuppose evil intentions on their neighbor's part and good intentions on their own (…)The doctrine of the army as a means of self-defense must be abjured as completely as the lust of conquest".* He even considers the concept of *"a gradual diminution of the military burdens"* as a mistake because *"the tree of military glory can only be destroyed at one swoop, with one stroke of lightning."*[2]

ARMED FORCES AND INTERSTATE CONFLICT

One could argue that if all countries in the world agreed to do so– on the basis of Nietzsche's words –armies could be removed. However, such statement overlooks the basis on which progress in the West is built: Cartesian doubt or, in other words, distrust. As noted by Felipe Giménez Pérez:

"peace is based on power. The principle of peace is not different from the principle of war… just like André Gide said that with good feelings one can only write bad literature; one could say that with good feelings one cannot fully understand international politics envisaged as power politics."[3]

Without a doubt, armies are a crucial element of deterrence. They are designed according to a scenario or, more accurately, to deal with a set of scenarios. Their sizing must obey and be in line with national interests. For instance, the definition of means made by the Marquis of Ensenada during the reign of Charles III of Spain was one of an army that combined with the English Army could confront the French one, and that of an army that combined with the French Army could confront the English one. [4]

Taking as paradigm a "minor" issue like inflation and in a more cohesive sphere as it is the internal one, every social partner agrees that once certain limits are exceeded, inflation is unfavorable, but they are not able to strike the evil. In fact, their attitudes put a strain on the system in a way that if it turns out to be excessive it could end up generating a spiral. At the international level, where a universal power does not exist, not even an equivalent one to the power of the State machinery, the control of the inflationary processes is even more difficult.

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[2] Nietzsche, Friedrich. Human all too Human. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996, pp. 337-338

[3] Giménez Pérez, Felipe. *"El materialismo y la paz"* en El Catoblepas, revista crítica del presente, núm. 28 junio 2004, p 16.

[4] Blanco Núñez, José María. Historia de la Armada española. Conferencia para el XII Curso de Estado Mayor, noviembre 2012.

There is no Court with universal and compulsory jurisdiction in the field of International Relations that could necessarily rule on litigious issues submitted to it. This does not allow their resolution to be made in accordance with the law. These conditions are not met in the Security Council, which is a political but not a judicial body, neither it is the International Court of Justice in The Hague, which only binds those States that accept its authority and binds them to the issues they agree to.

Since no such institution exists, the resolution of interstate complaints or those affecting one single State does not imply the best law (and everything is sustainable in line with the law, aside from the validity and vigor of the arguments used. The point is that there is no judge with the ability to judge and the arguments cannot be neither confronted nor validated. Hitler found *"reasons"* to kill six million Jews and *"legal"* means to do so) but the greatest power.

In the words of Hegel *"there is no Praetor to judge between states; at best there may be an arbitrator or a mediator, and even he exercises his functions contingently only, i.e. in dependence on the particular wills of the disputants."*[5] However, from a technical juriridical perspective, there are currently both jurisdictional procedures for the resolution of interstate conflicts - arbitrator or international court, previously accepted by the parties, that delivers mandatory sentences based on International Law– and non-jurisdictional procedures - good offices, mediation, inquiry, conciliation that are not necessarily based on International Law and that can rely on the criteria of political timeliness, while the State reserves itself the final decision on the matter. [6]

Nevertheless, war always remains as a last resort to be always used for legitimate self-defense. Moreover, as Clausewitz already noted:
"the concept of war does not originate with the attack, because the ultimate object of attack is not fighting: rather, it is possession. The idea of war originates with the defense, which does have fighting as its immediate object, since fighting and parrying obviously amount to the same thing."[7]

To return to the inflationary issue, and based on the action-reaction logic, the British jurisprudence, with the power of a law (1889) known as *"Two Power Standard"* could serve as an example. This jurisprudence led the Royal Navy to seek to surpass the power of the next two important navies together, alleging the security of the islands as an argument. This policy and the consequent German reaction ended up generating inflationary pressures in

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[5] Hegel, G.W.F. Principios de filosofía del derecho. Editorial Edhasa. Barcelona, p. 416.
[6] Pastor Ridruejo, José A. Curso de Derecho Internacional Público y Organizaciones Internacionales. Editorial Técnos, Madrid 1994, pp. 608 y ss.
[7] Clausewitz, Carl Von, De la guerra T II. Ministerio de Defensa 1999, p. 553.

the military field, which lies at the very origin of the First World War, turning unnecessarily a rival or a competitor into an enemy.

