

56/2014

20th May 2014

*Prof. Modibo Goïta**

FRENCH INTERVENTION, EU AND
UN. AFRICAN SOLUTION FOR
AFRICAN PROBLEMS?

[Visit WEB](#)

[Receive Newsletter](#)

FRENCH INTERVENTION, EU AND UN. AFRICAN SOLUTION FOR AFRICAN PROBLEMS?

Abstract:

Since independence in 1960, Mali confronted successive rebellions led Tuareg tribes in Northern region, Kidal. The latest has seen a nexus of separatist, radical Islamic, terrorists affiliated with the main rebel group MNLA been ousted from by their allied from proclaimed "independent state of Azawad".

But French military intervention "Serval" recovered occupied territory restored volatile stability paving the way for MINUSMA's deployment which incorporated African mission, launching of EU mission in charge of restructuration Malian army.

But military victory has not annihilated terrorists and radicals Islamic who are demonstrating a strong capacity of resilience and engaging in "asymmetric war of attrition". Therefore the presence of keys allies France, EU, UN, will be necessary for sometimes.

Peace negotiations are in standstill and their success will depend on political will from both sides and mainly from the readiness of the Central government to make hard concessions.

Keywords:

Mali. ECOWAS. AFISMA. Operation SERVAL. Tuareg.

***NOTA:** Las ideas contenidas en los **Documentos de Opinión** son de responsabilidad de sus autores, sin que reflejen, necesariamente, el pensamiento del IEEE o del Ministerio de Defensa.

INTRODUCTION

Independent from France in 1960, Mali experienced several rebellions led by Tuareg nomadic tribes over territory cultural, linguistic rights, self – determination. But the of latest turned to become a conglomerate of belligerents' groups¹has taken specific characteristics, a main separatist group MNLAⁱaffiliated with jihadists extremist group Ansar Deenⁱⁱ and terrorists groups AQIM and Mujaoⁱⁱⁱlaunched vast military offensive earlier 2011 took control of the north after Mali's president was overthrown in March²and Imposed a harsh version of Sharia law on the areas they controlled and that forced marriage, forced prostitution, and rape are becoming widespread. More the separatist group MNLA declared independence^{iv} for the north which was not recognized by any state of international community^v Then the coalition collapsed MNLA has been ousted from main towns Gao, Kidal, Timbuktu by AQIM and Ansar Deen and MUJWO³.

¹Mali's separatist, jihadist, terrorist groups


- Ansar Dine seeks to impose Islamic law across the country
- A number of its militants are Tuareg fighters who returned from Libya after fighting alongside Muammar Gaddafi's troops
- Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is al-Qaeda's North African wing, with roots in Algeria
- Made up mostly of foreign fighters
- Says it wants to spread Islamic law and liberate Malians from French colonial legacy
- Known for kidnapping Western nationals
- Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (Mujao) is an AQIM splinter group whose aim is to spread jihad to the whole of West Africa
- Advocates Islamic law and has waged a campaign of violence against Tuareg separatists
- The National Movement Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) is a secular Tuareg group which seeks independence for a homeland they call Azawad
- Cause dates back to when Mali achieved independence in 1960
- Many of MNLA's Tuareg combatants fought alongside Col Gaddafi's troops
- Former allies of Ansar Dine and Mujao, but now opposed to Islamist group

²In 22 March a Junta led by Captain Sanogo seized power, accusing President Amadou Toumani Toure of not enough to tackle rebels, 28 March: Mali suspended by regional bloc, Ecowas1 April: Rebels seize whole of north, including historic city of Timbuktu,12 April: Speaker of parliament Dioncounda Traore sworn in as Mali's interim leader;17 April: Junta arrests several allies of former President Toure,19 April: Mr Toure and his family flee to Senegal

³ For more informations on the strategies of Ansar Deen, MUJWA and MNLA see «Le Mali est le banc d'essai de la stratégie à long terme d'AQMI» in El Watan mercredi 29 aout 2012 le quotidien indépendant - mercredi 29 août 2012 by Prof. Modibo GOITA

NECESSITY OF THE BEST UNDERSTANDING OF THE NORTHERN MILIEU OF MALI

In general there are a false perception that major population of Northern Mali is only no mainly consists of Tuareg, but it is not true, (see the map). Whole Tuareg population represents third of the total habitants. This reality for many explain the reason why Tuareg have never raised a organization of a referendum on self determination, basis principle of international law. Instead they have all times chosen to resort by rebellions in order to achieve their agenda. I is essential to note that all rebellions started from the region of Kidal and excluding the which has been crashed in 1963, the remains have got great support of late Qaddafi regime. More all rebellions have not been supported by some Tuareg tribes.



