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THE MALIAN ARMED FORCES  
REFORM AND THE FUTURE OF  
EUTM

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## THE MALIAN ARMED FORCES REFORM AND THE FUTURE OF EUTM

### *Abstract:*

*The Malian Armed Forces are one of the parts involved in the conflict in Mali, and they can be part of the solution. The reforms of the sectors of defence and security are ongoing. In accordance with the Ouagadougou Agreement the new Malian government could negotiate aspects of these reforms, and the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) process for fighters. The European Union advises the Ministry of Malian Defence and instructs its new units. One battalion size unit has already deployed in the North of the country, and a second unit is close to doing so. The European Union Training Mission (EUTM) in Mali is currently being revised; a strategic review is on process since September, considering the Mission Commander's proposals, and the after presidential elections. EUTM Mali could be a medium or long term EU engagement with Mali, within the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) framework.*

### *Keywords:*

*Sahel, Mali, Tuareg, yihadista, Tamanrasset, EUTM Mali, GTIA, Lecointre, Guibert SSR, Ouagadougou, disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, DDR, strategic review, CMPD, PSC, CSDP, dialogue, reconciliation, CDR, Aguelhok, Tessalit, Kidal, FAMa.*

**\*NOTA:** Las ideas contenidas en los **Documentos de Opinión** son de responsabilidad de sus autores, sin que reflejen, necesariamente, el pensamiento del IEEE o del Ministerio de Defensa.

*"A first step was to use the Army itself in efforts to win the confidence of the Tuaregs. Second, and more difficult, was to change the manner in which the Army characteristically dealt with security problems in the north." (Keita, 1998)<sup>1</sup>*

## INTRODUCTION

The Malian Armed Forces (FAMa, French acronym) are not the main problem to be solved within the prolonged ethnic-political and social-international<sup>2</sup> conflict in Mali. There is a substantial historical background for it; the transnational terrorism influence,<sup>3</sup> the Tuareg combatants return from Libya and the last coup d'état have recently joined the conflict factor list.

The current FAMa situation reflects their society which has been divided and shaken by its recent history. The defence and security sector reforms (SSR) affect two different ministerial departments and it is a requirement to transform the Army into a functional tool for the long term peace.

The SSR will develop in concurrency with the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) process. Part of the reintegration could imply that some ex-combatants from the last rebellion in the North may join the FAMa. Perhaps, the United Nations' experience in this field could be useful.<sup>4</sup> The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) received the baton from the African-led International Support for Mali (AFISMA) on July the first. MINUSMA's mandate establishes to "coordinate the overall support of the international community in Mali, including in the field of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and Security Sector Reform (SSR)".<sup>5</sup>

Last June, the Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso) Agreement established that aspects concerning both processes will be negotiated, between the new government and the rest of the signatories. The Agreement was also signed by international witnesses such as Islamic Cooperation Organization, the African Union, the European Union and the United Nations.

The European Union currently runs an assisting and training mission for the FAMa (EUTM Mali); it is one among the EU tools in Mali, in conjunction with others related to security

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<sup>1</sup> KEITA, K. (1998). "Conflict and conflict resolution in the Sahel: the Tuareg insurgency in Mali", p. 21.

<sup>2</sup> GRASA, R (2010), "50 años de evolución de la investigación para la paz", p. 57-61.

<sup>3</sup> The terrorist issue is an important factor, but it is not the most important one. There are demographic, geographical, cultural and religious, economic and political roots for the conflict.

<sup>4</sup> <http://www.un.org/es/peacekeeping/issues/ddr.shtml> acceded on 12 September 2013.

<sup>5</sup> CSNU Resolution 2100 Art 11 dated 25 April 2013.

and development in that country and in the Sahel. The Comprehensive Approach regional strategy is the overarching framework for such tools.<sup>6</sup>

EUTM Mali's current mandate expires in May 2014. Its review is close, and its possible extension decision could also happen soon. The EU can play a relevant role related to the FAMa reform, as part of the SSR; that could imply a medium to long term engagement for the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), in case the new Malian authorities still demand such cooperation from the Union in this field.<sup>7</sup>

This article concerns some historical aspects related to the FAMa within the conflict, its evolution up to the current situation, and it also examines some future options for EUTM Mali.

### WHERE DO THE MALIAN ARMED FORCES COME FROM?

Mali got its independence in 1960. President Modibo Keita approached the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and China.<sup>8</sup> He militarily defeated the first Tuareg rebellion from 1962 to 1964; afterwards, a strong repression followed for two decades. In 1968, Lieutenant Moussa Traoré (later general) led a military coup, he did not change either the relationship with the soviets or the strong military control over the North of the country. In the South internal crisis broke out. Some student associations and other civilian movements were related to the crisis, before a military coup could take place again.<sup>9</sup> The military was also divided.

Traoré created a new presidential guard unit, the "red berets" parachutists, answering directly to the presidency, out of the Army chain of command. Later, they overthrew Traoré.<sup>10</sup> The "green berets" were the rest of the regular Army.