The German military class of the II Reich was not warmonger, unlike part of the intellectual class and the industrialists.[8] Brodie[9] wonders *"why a whole generation of Germans, before 1914, believed that the construction of a large fleet would tend to make of Britain a passive partner and not an enemy?".*

There is much discussion about the causes of the First World War. Perhaps the United Kingdom was not prepared enough for the rise of other powers and the consequent alteration of the *status quo*; or the secret diplomacy; or it was maybe the emergence of the mass media that made of the public opinion a key player in International Relations. The truth is that war was perceived as inevitable, causing its outbreak when the reality is that, practically, most of the contestants did not have political reasons to justify the war.

Hobbes said:
"and from this diffidence of one another, there is no way for any man to secure himself so reasonable as anticipation; that is, by force, or wiles, to master the persons of all men he can so long till he see no other power great enough to endanger him:."[10]

The Hobbesian fear generates pre-war situations. Examples of arms races are not so distant in time (Russians and North Americans could not confront one another with weapons without mutual destruction, so they fought in the space or through maneuvers) to be forgotten, although the return to a certain multipolarity in International Relations has allowed a slight relaxation at a global level, although not at the regional one, where it remains in effect.

For authors like Michael Howard, the arms race can be reduced to a process of modernization of the *status quo* in which no power wants to remain on the sidelines. Armed Forces, albeit in a passive way, constitute a belligerent factor, as they can be perceived (subjective act) as a latent threat and they may cause an early response because of the advantages associated with taking the initiative. This scheme reproduces the famous "prisoner's dilemma"[11]; the attack launched by Israel in 1967 is an apt example.

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[8] Fraga Iribarne, Manuel. Guerra y conflicto social. Gráficas Uguina, Madrid, 1962, p. 70.
[9] Brodie, Bernard. Guerra y política. Fondo de Cultura Económica, México 1978, p. 28.
[10] Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan McMaster University, London 1951, p. 77.
[11] A classic example. Two accomplices in crime are arrested by the police; if one testifies for the prosecution against the other and the other remains silent, the silent accomplice will be sentenced to thirty years and the betrayer goes free, if both stay silent, both of them go free; if both betray each other, they will both go to jail for five years. The obvious trend is that the two accomplices spend five years in prison.

War begins with a delegation of assignments to the on-scene commanders, even though the Revolution in Military Affairs has meant a flattening of the command structures and, consequently, a greater centralization. The advantage associated with being the first in attacking, [12] the foundation of the doctrine of preventive war, makes even a passive attitude to be interpreted in a hostile manner and could provoke an escalation. The possibility of a war by accident exists and it is the result of both proliferation and the difficulties in controlling the information with the doctrinal concepts.[13]

In the active sphere, Armed Forces are also a belligerent factor, and in many cases, *"he who has a hammer sees everything as a nail".* Their importance can grant the state a position of such power that leads the state to perceive war as profitable, both in terms of efficiency, because of the costs implied in its maintenance, and effectiveness, because of the low risks it assumes, the few losses it entails and the benefits that, conversely, the state can obtain.