AFRICAN SOLUTIONS FOR AFRICAN PROBLEMS: MYTH OR REALITY?

The military intervention in Mali must be in reality undertaken by the African Standby force supposed to be deployed within 45 days in such scenario (*see scenarios for deployments*) But in reality it was not able neither military nor logistically to undertake full in order to stop jihadists militants marching toward southern Mali. Ecowas has through its early warning system desperately informed the Malian authority about the imminent threat; in response any of sign reaction has been taken. African Union (AU) has backed plan to use force against jihadists and affiliated terrorists group AQMI⁴ occupying more almost half of the Malian territory⁵, has also endorsed the decision of ECOAWS to send its regional Standby Force (ESF) 3,300 troops to retake from the jihadists and terrorists elements.

REGIONAL INTERVENTION: ECOWAS

It has been established within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), a mechanism for collective security and peace to be known as "Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-keeping and Security"⁶ Interventions can be decided by members States in following cases⁷:

- Threat, aggression or armed conflict in a member state
- Internal conflict between two or several members' states
- Serious and massive human right violations
- Questioning of the right of a state, overthrowing or attempts of overthrowing a democratically elected government
- Any other situation determined by the MSC

Ecowas sent firstly a mission called MICEMA (Ecowas mission in Mali) with objectives⁸:

- Restore territorial integrity of Mali
- Undertake peacemaking police activities', keeping and reestablishment of peace and stability.

⁴About strategy of AQIM see «Le Mali est le banc d'essai de la stratégie à long terme d'AQMI» in El Watan mercredi 29 août 2012 le quotidien indépendant - mercredi 29 août 2012 by Prof. Modibo GOITA

⁵West Africa's Growing Terrorist Threat: Confronting AQIM's Sahelian Strategy. Africa Security Brief (A Publication of Africa Center of Strategic Studies) N O . 11 / F E B R U A R Y 2 0 11

⁶Article 1

⁷"Regional Security Cooperation & The Ecowas Mission in Mali" by Professor Modibo GOITA

Report presented at the LDESP AFRICA PRORAM USARAF seminar in 12- 14 march 2013, Vicenza Italia

⁸Op; Cit.

- Create an environment favorable for humanitarian activities
- Duration : 6 months renewable.

ESTABLISHMENT OF AFISMA /MISMA

African led force for stabilization in Mali (AFISMA) or MISMA come out after an authorization to resort to use force against extremist religious group affiliated terrorists groups AQIM occupying northern Mali⁹. The request made by Malian authority has been addressed to ECOWAS and enjoyed the approval by AU's Council of Peace and Security which paved a way to elaborate a concept of operation¹⁰.

Mission for AFISMA

The mission for AFISMA was fixed as follow¹¹:

- Authorization to use force at last resort
- Deployment of force
- Support Malian armed forces to recover northern regions
- Duration of 1 year
- Create conditions for stable and democratic Mali
- Deal with international terrorists and transnational criminal acts

Specificities of AFISMA

It can be noted some specific characteristics for African led mission for stabilization in Mali¹²:

- No classic peacekeeping force operation
- Fight terrorism international and transnational criminal organizations and religious extremist group
- Outside the hospices ESF ECOWAS (Ecowas standby force) and ASF (African standby force)

⁹See Chapter VIII Charter of United Nations

¹⁰Meeting temporary HQ of AFISMA Bamako Peacekeeping School Bamako Mali 20 February 2013

¹¹"Regional Security Cooperation & The Ecowas Mission in Mali", report presented by Prof. Modibo GOITA at the LDESP AFRICA PRORAM USARAF seminar in 12- 14 march 2013, Vicenza Italia

¹²"Regional Security Cooperation & The Ecowas Mission in Mali", report presented by Prof. Modibo GOITA at the LDESP AFRICA PRORAM USARAF seminar in 12- 14 march 2013, Vicenza Italia

- Primary concept support national armed forces
- Who is in charge of the command, Malian forces, ECOWAS, African Union or United Nations?