Between 1990 and 1996, the second Tuareg rebellion took place. The Tamanrasset (Algeria) Agreement in January 1991 and the National Pact in 1992 were two milestones prior to the Alger Agreement in 1996. Algeria was the moderator in the conflict negotiations. In March 1991, a parachutist Lieutenant Colonel, named Amadou Toumani

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<sup>6</sup> Strategy for Security and Development for the Sahel, 2011, available on [http://eeas.europa.eu/africa/docs/sahel\\_strategy\\_en.pdf](http://eeas.europa.eu/africa/docs/sahel_strategy_en.pdf), accessed on 23 August 2013.

<sup>7</sup> The new President will define his own position concerning foreign military presence. About this issue, see the article available on <http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20130819-mali-france-serval-ibrahim-babacar-keita-defense> published on 19 August 2013, accessed on 21 August 2013.

<sup>8</sup> FALAKAN CISSOKO, J. (2011) "A Third- World Country Facing Indigenous Insurgencies: The Malian Touareg Insurgency", p. 9, citing to Ross Velton "Mali", 2000.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid, p. 9-11.

<sup>10</sup> Sana E. (2013) Chapter "L'armée malienne, entre instabilité, inégalités sociales et lutte de places" in GALY, M. "The guerre au Mali", p.112.

Touré (ATT), led a new coup. This event had its roots related to the Tamanrasset Agreement, since it meant an autonomous territorial arrangement without a military presence in the North.<sup>11</sup>

The Tamanrasset Agreement stipulated, among other aspects, that the FAMa would no longer take civilian administrative responsibilities (Art. 5), and that they would only defend the territorial integrity of the borders of the State (Art. 7), avoiding the military presence in populated or pasture lands (Art. 6).<sup>12 13</sup> Afterwards, the development of the 1992 National Pact favored the rise of organized crime, and the implantation of salafist extremist groups.<sup>14</sup> The agreement's conditions would partly facilitate the next rebellion one decade later.<sup>15</sup>

Alpha Oumar Konaré (AOK) reached the presidency after the elections in March 1992. In June, Lieutenant Colonel ATT directly became a General.<sup>16</sup>

The Malians carried out a partial ex-combatants reintegration from different rebel groups: 610 into the Army in 1993, 1200 in 1996 into the Army, National Guard and Gendarmerie, 300 into Police, Custom Service and Water and Forest Services, and other 120 ex-fighters into the civilian administration.<sup>17</sup> Apart from the main goal which was to reintegrate them, they were also trying to counter balance the deficit in terms of Tuareg participation within the administrative structure of the state.<sup>18</sup>

Since 1994, the Army tried to use well-educated young leaders to break the fear and distrust circle with relative success.<sup>19</sup> In 1998, they wondered themselves: "How durable is this peace? Have the Tuaregs renounced armed rebellion as a viable option? Is the military integration a success for the long term?"<sup>20</sup>

In May 2006, the insurgency re-activated the fight, and in July the parties achieved the Algeria Accord, the Army withdrew from the North. A part of Tuareg deserters rejoined

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<sup>11</sup> BADI, Dida Ag Khammadine. (2013) "Genese et evolution du probleme touareg".

<sup>12</sup> The MA AF missions are still an issue to be delimited.

<sup>13</sup> Ougadougou Agreement available in

[http://www.unesco.org/culture/fr/indigenous/Dvd/pj/TOUAREG/TouaregC4\\_2.pdf](http://www.unesco.org/culture/fr/indigenous/Dvd/pj/TOUAREG/TouaregC4_2.pdf).

<sup>14</sup> DJIBRILLA MAIGA, M. (2011) "Lutte contre le terrorisme au Mali. Gestion, prévention et une mobilisation pleine et entiere de la societ e civile".

<sup>15</sup> Ibid, FALAKAN CISSOKO.

<sup>16</sup> <http://www.interactioncouncil.org/amadou-toumani-tour> accessed on 21 August 2013.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid Keita, K. p. 33-34.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid, p. 26.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid, p. 21-23.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid Keita, K, p.28.

the Army, and they created a special unit, composed of at least 50% Northern military personnel. It would be responsible for security in the administrative Kidal region.<sup>21</sup>

Nevertheless, another part of the rebels continued fighting. Two factors facilitated the desertions again: the existence of units with a significant percentage of Tuaregs, and the fact that some special units were composed mainly of former rebels. Since the Army was ineffective in the desert, the government used paramilitary units as an alternative; some of them were also Tuareg militias, to eventually beat the rebellion in 2009.<sup>22 23 24</sup> Already in the 90s Bamako had extensively used the paramilitary militias.<sup>25</sup>

ATT followed AOK as president. He won the elections in 2002 and 2007, and he stayed in power up to March 2012's coup d'état, led by Captain Amadou Haya Sanogo.