Such is the calculation made by Napoleon in 1808, whose armies surpassed one million men, at the time of the Spanish invasion, estimating that it would cost him no more than ten thousand men. If Spain had had a regular army able to put up resistance, the invasion would not have taken place. Moreover, nearly half of the Spanish Army of that time (altogether 65,000 men) was expatriated and following orders by Napoleon, 14,000 troops in Denmark and 6,000 in Portugal, when the entry into the country was authorized.[14] However, the nationalist reaction – an element that Napoleon did not consider in his linear analysis, as it was atypical, he did not see in others what was his own - ended up costing him 150,000 along with a significant amount of troops stuck in the peninsula and the psychological effects arising from the first defeat of his armies.

In the light of the above, it follows that both having excessive forces and having inappropriate ones can be a belligerent factor. Something similar happens with vitamins: their lack can cause problems and their excess, although it may not be harmful, it can be onerous. Everything depends on the situation.

To the contrary, Armed Forces may also contribute to the mutual understanding and to maintaining stable international relations. And in the field of heteropotential relations between countries from the first and third world, the field of security, being realistic, is an area of meeting rather than of confrontation, since an interstate conventional conflict is not viable. Moreover, it is an area of sharing and of national policies. This conclusion cannot be extrapolated to other spheres, such as the socioeconomic once, since, from the perspective

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[12] Prays the Roman adage *"who hits first, hits twice"*

[13] Pastor Verdú, Jaime. La evolución del marxismo ante la guerra y la paz. Editorial de la Universidad Complutense de Madrid 1989, p. 60.

[14] Cardona, Gabriel. El problema Militar en España. Historia 16, Madrid 2005., p. 18.

of the prevailing market, the state´s performance capacity is limited, as the interests of individual partners guided by their own benefit come first.[15]

One advantage of this meeting sphere is that the interlocutors are directly integrated into the ruling elites and often times they are the closest actors to the West from their respective nations. Today, the military is a Western-style subculture, as Ibn Khaldun had already predicted. And in the same way that Egyptian, Chinese, Ethiopian or Russian diplomats can understand each other, so can the military personnel within the framework of that common space. The difference is that the military is a large group that contributes significantly to the national cohesion, especially in third world countries, where they channel the interests of their societies and also contribute to the organization of the people's needs.

For all these reasons, the dialogue in the areas of Defense and Security goes beyond the scope to which it is confined and it allows not only to export the democratic system but also to strengthen and to consolidate interstate relations. This could even serve as a basis for its construction and as an important element for projects such as the Alliance of Civilizations.

This fact, and thanks to being the segment of their societies closest to the West [16], allows the military to be used in order to mediate democratic proposals and insert them at the very core of these societies and it could also serve to know its firmness. The dialogue among military personnel is of great interest because of its fluency and asymmetry (in the third world, they tend to occupy more important positions than their Western counterparts), if the different power position of them both is taken into account.

In this context, multilateral military agreements allow the setting of a stable framework with which they, at least partially, neutralize the imbalances triggered by the difference in potential between the parties and the disadvantages of the non-biunivocal nature of the relationships. On this basis, it may be complemented with bilateral agreements that meet the objective interests of the states and serve to the strengthening of the system as a whole.[17]

Furthermore, multiple negotiating tables arise, which prosaicism and the military routine tend to make them permanent, and these make the exchange and their transfer to other

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[15] Aznar Fernández-Montesinos, Federico. *"Las Fuerzas Armadas en la construcción de las Relaciones Internacionales"* en Revista Ecofin abril 2008, p. 35.
[16] *"Armies are among the most modern elements of the underdeveloped countries and they are imbued with the spirit of the rapid technological change" (Pie*, W. Lucian. European Journal of Sociology, II, 1961 p. 83.)
[17] Aznar Fernández-Montesinos, Federico. *"Las Fuerzas Armadas en la construcción de las Relaciones Internacionales"* en Revista Ecofin abril 2008, p. 35.

areas even more likely, as well as the agreement to solve members' further problems. At the same time, it develops informal networks that in the future may help to resolve conflicts.