AFISMA: End State

African led mission for stabilization in Mali fixed following end states¹³:

- Restore territorial integrity
- Minimize terrorists and criminal acts
- Create a Safer environment to protect population
- Restore basic needs and return of IDP (Internal displaced persons) and refugees

Generation of force for AFISMA

PAYS COUNTRIES	PROMIS PLEDGED	DEPLOYES DEPLOYED	ATTENDUS EXPECTED	OBSERVATIONS REMARKS
ETAT MAJOR DE LA MISMA - MISMA HQ				
	150	78	72	
PAYS CONTRIBUTEURS DE TROUPES – TROOPS CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES				
BENIN	434	202	232	56 pax arrivés
BURKINA FASO	650	500	150	
GAMBIE	144	0	144	
GHANA	124	120	4	
GUINEE CONAKRY	144	144	0	
LIBERIA	46	0	46	
NIGER	671	532	139	
NIGERIA	1062	445	617	
RCI	432	0	432	
SENEGAL	642	495	147	
SIERRA LEONE	50	0	50	
TOGO	871	727	144	
TCHAD	2250	2035	215	+ 33 pax arrivés
TOTAL TROUPES	7520	5200	2320	69%
TOTAL GENERAL	7670	5278	2392	

17/02/2013
09H00Z

¹³Op. cit.

WHAT LESSONS CAN BE LEARNED FROM AFRICAN INTERVENTIONS?

It can be noted following lessons from the peace support operations undertaken by Africans:

- Delay in the deployment of force
- Lacks of heavy planes carriers and combat aviation
- Weak logistical difficulty Capacity of states to support their troops
- Specific CONOPS (concept of operations) peace support operations in the context of asymmetric warfare
- The presence of AFISMA has played dissuasive role and permitted the launching of “*operation Serval*”
- Unhurried response from Malian transitional to approve the request form ECOWAS to deploy force¹⁴.

LESSONS LEARNED FROM AFRICANS INTERVENTIONS

Despite lot of critics we can say that AU has shown political will and despite its limited capacity AU succeeded to donate 50 million dollars to support MISMA (Mission Internationale assistance au Mali). Implementation of the 5 regional forces supposed to form are fully African standby force is underway despite we can note progress some progress such for Ecowas standby force which succeeded to send to deployed of force 3 300 troops.


AU’s peace fund is not a position to finance African Union’s peacekeeping missions e.g. up to the 50th of OAU - AU creation only 17 members states¹⁵ among 54 have paid contributions therefore relied only in western countries.

¹⁴It has taken 8 months for Malian transitional authority to allow the deployment of force from ECOWAS

¹⁵Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Egypt., Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Guinea, Lesotho, Libya, Malawi, Mauritania, Namibia, Rwanda, SahrawiArabDemocraticRepublic (SADR) , Zambia.

FRENCH MILITARY INTERVENTION

Islamist militant groups and their areas of influence in Africa



Codenamed “*Opération Serval*”⁶ this military intervention can be considered as one of the most important French’s military intervention¹⁶ undertaken in the African continent African and particularly the 8th French intervention in the Sahel-Saharan region¹⁷. It has been requested for assistance from France by legitimate Malian president supported by West African States of ECOWAS *Article 51 UN Charter (Collective defense)*, had fixed a clear and limited objective anchored in international law based on the UN Security Council resolution, enjoyed the approval and full backing of regional organization’s Ecowas, African Union EU, United States, European partners offered logistical, intelligence support and financial support.

¹⁶The Force Commander was French Gal Gr. Saint Quentin, Some 4,000 French troops along side with 2 500 Chadian troops (Forces Armées Chadiennes au Mali) FATIM More French 32 combat planes, helicopters, Drones.

¹⁷Since 1960 French have undertaken more than 40 military interventions in former African colonies, 8 in Sahel-Saharan region: Chad, 1968- 1972 Opération Limousin, 1969-1972 Opération Bison, 1978-1980 Opération Tacaoud, 1983-1984 Opération Manta, 1986 Opération Epervier, in Mauritania, 1977- 1978 Opération Lamantin in Libya 2011, Opération Harmattan.

SERVAL: OBJECTIVES OF INTERVENTION

In his speech ordering the launching the military intervention in Mali¹⁸, it took place after the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2085 of 20 December 2012.