United Nations General Secretary Ban Ki-moon released a report about the situation in Mali, dated 26 March 2013, which recalled the Malian Interim Government position on the political situation confirming "the view that the root causes of the conflict, namely, poor governance, *corruption* and an *ineffective* rule of law and security sector, would have to be addressed by an elected Government" (elections in July 2013). In the same paragraph, the report followed as: "Some interlocutors expressed concern that continued interference by elements involved in the coup d'état of 21 March 2012 weakens institutions. They confirmed that *significant divisions* among political actors and *within the military persist...*"<sup>26</sup>

The conclusion is that since 1960, and until the last rebellion and 2012 coup d'état, the difference between the military and the politics was permeable, within a divided social framework facing rebellions in the North. The FAMA capabilities turned out to be insufficient to ensure the territorial integrity of the State; this causes the authorities to

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<sup>21</sup> MOUSTAPHA TOURÉ, M. (2012) "What is the extent of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and where it derive its strength in the Sahelian-Saharan Region: A case study of Northern Mali".

<sup>22</sup> Tuareg Colonels Ag Gamou, Ould Bou y Ould Meydou benefited from Bamako to form militias to fight along with the Malian Army." Ould Bou was killed in Tombouctú by AQMI on 10 June 2009. He was the chief of a berabiche arab militia. GALY, M. (2013) " La guerre au Mali", p. 44. IBK has recently promoted Ag Gamou and Ould Meydou to Generals (<http://www.maliweb.net/news/armee/2013/09/20/article,171105.html>).

<sup>23</sup> Colonel El Hadj Gamou's tribe is an Imghad Tuareg; before and during the colonization, the members of this tribe were vassals of the Ifoghas. MORGAN, A.(2012) "The Causes of the Uprising in Northern Mali". Ag Gamou took part in the Tuareg rebellion in the 90s and afterwards he joined the Army. Colonel Ag Gamou, in February 2013, after 10 months in exile in Niger, returned to Northern Mali. In Gao, he stated his loyalty to Bamako and to an united country. <http://www.france24.com/fr/20130203-mali-colonel-major-el-hadj-ag-gamou-touareg-gao-mnla> and <http://www.franceculture.fr/player/reecouter?play=4646582>

<sup>24</sup> Colonel Abderahmane Ould Meydou is an arab from the North. His militia and Ag Gamou's played a significant role in ATNMC defeat, led by Bahanga, in 2009. Ibid MORGAN.

<sup>25</sup> MAZARRASA RODRÍGUEZ, P. (2012) "Mali: razones profundas del conflicto en el Sahel".

<sup>26</sup> Emphasis by the author, [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/2013/189](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2013/189)

turn to the use of paramilitaries as an option. In the past, the way ex-combatants integrated into the Army facilitated future rebellions.

### THE RECENT INCAPABILITY AND INTERNAL DIVISION IN THE MALIAN ARMED FORCES

The Armed and Security Forces (Police, Gendarmerie, and Republican Guard<sup>27</sup>) situation was quite deficient in the summer-autumn of 2011, they would be revealed as incapable of facing the new rebellion that was under preparation in the North.<sup>28</sup>

With the exception of Algeria, the rest of Western Sahel countries did not have enough means to control their vast territories, and they were even less capable to fight jihadist groups.<sup>29</sup> Hence, the FAMa incapability against the Tuareg rebellion, which was reinforced with fighters and weaponry from Libya, and with jihadist elements, was not a surprise in the Sahel. Despite the situation depicted, it is not possible to exempt ATT from his responsibilities concerning the deteriorated military and security environment in the North during 2011 and 2012.

There was mistrust in the FAMa chain of command; the trust is not yet completely settled. The soldier's salary is not low in the Malian context. In 2007, there were no recruiting problems<sup>30</sup> and neither do they exist up to now. Even though in cases where the motivation to enter the Army is economical, the soldier's satisfaction cannot be achieved only by money. When they lack the basic means to accomplish their mission, there are logistic shortages and other essential capabilities for combat are missing, and they perceive that the chain of command could use them as "cannon fodder"<sup>31</sup>, then, the coup in March 2012 is the result. It did not lack public support in Bamako.

Some sources denounced corruption among high officers in the past. These ones were not only in charge of military affairs, as they are normally understood in Europe, but also frequently involved in civil administrative state territorial issues. Meanwhile, the captains kept alone in the middle, responsible for the operational situation on the ground, as it happened during the rebellion in the North.<sup>32</sup>

"ATT reinforced the typical imbalance within the Malian Army. On one side, there was a galaxy of generals and officers, loaded with honor, enrichment and opulence;

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<sup>27</sup> Later on named National Guard.

<sup>28</sup> BALLESTEROS MARTÍN, M. (2013) "Diagnóstico geoestratégico del conflicto en Mali".

<sup>29</sup> Ibid Ballesteros, 2013.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid, Galy, p. 107.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid, p. 106-112.

<sup>32</sup> Like it happens in Markala-Diabali, Sevare and Douentza-Gao (Galy, 2013,106-112)

on the flip side, the troop caught in a poverty or scarcity cycle that their Army was not breaking."(Galy, 2013)<sup>33</sup>

Sanogo led a group of "green berets" during the coup in March 2012. On the 30 of April the "red berets" unsuccessfully tried to reverse the situation. The greens had been fighting the Tuareg rebellion with a lack of means; while the red parachutists were the presidential guard safe in Bamako (ATT was also a parachutist). After this counter-reaction, Sanogo intended to break up the 33<sup>rd</sup> Parachutist Commando Regiment (33e RCP in French); he eventually did not follow with the initial threat.<sup>34</sup>

The clashes came to the spotlight again in February 2013: "Parachutist mutiny in Mali, a setback for the offensive" (in reference to the reconquering in the North).<sup>35</sup> The parachutists had orders to integrate themselves into other Army units deploying in the North; this was perceived as a threat to their cohesion as a single unit.