Among cooperation instruments, in the long run, the role played by the Military Education stands out because of its ability to develop permanent links between states and the benefits derived from knowledge and personal interaction. The Spanish-Thai relations have been a benchmark, as they serve, *ceteris paribus,* as an example of their potential. It shows that its export to other areas, with due caution, can always be beneficial.[18]

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[18] *"The Spanish-Thai relations are not only in good shape, but they also stand out among any other relations that Spain maintains with other Southeast Asian countries and they have served as a gateway to the area. The proof of such a good health have been the several reciprocal visits by members of the respective royal families (...) And although in 2005, there were only 290 Spanish residents and 64 non-residents in the Asian country and despite the distance, there is a strong trade relationship and significant tourist flows, and there are even direct flights. Perhaps the leadership of some naval officers of the 50s and their forward-looking attitude have something to do with the current scenario (...) the development of interstate relations is a long task and external from short-term profit interests. In 1951 at the beginning of the Spanish returns process back to the international community, the Envoy Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Thailand presented his credentials before the Head of State. In 1954, a diplomatic mission was established in Madrid coinciding with the admission into the Naval Academy of the first Thai candidate, as a result of the bilateral agreements between the two navies. In 1961 the mission became an embassy (...) The Thai students studied for one year at the Naval Academy of their country and they were then selected from the best. Then, they studied the Spanish language for another year in Spain (...) Since 1954, almost every graduating class of Navy officers have among its members at least one classmate from the Thai Navy. This created a link between the two navies that may surprise those who do not know its origins and development. Spanish officials see their Thai colleagues, some of which have been the number one of their classes, as comrades, without distinction (...) Until 2007, 50 Thai Navy Officers and 4 Equatorial Guinea Navy Officers have obtained their offices, without the prosperity of any other initiatives of equal significance for various reasons. Many of these officers have reached the rank of admiral and even some of them have become a leader of their navy as a Chief of Staff (...) And, although the Cooperation Plan in the field of Education, which is currently in force, has opened many centers dedicated to the teaching of members of the Armed Forces from other countries, the pioneering and successful character of this initiative of the Spanish navy cannot be denied. The Thai Navy has adhered to this plan and Thai officials are attending various courses, including the Staff Course. Consequently, they are continually refreshing their relationship with Spain (...) The stability of this cooperation program is patent; it has not only been adapted to the major political changes in Spain but it has also survived the shocks of the Thai politics. Moreover, it has expanded horizontally and transversely, strengthening the overall framework of relations (...) Furthermore, the analysis of this process of transnational dialogue shows the important role that the Armed Forces can play for the mutual understanding and channeling of States' interests. Thus, if we take a look at the exchange of high level visits, its asymmetric character becomes patent. From the Thai side visits of military personnel predominate, while from the Spanish side are the trade missions (...) The results of this collaboration can be measured; Spain has built the aircraft carrier "Chakry" for Thailand, something that is really unusual because of its importance (Thailand has also purchased smaller sized boats in other cooperating countries). Likewise it has purchased second-hand Harrier devices from Spain and it has considered the possible construction of other medium-sized vessels (...) The training of the Thai personnel who was to operate with them was developed by the Navy and its doctrine has Spanish roots. A Spanish commission was completing in Thailand the whole process of training and there is a logistics line permanently open. Indeed, Spain's presence in Southeast Asia has been strengthened with the sale of submarines to Malaysia or ships to Australia." Aznar*

ARMED FORCES AS AN INTRASTATE WAR FACTOR

Historically, there have been private forces competing for control over the same territory. Thus, nobles in Europe have had, for a long time, the legal right to make private wars. Nevertheless, and definitely from the seventeenth century, rulers have imposed their power over both private citizens and against the powerful to such an extent that they have made the use of private weapons unpopular, criminal and impractical, have banned private armies and they have normalized the fact that those agents dependents from the states face an unarmed population.[19]

The process leading to this situation has been gradual and progressive. Gradually the formulas that marked the tendency of weapons seizures after rebellions, the banning of duels and vendettas, the production controls, licenses, restrictions on its public display were imposed. Kings like the Tudors and Louis XIII destroyed more fortresses within their internal domains than those they built in the borders while they were reorganizing their Armed Forces.