French President Francois Hollande fixed the main following objectives:

- Prevent entire 'territory' be occupied by AQIM which aimed to impose the Sharia law and establish a base aiming to destabilize the entire region
- Enable Mali regain territorial integrity Prevent taking hostages of 6 000 French and western nationals living in Mali, Liberate western hostages held by AQIM and armed jihadists groups.^{vi}

WHO WERE THE BELLIGERANTS FOR FRANCE?

French have labeled initially jihadists militants and terrorists elements under by GAD (**Groupes Armés Djihadistes**) Armed jihadists groups: which consist of AQIM terrorists, fighters of Ansar Deen, MUJAO/MUJWA, Boko Haram, (Between 3,000 to 5000 fighters)^{vii} then they f that the use of jihadists can be misinterpreted and offend true believers therefore term was abandoned and substituted for GAT(Groupes armés terroristes) so-called terrorists armed groups. In opposite MNLA, MIA, MAA, and others signatories of the "Ouagadougou Accords" have designated "Groupes armés signataires" term **GAS**¹⁹

FRENCH' S POSITION TOWARD SEPARATIST GROUP MNLA

France has adopted impartial position toward MNLA others separatists groups and militias as GAS (Groupes armés signataires) otherwise.

Malian internal matter and advises political solution through dialogue between Malian authority poses conditions for dialogue with MNLA in the basis of the» *negotiations de Ouagadougou*" (Cf *position of the New elected president*)

French military sources have indicated that the Islamists are better trained and better armed than they had initially expected.

¹⁸The operation is named after the medium-sized African wild cat species Serval

¹⁹"France's military intervention in the Sahara: ramifications to Mali, Nigeria, and Libya" By Professor Modibo GOITA, Report presented at the African dialogue series on Mali, April 2013, Stuttgart Germany

MAIN FACTORS FOR “SERVAL” SUCCESSES

Assessing the success of French military intervention in northern Mali we can draw following keys factors²⁰:

- Prepositioned French troops in Burkina Faso, Chad, Côte d’ivoire, Senegal
- Good knowledge of the terrain ,
- Efficient logistical capacity
- Closure of Algerian border and ‘open sky’ by neighbors’ states
- US, European states support in strategic airlift, and intelligence
- Reliable intelligence
- Large support of local population
- Skilled, equipped French’ special forces pre-positioned in the region
- Air power
- Leading role of Chadian troops²¹

MEASURING SUCCESSES OF “SERVAL”

After one year we can measure the successes of French “opération Serval “may be based on following factors²²:

- The military operations have been conducted military operations in accordance with war laws
- Lack of significant collateral damage
- Recapture of main towns, (Destruction of AQIM main sanctuary, MUJWA (Mouvement pour l’unicité du Jihad Africa l’ Ouest) Ansar Deen’ strong holds)
- Liquidation of tops terrorists groups leaders, Abou Zeid, but Belmokhtar death has not been confirmed by French and American intelligence service concerning casualties among terrorists groups some estimations alleged (700 killed, 200 captured)

²⁰Ibidem

²¹“France’s military intervention in the Sahara: ramifications to Mali, Nigeria, and Libya” By Professor Modibo GOITA, Report presented at the African dialogue series on Mali, April 2013, Stuttgart Germany

²²Op. cit.

- Return of refugees (40%) IDPs (90%)
- Recovery of local economy
- Reopening of schools
- Revival of agricultural activities
- Disruption of drug trafficking's corridors
- The perceptions of French military intervention in Mali^{viii} and United States military presence in the region were: 76% have positive opinion on French military and 78 % were favor to the American²³

MEASURING WEAKNESSES OF "SERVAL"

Considering the weaknesses of "*opération Serval*" we can note as follow²⁴:

- Shortages in strategic airlift and air refueling, intelligence heavy reliance upon allied support
- Underestimation of the resilience capacity of jihadists and terrorists groups AQIM MUJWO²⁵
- Conflicting claims for Victory (Victory in Ammetetai Valley French or Chadian?)
- Various messages about French's pull out timetable
- Unknown fate of the hostages and their liberation through non official Chanel.
- Unsolved question of the MNLA armed rebel group presence in Kidal (Territorial integrity)