On 26 June 2013, both type of berets staged a Reconciliation and Forgiveness Ceremony, the Interim President chaired it, the President of the Reconciliation and Dialogue Commission (RDC) was also present, and some other civilian and religious authorities too. Captain Sanogo asked for forgiveness in relation with the past incidents, allegedly caused by mutual misunderstandings. The Interim President expressed his will that never again will Mali have two Armies nor two polices. He announced the immediate freedom for the detainees because of the incidents.<sup>36</sup>

At the end of August, the media published the expulsion of some red berets because of indiscipline.<sup>37</sup> Days before, on the 14 August, the Interim Government exceptionally (in French "a titre exceptionnel") promoted Sanogo to the rank of Corp General. There was no place in the Army structure for such a rank; the CHoD, Ibrahima Dembele, was a Brigadier General. His promotion could be a first step in his way out. It was controversial and even considered as illegal by some locals.<sup>38 39 40 41</sup> As a consequence, the media reported

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<sup>33</sup> Ibid, Galy, p. 109-110. Author translation.

<sup>34</sup> <http://maliactu.net/dissolution-du-33e-rcp-les-colonels-major-yamoussa-et-dahirou-interpelles/> acceded on 02 June 2013.

<sup>35</sup> <http://lta.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idLTASIE91701F20130208> acceded on 29 April 2013.

<sup>36</sup> Video sobre la ceremonia disponible en

<http://www.panafricain.com/index.asp?page=galvideos&lang=fr&pi=17&Idmedia=12027&idchaine=20&cat=0&tipe=0> consultado el 20 de julio de 2013.

<sup>37</sup> <http://mali-web.org/crise-malienne/dioncounda-traore-radie-des-berets-rouges-dont-le-colonel-seydou-moussa-diallo> acceded on 20 August 2013.

<sup>38</sup> <http://maliactu.net/nominations-aux-grades-de-generaux-a-titre-exceptionnel-le-colonel-gamou-livre-a-la-risee-du-mnla/> acceded on 19 August 2013.

<sup>39</sup> <http://maliactu.net/controverses-autour-de-la-promotion-du-capitaine-sanogo/> acceded on 19 August 2013.

<sup>40</sup> The United Front for Democracy (FDR) criticized this promotion based on violation of articles in the Law 055 General Status of Military Personnel.

[http://www.panafricain.com/index.asp?page=detail\\_article&art=82093&lang=fr&pi=17](http://www.panafricain.com/index.asp?page=detail_article&art=82093&lang=fr&pi=17) published on 26 August 2013, acceded on 27 August 2013. Law 055 is available on

[http://www.fonctionpublique.gouv.ml/administration/documents/texte\\_statutaire.pdf](http://www.fonctionpublique.gouv.ml/administration/documents/texte_statutaire.pdf)

possible dissidence within the close military circle around Sanogo, although it was later denied.<sup>42</sup>

Since January 2013, Sanogo was nominated to supervise the defence and security reforms. He chaired a Committee directly responsible to the Presidency.<sup>43</sup> Hitherto, his post was in Kati (16 km,s to Bamako).<sup>44</sup> The plan was that his new position should last until the end of the transition process; his presidency of the Committee was over on the 28 August. On 18 September the new President, Ibrahim Boubacar Keita (IBK), promoted some Colonels to Generals, among them, Ag Gamou and Ould Meydou<sup>45</sup>, who faced the last rebels. On 3 October, IBK announced the dissolution of the Committee.

The political management of the last internal incidents, happening in Kati on 30 September, shows the efficiency of the Ministry of Defence and Former Combatants. Soymeylou Boubeye Maiga had previously stated that “culturally, the military need to be commanded, and commanded in a good way”.<sup>46</sup> He neutralized the problem without violence, but at the same time, showing his determination not to tolerate any case of indiscipline or ethical misconduct.<sup>47</sup>

The conclusion is that the some positive measures have been taken in relation with the normalization of the military. The reconciliation ceremony for the integration of the red and green berets, a way out for Sanogo’s influence, the closure of a Committee coming from the military Junta times, and the promotion of certain key Malian military against the last rebels are positive steps. Those measures are accompanied by a determined,

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<sup>41</sup> The Interim President Diocunda Traore justified that it was an exceptional promotion, and not only for Sanogo but also for other officers, and that it was unnecessary to focus on him, this should be understood within the framework of reconciliation and forgiveness. <http://maliactu.net/depuis-ouaga-dioncounda-demande-de-ne-pas-se-focaliser-sur-la-promotion-du-capitaine-sanogo/> and <http://maliactu.net/mali-dioncounda-traore-sexplique-sur-la-promotion-du-capitaine-sanogo/> acceded on 21 August 2013.