Simultaneously, the expansion of the armies, began to overshadow the available weaponry for the internal forces, establishing a clear distinction that did not previously exist, between *"inside"* and *"outside"*, strengthening the link between war and State action, while making valid Max Weber's definition *" state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory."*[20]

Other institutions, such as the Church, have also played significant roles in this process, which sometimes has not been accompanied by a steady development in the civil society. In this regard, Azaña wrote in 1931:

"the army had taken in Spain the preponderance that all of you know and it was not its fault, nor the military service one, neither the fault of the military personnel itself, because we are all born from the same quarry, but because of the lack of density of the Spanish political society, in which, uprooted the institutions from the old regime, the reduction of the authorities and the values that maintained the discipline, it turned out that the military authority was the only existing force, the only lasting operating and enforcement spring that was available to the weak parliamentary governments of the last century in order to be obeyed and even to seize power."[21]

Fernández-Montesinos, Federico. "Las Fuerzas Armadas en la construcción de las Relaciones Internacionales" en Revista Ecofin abril 2008, p. 35.

[19] Tilly, Charles. Coerción, capital y los Estados europeos 990-1990. Alianza Editorial, Madrid 1992, pp. 112 y 113.
[20] Ibídem, pp. 112 y 113.
[21] Doctrina política de Manuel Azaña. Editorial Fenicia, Madrid 1978, p. 37.

Bobbio[22] said that not only the truth, but also the institutions are spirits of their time and he summarized this idea with the phrase *"civitas temporis filia"*. This reasoning also applies to the Armed Forces, because *"we are all born from the same quarry"*, from the same society; a society in which a settled culture regulates the relationships framework. Therefore, for its proper assessment, its role must be judged in the historical context and from the perspective of time; it is not the same today, than it was fifty or three hundred years ago.

Indeed, history is useful to explain the past, but one cannot look at the present focusing on the past, or in order words, looking at the present with the eyes of fifty, hundred or two hundred years ago. This is so showy, plastic and false as to judge the past from the present (the Spanish Inquisition is usually a classic), something that is done, by the way, in no few occasions in low quality films, creating dead easy speeches targeted to an audience that does not reflect on them and simply understand what is presented to be understood and congratulates itself (and the author) for it.

A sensu contrario to these judgments, likewise those made from the military institution, references from one's own society or from our cultural environment should be used, and complemented with a past look if wanted, but one should not make of that look the axis around which every judgment is articulated. To progress is to flee from the cliché.

Tilly uses four scenes to describe the evolution of the Armed Forces-State relations. In the first scene, the king carries a sword and runs his own army. In the second one, the king wears glorious attire and negotiates with the mercenaries. In the third one, he wears royal clothes and talks with his ministers. In the last one, the king in street clothing negotiates with large civil powers. Tilly gives these scenes the titles of patrimonialism, mediation, nationalization and specialization respectively.[23]

In the West, armies have gone from being the backbone of the state to becoming its armed wing. The transition between the two tasks has been neither easy nor quick, and it has required structured societies, not subject to great tensions, a process of acculturation of members of the Armed Forces, as well as the political commitment express or implied, if its support is not gathered in the process of interest articulation.

And, once established and developed its last stage, the articulation of the Armed Forces in the institutional machinery of the state rests on the exercise of a neutral power materialized in the modernization of its functions, and also in the resignation of the parties to use or display the coercion they embody in the political game.

[22] Bobbio, Norberto. El problema de la guerra y las vías de la paz. Ediciones GEDISA, Barcelona 1992, p. 26.

[23] Tilly, Charles. Coerción, capital y los Estados europeos 990-1990. Opus Cit., p. 300.