FRENCH AMBIVALENT ATTITUDE OVER HOSTAGES

About the question of hostages detained by terrorists in the north of Mali, we can note conflicting declarations about the way to resolve it. In one hand there was statement for negotiations for their liberation and in other hand we have noted strong declaration that there will be paid no ransom for hostage's liberation²⁶. Nevertheless France has clearly

²³L'indépendant No. 3219 Mardi 19 Mars 2013 page 5

²⁴"France's military intervention in the Sahara: ramifications to Mali, Nigeria, and Libya" By Professor Modibo GOITA, Report presented at the African dialogue series on Mali, April 2013, Stuttgart Germany

²⁵"Challenges of international intervention in Mali" report presented at THE LDESP AFRICA PRORAM USARAF seminar 12- 14 march 2013, Vicenza ITALIA , By Prof. Modibo GOITAEcole de Maintien de la Paix ABB. Mali

²⁶"Challenges of international intervention in Mali" report presented at THE LDESP AFRICA PRORAM USARAF seminar 12- 14 march 2013, Vicenza ITALIA , By Prof. Modibo GOITAEcole de Maintien de la Paix ABB Mali

declared war against terrorists groups in the contrary, Barak Obama²⁷ who has abandoned in 2009 Bush's doctrine on «Global War on Terror». Nevertheless there were a clear indication that have been paid for the liberation of French hostages in that was not denied by French Foreign minister Laurent Fabius recognizing the payment by a French society AREVA exploiting uranium in Niger.

REMARKS

“Serval” succeeded to achieve in short term its immediate objective, restore control on territory controlled by jihadists' militants' terrorists elements. For all these reasons “Serval” may be considered as a model of international cooperation in fighting against terrorism²⁸

EUROPEAN IMPLICATION

The EU led training mission in Mali (EUTM) has been deployed in February 2013, consists of 550 military trainers coming 23 European countries having to build re-equip new Malian forces. According to Mr Richard ZINK his representative of European Union in Mali, EU has spent more than 200 billion²⁹ XOF for Mali, among 50 for humanitarian aid 80 budgetary support, concerning security support, European team in Mali (EUTM) consists of 450 military trainers has achieved formation and training for three battalions nicknamed: *Waraba, Elou, Sigui, Balanzan*³⁰ added training for the 4th battalion is underway. According to Richard ZINK, ambassador of EU in Mali mentioned in press conference that 2800 military have been trained and he planned until 2016 up to 8 battalions which will constitute a powerful built of new Malian armed forces. Concerning their redeployment in the north 170 vehicles 4X4, 200 camels delivered³¹ will face Challenge to train Malian forces in order to make them fit to replace French forces and MINUSMA, European Union played and will have to implicate more crucial role for solution.

Challenge remains for EUTEM to protect them against major terrorist attack and trained forces in asymmetric warfare not conventional war. Also be prepare to protect their

²⁷The use global on terrorism instituted by Bush has been abandoned

²⁸Au Mali, la France est "en guerre contre le terrorisme". L'Elysée, la Défense et le ministère des affaires étrangères martèlent ces mots depuis vendredi : la France n'a "d'autre but que la lutte contre le terrorisme", déclarait samedi 12 janvier François Hollande. Elle est "en guerre contre le terrorisme", répétait dimanche le ministre de la défense Jean-Yves Le Drian. Le chef de la diplomatie Laurent Fabius allait plus loin, en qualifiant les groupes armés maliens de "terroristes criminels", estimant que "quand on voit des terroristes débouler" vers Bamako,

²⁹ West African (CFA) ,Currency in West African States members(Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea Bissau, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo. 1US D= 500 XOF

³⁰ Meaning Lion, Elephant, Elephant (Tuareg), Buffalo

³¹ Coopération Mali- Union Européenne : un bilan impressionnant, Essor quotidien national d'information mercredi 29 janvier 2014 53^e année No 17606 p.16

interests and nationals and if necessary to conduct more operations special to rescue citizens.

UNITED NATIONS MULTIDIMENSIONAL INTEGRATED STABILIZATION MISSION IN MALI

The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) was established by Security Council Resolution 2100 of 25 April 2013 to support political processes in that country and carry out a number of security-related tasks.