<sup>42</sup> Denies news about the arrest of Colonel Youssouf Traoré, published on 21 August 2013 in <http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20130821-mali-proche-general-sanogo-arrete> and <http://maliactu.net/armee-le-colonel-yousouf-traore-arrete/> and later denied on 22 August in <http://www.maliweb.net/news/armee/2013/08/22/article,165512.html> acceded on 23 August 2013.

<sup>43</sup> Diez Alcalde, J (abril 2013), “Ganar la paz para refundar Mali”.

<sup>44</sup> [http://www.primature.gov.ml/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=category&id=29&layout=blog&Itemid=100110](http://www.primature.gov.ml/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&id=29&layout=blog&Itemid=100110)

<sup>45</sup> Official Statement on [http://www.primature.gov.ml/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=79&Itemid=100037](http://www.primature.gov.ml/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=79&Itemid=100037) and opinion on <http://www.maliweb.net/news/armee/2013/09/20/article,171105.html> acceded on 22 September 2013.

<sup>46</sup> Jeune Afrique, “IBK face à l’armée” published on 22 September 2013.

<sup>47</sup> See Official communicate on 4 October on [http://www.primature.gov.ml/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=10889:communiqu&catid=5&Itemid=100037](http://www.primature.gov.ml/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=10889:communiqu&catid=5&Itemid=100037)

legitimate and strong political leadership, which is paving the path to turn over the page, and focus on the re-foundation of the FAMa.

Furthermore, the Preliminary Ouagadougou Agreement, between the northern and southern parts, permitted the presidential elections to take place on 28 July and 11 August. The new president, IBK, swore his oath on 4 September. Among his many challenges, he will follow with the ongoing SSR reforms, and also with negotiations with the North, among other issues, about the DDR process. Concurrently, he is defining his position concerning the presence of foreign troops on Malian territory, and on the way that the international community may cooperate in those processes. The United Nations' experience and the EU cooperation could continue as actives to solve these challenges.

### **IMMEDIATE CHALLENGE: NEGOTIATIONS ON SSR AND DDR**

In the mentioned Agreement, they agreed on the requirement to disarm several groups, the first step was to put them into cantonments; that allowed running the elections in Kidal. The disarmament would end after the signature of a definitive and global peace agreement within the DDR process (Art.6).

In Ouagadougou, the signatories agreed on a 60 days deadline, starting since the new government was established, to start negotiations. The president nominated his government on the 8 September.<sup>48</sup> The Armed Forces reform has already started and EUTM Mali have been assisting. The new government will confirm or change the current plans. In accordance with Ouagadougou, the SSR and DDR should be part of the dialogue.<sup>49</sup> The possibility that a dialogue might have an influence on the FAMa restructuring is still uncertain. Other points in the negotiations could be controversial in political and social spheres, and also in the FAMa. Non proper statements or interferences from the military into politics are a risk to mitigate; the desire of revenge is still alive in many circles.

As agreed, different national and international actors should cooperate during the negotiations. IBK showed his appreciation towards international efforts on his speech to the nation on 3 October. His early return from a visit in France was forced by the terrorist attacks in Tombuctu, the last clashes in Kidal and the events in Kati.<sup>50</sup> On 2 October, as a sign of open hand for the dialogue, 23 prisoners were freed. The process requires a strong

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<sup>48</sup> <http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/afp/130908/mali-announces-first-post-war-government>

<sup>49</sup> The Ouagadougou Agreement establishes the need of "an inclusive dialogue to find a definitive solution to the crisis" (art 3) covering, among other issues, the "reorganization of the defence and security forces and also the DDR program" (art 21).

<sup>50</sup> <http://www.maliweb.net/news/video/2013/10/02/article,173176.html>

civilian authority, with adequate control over the Armed Forces; the law and human rights principles should lead them.

The Malian case is one more example of the fact that, nowadays, the development and security agendas work hand in hand while building peace.<sup>51</sup> The described events and circumstances define part of the context where EUTM Mali carries out its tasks.

## EUTM MALI. PRESENT AND FUTURE

Since 2011, the EU implements its Security and Development Strategy for the Sahel working on different action lines.<sup>52 53</sup> From 2007 to 2013, the EU has invested €1.535 billion in development in Mali, Mauritania and Niger.<sup>54 55</sup> In October 2012, and specifically for Mali, the EU activated €167 million extra for urgent help.<sup>56</sup> To these figures, we also should take into account the EU role during the donors' conference in Brussels in May 2013, where up to €3250 million were engaged. The EU contribution was €520 million for the period 2013-2014. In addition to this, the Union also finances the civilian mission "EUCAP Sahel" related to the security sector, and the military mission "EUTM Mali" assisting the Malian Armed Forces.<sup>57</sup>

End of August budget data reveals that EUTM common costs raise up to €23.4 million for the 15 months mandate.<sup>58</sup> Considering the mission cost and its possible positive impact in short and long term, the conclusion is that the expense is an efficient one.