The problem that appears in this fitting within the State institutional framework has been luckily overcome in the West by using accepted formulas that have shaped the space, the form and the framework in which they develop and the political control over the military in a way that it invalidates the Janowitz's dictum: *"believing that the army isn't an effective group of pressure on the Executive is making a political mistake,"*[24] even though some tensions may arise occasionally, something which is normal in a checks and balances system as it is a consolidated and accepted democracy by an international system that would not allow anything else. Democracy is not only a set of rules but an entire culture; as a matter of fact it is very powerful. As the Duke of Wellington said, *"you can do anything with bayonets except sit on them."*[25] The political control of Armed Forces is happily achieved. In order to close the circle it is necessary that a part of the society feels the inherent responsibility of this control as its own.

The countries in the third world are different cases, where they are still playing a leading role, not infrequently tied to a particular sector of the society (defined by ethnicity, religion or culture) rather than to the state as a whole.[26] For this reason, it is an element of domination and repression, when not participant in wars.

It is worth mentioning the dismantling of the Armed Forces[27] of the third world countries (like Ethiopia) or the case of those countries controlled by the former Soviet Union like Albania. This leads to the loss of control over a good amount of weaponry that boosts collective effervescence. Consequently, one of the key activities in the post-conflict phase is the Security Sector Reform.

What happened in the Eastern countries is particularly noteworthy and it may be argued that NATO's contribution to the reform of their Armed Forces has been key for its peaceful transition towards democracy.[28] The elites of these countries were divided into three social groups: political leaders, senior administration officials and large national or nationalized companies, and senior staff of the Armed Forces. For this reason, in order to talk about the current political formula in these countries until 1989, we should fundamentally refer to the classical model established in the socialist countries of Eastern Europe: a triangle[29] in which base were the Party and the Armed Forces and in which peak was the Government.

[24] Janowitz, Morris. El soldado profesional. Spanish Ministry of Defense, Madrid 1990, p 89.

[25] Hobsbawm, Eric. On Empire: America, War, and Global Supremacy, The New Press, p. 35.

[26] VV.AA. "La era de la globalización: Estados bajo presión." Conference report 03. Fundación FRIDE 2008, p. 7.

[27] Molinero Huget, Jorge et al. Guerra global permanente. Editorial Catarata, Madrid 2005., p. 127.

[28] Boonstra, Jos. "El papel de la OTAN en la reforma democrática." FRIDE's working document no 38, Madrid 2007.

[29] Federal Research Division, Library of the Congress Algeria, a country study. Helen Chapin Metz, Washington, 1994.

The Armed Forces were involved in the Party leadership, which in turn provided the ideology context in which they were developing. Both endowed the state administration and the government of the nation with its middle and senior officers. With the fall of the communist model, the triangle was reduced and the power lined up with the Armed Forces. An organization such as NATO regulated the transition of these countries towards democracy.

CONCLUSIONS

One of the most important conceptual developments of Clausewitz is what it is known as the trinity. For the German thinker, the nature of war, in its full sense, lies on a trilogy formed by the people, which are its passionate part, the free activity of the Armed Forces, which are its volitional part, and the rational arena is reserved for governments.

Armed Forces are a substantial part of the state power. In the West they are its armed wing. Its institutional position is fully achieved by internalizing the democratic culture that impregnates the already existing scarce spaces of vagueness and lubricates the relationships between the different actors of the institutional universe helping its positioning.

Thus, and as it is natural, the Armed Forces only do what the political power orders them. While it is true that some problems may arise in the sense of the public opinion, it attributes them the responsibilities allocated to them, rather than the form under which they are to be carried out (assuming that these belong to the field of their choice).

And, in many occasions their work is subject to a judgment made from clichés from the past that makes a sector of the population exclude them or exclude itself from the issues that concern them. By doing this, they delegitimize, to a certain extent, an institution that changes and renews its members while (in the West) is adapted to the highest democratic standards in a matter of such importance as is the use and management of violence.