The Mission has been asked to support the transitional authorities of Mali in the stabilization of the country and implementation of the transitional roadmap, focusing on major population cent The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) was established by Security Council resolution 2100 of 25 April 2013 to support political processes in that country and carry out a number of security-related tasks. The Mission has been asked to support the transitional authorities of Mali in the stabilization of the country and implementation of the transitional roadmap, focusing on major population centers and lines of communication, protecting civilians, human rights monitoring, the creation of conditions for the provision of humanitarian assistance and the return of displaced persons, the extension of State authority and the preparation of free, inclusive and peaceful elections³². On 1 July 2013, MINUSMA would take over the authority from the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA), subject to further review by the Council of the security situation in Mission's area of operations. MINUSMA would comprise up to 11,200 military personnel, including reserve battalions capable of deploying rapidly within the country as and when required, and 1,440 police (comprising formed police units and individual police officers)³³. But up to January 2013 the total force present has exceeded 6010 men among 5201 soldiers and 809 policemen coming from 30 states.

³²Op. cit <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minusma/index.shtml>

³³Tchad (1 252, dont 1 242 militaires), Togo (1091, dont 939 militaires), Niger (862, dont 859), Sénégal (796, dont 510 militaires et 280 policiers d'unités constituées), Burkina-Faso (680, dont 670 militaires), Bénin (309, dont 305 militaires), Nigeria (261, dont 115 militaires et 140 policiers d'unités constituées), Bangladesh (182), Guinée (152), Côte d'Ivoire (133), Ghana (128), Allemagne (60), Liberia (48), France (17, 13 militaires et 4 policiers), ne sont pas compris dans les 3 200 militaires de l'opération française Serval, Suède (6), États-Unis (6), Sierra Leone (5), Mauritanie (4), Burundi (2), Cambodge (2), Cameroun (2), Jordanie (2), Royaume-Uni (2).Belgique (1), Canada (1), Chili (1), Égypte (1), Finlande (1), Italie (1), Rwanda (1).

CONCLUSIONS

It can be noted a Strong capacity of resilience of terrorists groups (AQIM MOJWO) despite defeated in Mali they succeeded to regenerate, resurface in the mountains Tegharghat a perfect place for guerrilla warfare, many caves, 1400 km (900 miles) resurface around Gao, Timbuktu, their 'arms caches remain' launch sporadic suicide and continue shelling against Gao, Kidal suicide attacks and spreading a new wave of violence in Libya.

It should be retained there are no purely military solution in the case of internal where ethnic groups are fighting for independence central power must never rule out referendum on self-determination and a focuses to improve the living condition of local addressing economic, social, good governance³⁴.

Many remain to do for African Union standby force (ASF) to be able to deploy and undertake complex military intervention. It can be remarked that Malian case expects Chadian forces states contributors troops relied heavily on western heavy transport carriers.

It is urgent to recognize that the falling African states will never be able to contain spreading of terrorism in the Sahara region and the more to fear is unemployment of the youth which is reaching 80% so the most coming threat will or and root for terrorism.

The weaknesses of African regional organization ECOWAS and the African Union have demonstrated by their incapacity to deploy sufficient troops bale to deal the situation , maximum 3 500 men for the area 800 000 km2.

European Union must adopt consistent and clear strategy towards Africa addressing creating jobs and ensure economic growth promised billions of Euros in aid must reach the people who need it and means not to turn blind eyes to the corruption

Need to have disciplined, motivated and well trained that represents a national agenda and history learned us that that neither coalition of states have succeeded to defeat completely a terrorism.

Without addressing the roots causes of the current situation the same causes will produce the same effects and *status quo* will remain for long time.

It will be necessary to consider following points:

- A military option must be excluded as solution. A strong *political will is the prerequisite* of the success.
- All options must be on the table of negotiations

³⁴Revue de Défense Nationale: Semaine 11 /04/ 2011 au 17/04/2011

Billet – Questions autour du référendum sud soudanais –Modibo GOITA 2011 -04 _ 15_ 25 532

- The central government must not reduce all members of MNLA as armed bandit affiliated drug traffickers and terrorists
- Up to the government to consider some legitimate claims of tuaregs and make hard concessions

ix

*Prof. Modibo Goïta**

EMPBAMAÑO : Instructeur Permanent

* **NOTE:** The ideas expressed in the *Opinion Documents* are responsibility of their authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IEEE (Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies) or the Ministry of Defense.