After the official request from the Malian government, and in accordance with United Nation Security Council resolutions 20171 and 2085, the European Union decided to launch this new military mission within the framework of the Common Security and

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<sup>51</sup> Ibid, GRASA, R (2010).

<sup>52</sup> It is related to the European Strategy for Africa 2007, and also to the European Security Strategy 2003 as a higher framework. Available in [http://www.eeas.europa.eu/africa/docs/sahel\\_strategy\\_en.pdf](http://www.eeas.europa.eu/africa/docs/sahel_strategy_en.pdf)

<sup>53</sup> [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/132802.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/132802.pdf) acceded on 15 May 2013.

<sup>54</sup> One of the components of the FED is the so-called Africa Peace Facility (CSDP Handbook, p 35).

[http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/acp/regional-cooperation/peace/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/acp/regional-cooperation/peace/index_en.htm) acceded on 1 August 2013.

<sup>55</sup> [http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eutm-mali/documents/210309factsheet\\_eutm\\_mali\\_en.pdf](http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eutm-mali/documents/210309factsheet_eutm_mali_en.pdf) acceded on 17 September 2013.

<sup>56</sup> <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/homepage/showfocus?focusName=eu-support-for-mali&lang=es> acceded on 28 August 2013.

<sup>57</sup> [http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Brief\\_28.pdf](http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Brief_28.pdf) acceded on 28 August 2013.

<sup>58</sup> Besides these costs, it has to be consider that every contributing nation pay its own troop expenses. The EU Member States, under the Mechanism Athena rules, only pay for those expenses eligible as common costs. Military Missions within CSDP are not paid by the regular EU budget.

Defence Policy (CSDP).<sup>59</sup>

The work done on the crises management concept (CMC) was part of this decision, it was a CMC "relating to the reorganisation and training of the Malian defence forces", which took into account the local needs.<sup>60</sup> At that time, the urgency was to deploy forces capable of reconquering the North of the country. The planners conceived the CMC during October and November, and the Council approved it on 10 December 2012. The jihadist rebel offensive advanced towards the South one month later, and as a response to it, Operation Serval reacted. Therefore, the situational context within the EUTM Mali planning phase took place, later on, drastically changed.

The experts and instructors completed the deployment on the ground during February and March.<sup>61</sup> One of EUTM Mali pillars is the assistance, the so-called "Advanced Liaison Task Force (ALTF)" perform it, these advisors work with the FAMA to reinforce them with their re-foundation.<sup>62</sup> The ALTF assists the Ministry of Defence in Bamako. The instructors train the units in Koulikoro (60 kms from Bamako).<sup>63</sup> They accomplish their duties restricted to the Southern part of the country.

MINUSMA's mandate, resolution 2100 from April 2013, welcomes EUTM Mali's mission for capacity building and assisting of the FAMA "contributing to strengthening civilian authority and respect for human rights" (Art. 22).<sup>64</sup>

The European mission trains Army tactical units (task forces) prior to their deployment in operations. They are the so-called GTIA ("Groupement Tactique Inter-Armes" in French), a Task Force battalion size combat organization composed of approximately 700 soldiers.

The previous Interim Malian Ministry of Defence had decided the integration of "red beret" elements into these Task Forces, and EUTM Mali is cooperating to perform this task. The red berets form a sub-unit, the "Commando Detachment", within the GTIA; the task force fosters a cohesive esprit de corps.<sup>65</sup> Instructors from the Spanish Command of Special Forces lead the training of that subunit. In the future, the parachutists could

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<sup>59</sup> [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/134770.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/134770.pdf) acceded on 18 July 2013.

<sup>60</sup> Council Decision published in Official EU Bulletin, dated 18 January 2013, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2013:014:0019:0021:EN:PDF> acceded on 21 August 2013.

<sup>61</sup> Articles published in February and March 2013 available in <http://www.eutmmali.eu/> acceded on 14 August 2013.

<sup>62</sup> <http://www.eutmmali.eu/?p=1315> published on 18 August 2013, acceded on 30 August 2013.

<sup>63</sup> EUTM Mali liase with counterparts at Ministry of Defence level in Bamako, without contact with Sanogo whose post was in Kati.

<sup>64</sup> UNSC Resolution 2100 available in [http://www.un.org/es/comun/docs/?symbol=S/RES/2100\(2013\)](http://www.un.org/es/comun/docs/?symbol=S/RES/2100(2013))

<sup>65</sup> They form a subunit composed of 36 military selected by the Malian Ministry of Defence. [http://www.telecinco.es/blogs/aquimifusilaquimipistola/Mali-ejercito-comandos-instructores-guardia\\_pretoriana-expresidente\\_6\\_1638615002.html](http://www.telecinco.es/blogs/aquimifusilaquimipistola/Mali-ejercito-comandos-instructores-guardia_pretoriana-expresidente_6_1638615002.html) acceded on 20 August 2013.

compose the core of a GTIA training with EUTM Mali. This would be one more example of the normalization of this unit, within the regular structure of the Army.