The concept of security is as wide as vague. It also forces to establish a time frame so it is always a deal in the medium and long term. However, the variables of the equation that define security could not be taken as absolute, since to evaluate them they must be related with the context. As Simmel argues, it also happens that *"the most effective presupposition for preventing struggle, the exact knowledge of the comparative strength of the two parties, is very often only to be attained by the actual fighting out of the conflict."*[30]

Acting with margins of error is important to overcome these difficulties, sometimes too broad, others too narrow.

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[30] Ibidem, p. 501.

"The psychology of weakness is easy enough to understand. A man armed only with a knife may decide that a bear prowling the forest is a tolerable danger, inasmuch as the alternative — hunting the bear armed only with a knife — is actually riskier than lying low and hoping the bear never attacks. The same man armed with a rifle, however, will likely make a different calculation of what constitutes a tolerable risk."[31]

The problem, then, are the subjective elements. There are different ways to solve it. Machiavelli affirmed that the Prince, who couldn´t be feared and loved[32] at the same time has to be more feared than loved because if love happens, fear never takes place and he added that good arms and good laws are the foundation of states;[33] Al Capone expressed it by saying that *" You can get much farther with a kind word and a gun than you can with a kind word alone."*[34]

However a real democracy cannot (shouldn´t) act beyond its borders differently than it does within. If its behavior punctually matches somehow with the suggested one by a Mafioso, this cannot (shouldn´t) be a mark of glory.

Considering as relative the terms of the definition, the absolute security would be unachievable. Consequently, societies would always tolerate a threshold of risk, which is the one that would be defined and which will become increasingly smaller as the effort to reduce it becomes greater. This would generate an asymptotic movement with the excellence that would only be achieved in the infinity.

Ray Bradbury, in Fahrenheit 451, summarized it in words of his main character *"ask no guarantees; ask for no security, there never was such an animal."* And, although it seems paradoxical and contradictory with its many manifestations, there is a yearning for security in our societies that is expressed, for instance, in the proliferation of private companies and surveillance officers, along with metal detectors at the most remote and unsuspected places, while a decrease in military spending is demanded when, paradoxically, internal security is a necessary extension of the outer one.

A Hobbesian vision of peace would mean that to the power of one corresponds the impotence of all others. But neither in this way full security would be achieved, considering, for instance, natural disasters (until predicting the fall of an asteroid or Solar collapse; the

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[31] Kagan, Robert. <u>Power and Weakness</u> Policy Review no 113, 2002.
[32] Maquiavelo. <u>El Príncipe</u>. *Editorial* Millenium, Madrid 1999, p. 81.
[33] Chap XII: "*The chief foundations of all states, new as well as old or composite, are good laws and good arms; and as there cannot be good laws where the state is not well armed, it follows that where they are well armed they have good laws. I shall leave the laws out of the discussion and shall speak of the arms.*"
[34] Barber, Benjamín R. <u>El imperio del miedo</u>. Ediciones Paidós Ibérica S.A., Barcelona 2004, p. 23.

lack of real risks for our societies is expressed in the proliferation of films about such situations). These concepts link to Treitschke's thinking when he says that *"the truth remains that the essence of the State consists in its incompatibility with any power over it"* [35]

The balance of forces implies a balance in terms of security, which is shown as one of relational nature. A too broad Hobbesian concept of security implies insecurity for all others.[36] This kind of security should be as high as possible but also as equal as possible. This would allow, a sensu contrario, the rather positive view that, increasing the security of the other party, expands its own.[37]

Therefore Galtung, on the basis of this negative conception of security, defines it comparing to the security of others, positioning it as the invulnerability of one minus the capacity to destroy the other party. He comes to the very interesting conclusion that one's security depends on the security of the other actors. The difference of securities unbalances the system.[38]

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[35] Enzensberger, Hans Magnus. Política y delito. Seix Barral, Barcelona 1968, p. 17.
[36] Chomsky, Noam. El nuevo orden mundial (y el viejo). Mondadori Barcelona 1996, p. 51.
[37] Galtung, Johan. ¡Hay alternativas¡ Editorial Tecnos. Madrid 1984., p. 207.
[38] Ibidem, pp. 153 y ss.