The first GTIA completed its formation period with EUTM Mali on 22 June, after training for 10 weeks.<sup>66</sup> There is a ratio of 3 soldiers per trainer. The second GTIA celebrated its closing ceremony on 14 September, and it left Koulikoro towards the North on 28 September. The current mandate, expiring in May 2014, includes two more GTIAs training. The respect of Human Rights is one specific discipline taught during the whole period; the instructors coordinate the contents with UN agencies.<sup>67</sup> At the end of the first GTIA training period, the EUTM Commander, General Lecointre, declared that, although their capabilities have improved, they still have room to enhance their discipline, cohesion and trust in the Army chain of command.<sup>68</sup> He also stated that the way was still long to rebuild the Malian Army up to a point that it is capable of withstanding every form of destabilization.<sup>69</sup>

GTIA 1 deployed in the North of the country at the end of July, other international troops, rather than EUTM Mali, accompanied them. Aguelhok and Tessalit, in Kidal region, are among the deployment locations.<sup>70</sup> It goes without saying that the environment is tense and demanding for these new units; furthermore, they are in the national and international media spotlight.<sup>71 72</sup> Among other issues, the International Criminal Court (ICC) investigates the past events in Aguelhok.<sup>73</sup>

In the past, the existence of specific units with a high percentage of Tuaregs facilitated desertions. They take into account this factor when it comes to integrating Tuaregs and Arabs that are more than one hundred in GTIA 1 and 2, within units composed approximately of 700 soldiers. The units are not based on ethnicities or geographical bases, all of them are mixed. This is another way in which the FAMA could also be part of the long term solution, fostering different ethnicities integration.<sup>74 75</sup>

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<sup>66</sup> <http://www.eutmmali.eu/?m=201306> acceded on 13 July 2013.

<sup>67</sup> <http://www.eutmmali.eu/?m=201307> acceded on 21 August 2013.

<sup>68</sup> General Lecointre's statements published 21 July 2013, available in <http://www.bruxelles2.eu/zones/sahel/reussites-et-manques-le-bilan-des-six-premiers-mois-deutm-mali-lecointre.html> published on 21 July 2013, acceded on 25 July 2013.

<sup>69</sup> Published on 29 July 2013, available in <http://www.afribone.com/spip.php?article50901>, acceded on 15 August 2013.

<sup>70</sup> <http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20130730-mali-armee-malienne-waraba-poursuit-son-redeploiement-nord-publicado-el-30-de-julio>, acceded on 12 September 2013.

<sup>71</sup> <http://maliactu.net/larmee-malienne-de-retour-a-aguelhok-et-tessalit/> acceded on 20 August 2013.

<sup>72</sup> <http://www.maliweb.net/news/armee/2013/07/29/article,161376.html> acceded on 4 September 2013.

<sup>73</sup> <http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20120213-mali-executions-sommaires-aguelhok-selon-paris-bamako>, acceded on 9 September 2013. There are accusation on rebels executing Malian soldiers in Aguelhok, in January 2012.

<sup>74</sup> Mission Commander, General Lecointre, after being asked about the ethnical composition of GTIA 1, answered: "The Army must be like an integration crucible tool... To guarantee the integration within the

General Lecointre, who commanded the mission until 1 August 2013, submitted his end of mission report, and briefed about it to the EU Military Committee (EUMC) and to the Political and Security Committee (PSC) on 17 and 18 July respectively. He held press conferences both in Brussels and Bamako; he openly shared "his soldier opinion" about the need to extend the mandate.<sup>76 77</sup>

He stated his point of view concerning the need to train the rest of the Malian Army (up to 8 GTIAs, instead of 4 in the current mandate), to enhance the platoon leaders development, to follow with the assisting pillar working on doctrine about the use of force, on a Defence Programming Law, improving the audit on the human resource system, the logistic support, etc. One of the challenges is to achieve a sustainable Army in accordance with the budget restraints.

The Malian equipment needs were present since the beginning of the mission; however, equipping is not part of EUTM mandate.<sup>78</sup> The material and equipment deficiencies can obviously limit the quality of the training, and operational readiness prior to deployment.

The hypothetical contribution to improve their command and control capabilities to plan and execute operations with the units previously trained is another key aspect to consider.<sup>79</sup> The transformation, from a territorial structure of the Malian Army into an operational oriented structure could be another key issue within the reform process.

The previous EUTM Commander went over topics that "the PSC will tackle in the future" concerning the mission's way ahead:

After the training, the battalion deploy in the area of operations. Once there, the routine and the problems are real threats... Therefore, the goal is to keep their personnel into a permanent operational tension through training their battalion

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Battalion they are mixed. The goal is that they do not form a unit apart from the rest. You can find six or seven Tuaregs in every platoon in order to be -neither being- isolated." Published on 21 July 2013, available in <http://www.bruxelles2.eu/zones/sahel/reussites-et-manques-le-bilan-des-six-premiers-mois-deutm-mali-lecointre.html> acceded on 25 July 2013.

<sup>75</sup> Nevertheless, it could be more difficult to integrate the Iforas Tuaregs rather than the Imghad Tuaregs, and obviously, it is quite another thing to integrate a Tuareg from Kidal than one from Menaka o Tumbuctu.

<sup>76</sup> The completed Press Conference is available in <http://tvnewsroom.consilium.europa.eu/event/eutm-mali/press-conference-part-16551958>

<sup>77</sup> <http://www.afribone.com/spip.php?article50901>, acceded on 15 August 2013.

<sup>78</sup> General Lecointre's statements published on 21 February 2013, available in <http://euobserver.com/defence/119132>, acceded on 10 June 2013.

<sup>79</sup> This could be done through assisting the battalion staff, and also to the operational chain of command of higher echelons.

staff... (I propose) to permanently deploy experts or to regularly send teams to verify the training." (General Lecointre, julio 2013) <sup>80</sup>

Provided political approval, this last proposal would imply significant changes in the current mandate, since it would mean to include the future deployment zones of the GTIAs in the North, into the Area of the Mission, where the mission does not work today. French "Assistance Operational Detachments" (DAOs in French) accompany the GTIAs during the deployment in the North. The DAOs are part of Operation Serval. <sup>81</sup>

The current Mission Commander, General Guibert, recently emphasized the lack of training culture within the FAMa. <sup>82</sup> One proposal is to form ad hoc teams to support the battalion training, once they return from operations to their barracks, to follow with the assistance to put into practice training cycles on a regular basis.

The mission's strategic review will have to consider, among other factors, the proposals from the previous and the current Mission Commanders, prior to any decision concerning the possibility to extend the mandate. <sup>83</sup> In December 2013, the EU Defence Ministers will meet; by then, it is foreseeable that options will have been further analyzed, and the required consensus achieved among the Union member states.

As a conclusion, the cohesion, the discipline and the culture of respect to human rights and to the civilian authorities are aspects to continue working on to improve the FAMa, while enhancing the training in technical and tactical aspects, the command and control capabilities and the logistic support. Furthermore, a better human resource management could be, in a certain way, another element to integrate ethnicities in the path for a long term solution for Mali. Military careers and promotions must be defined taking in account "merit, predictability, equity, and justice". <sup>84</sup> Counting on both pillars, advising and training, the EU can play an important role, provided the new Malian authorities follow requesting the assistance. The future of EUTM Mali will soon be decided after the strategic review which is ongoing.

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<sup>80</sup> <http://www.bruxelles2.eu/zones/sahel/reussites-et-manques-le-bilan-des-six-premiers-mois-deutm-mali-lecointre.html> acceded on 25 July 2013 (Author translation).

<sup>81</sup> In accordance with French Ministry of Defence website published on 8 August 2013, <http://www.defense.gouv.fr/espanol/content/view/full/213697>, acceded on 23 August 2013.

<sup>82</sup> <http://www.bruxelles2.eu/category/zones/sahel>, publicado el 16 de septiembre de 2013.

<sup>83</sup> The Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD) is in charge of the mission strategic review. CMPD is part of the structure of the European External Action Service (EEAS). [http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/structures-instruments-agencies/cmpd/index\\_en.htm](http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/structures-instruments-agencies/cmpd/index_en.htm), acceded on 23 August 2013.

<sup>84</sup> IBK words during his speech on 2 October 2013.

## CONCLUSIONS

Taking into account that the current Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) are not the main issue to be solved within the conflict, it is admitted that they were part of it and that they are part of the solution.

Since 1960, and until the last rebellion and 2012 coup d'état, the difference between the military and the politics was permeable, within a divided social framework facing rebellions in the North. The military capabilities turned out to be insufficient to ensure the territorial integrity since the second rebellion in the 90s; the situation had not yet improved when the third one broke out in 2006, and neither in 2012. As a consequence, the authorities turned to the use of paramilitary unit as an option.

In the past, the integration of former rebels into the FAMa was part of a negotiated disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) process. The way ex-combatants were integrated into the Army facilitated future rebellions.

Some positive measures have been taken in relation with the normalization of the military. The reconciliation ceremony for the integration of the red and green berets, a way out for Sanogo's influence, the closure of a Committee coming from the military Junta times, and the promotion of certain key Malian military against the last rebels are positive steps. Those measures are accompanied by a determined, legitimate and strong political leadership, which is paving the path to turn over the page, and focus on the re-foundation of the FAMa.

The Malian authorities offer an open hand to continue the dialogue with those who sign the Ouagadougou Agreement regarding DDR aspects, and it could also be, up to a certain extent, the case about the ongoing reforms in the sector of security and defence.

The cohesion, the discipline and the culture of respect for human rights and for the civilian authorities are aspects to continue working on to improve the FAMa, while enhancing the training in technical and tactical aspects, the command and control capabilities and the logistic support.

Furthermore, a better human resource management could be, in a certain way, another element to integrate ethnicities in the path for a long term solution for Mali. Military careers and promotions must be defined taking in account merit, predictability, equity, and justice. Counting on both pillars, advising and training, the EU can play an important role, provided the new Malian authorities request the assistance.

In this context, now is the time to revise the future of EUTM Mali, an extension will be considered. EUTM, within the framework of the CSDP could be an example of mutual engagement between the EU and Mali in the medium to long term.

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