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**NATO AND THE EU IN THE CHICAGO
SUMMIT. A NECESSARY
COOPERATION**

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Abstract:

On 20 and May 21 the NATO Summit will be held in Chicago, which will unite the presidents of the Commission and the Council of the European Union, as well as the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. In a situation where the financial crisis and electoral processes appear to call into question the soundness of a common policy on European security, the Treaty of Lisbon opens a window of opportunity for its leaders to reinforce their positions, in a meeting where the main themes will be: the Alliance's commitment to Afghanistan through transition and beyond; ensuring the Alliance has the capabilities it needs to defend its population and territory and to deal with the challenges of the 21st century; and strengthening NATO's network of partners across the globe.

Keywords:

European Union, NATO, Cooperation, Capabilities, Afghanistan, Chicago Summit.

1. NATO-EU. FORCED TO UNDERSTAND EACH OTHER

After some doubts resulting from Turkey's opposition, the European Union will be represented at its highest level in the Chicago Summit. The European Union will hold a key role in the Summit with 21 of its members in the Alliance and the rest, except for Cyprus, actively collaborating with it¹. At a time when the economic crisis overshadows the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), the practical aspects of its necessity become a reality.

After the campaign in Libya and after having learnt some lessons, work on the ground in the main operation sceneries, Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Darfur, Macedonia, Kosovo, the coast of Somalia, coordination of practical and on-the-ground aspects prevailed over a reality which only allows political dialogue on Serbia. Besides, the Turkish-Cypriot dispute, the reason why the current situation status, which does not seem to be solved in the medium term, and whose evolution may differ even more the positions of the players, makes the possibility of a high-level political dialogue more and more unlikely.

This reality imposes on the wish of the Lisbon Summit from November 2010, where the partners expressed their will to improve the strategic partnership between the NATO and the EU. The new Strategic Concept adopted at the Lisbon Summit highlighted the necessity



of cooperating closely in the crisis prevention, conflict management and post-conflict stabilization, especially with the EU.

The aforementioned document clearly states that an active and effective EU contributes to the comprehensive security of the Euro-Atlantic area and recognizes the importance of strengthening Europe's defensive capacity, described as a 'unique and essential' partner for the Alliance. The previous Strategic Concept of 1999 was obsolete since it pointed out that Europe should assume greater responsibilities throughout the 'European Security and Defence Identity' and considered the Western European Union (WEU) as the European reference organization in terms of defence. This document recognizes therefore the importance of 'a stronger and more powerful European defence for

¹ Since the enlargement of the NATO and the EU in 2004, along with the incorporation of Bulgaria and Romania to the EU in 2007, both organizations have 21 members in common. Canada, the United States, Iceland, Norway and Turkey, which are members of the NATO although not of the EU, take part in all meetings between both organizations as well as Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and since 2008 Malta, which are members of the Partnership for Peace (PfP). However Cyprus, which does not take part in the PfP program and does not have any security agreement with the NATO to exchange classified documentation, cannot participate in these meetings. In spite of this, Cyprus is invited to some informal meetings which are hold in different ways: Ministers of Foreign Affairs, ambassadors and military representatives.

the Euro-Atlantic security, welcoming the possibilities derived from the Treaty of Lisbon in this respect and pointing out that both organizations can and indeed should play complementary roles with mutual support in favour of peace and security. With transparency and respect for the institutional independence and autonomy, the Alliance proposes: to improve practical cooperation in operations, from coordinated planning to mutual support on the ground; to enhance political consultations in order to include issues of common concern to share assessments and feedback; and to cooperate more closely in the development of capabilities to reduce duplications as much as possible and maximize cost-effectiveness².

In the final declaration on the summit, the necessity of improving the strategic association NATO-EU is specially highlighted. The origins of this relation began in February 1992, when the EU adopted the Treaty of Maastricht, the common security policy started to be traced out and a closer cooperation between the NATO and the WEU was established³. NATO reacted immediately and, in the Oslo conference on foreign affairs in June 1992, supported the objective of strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance and that the WEU, as the defensive component of the EU, carried out the 'Petersberg' tasks⁴.

In June 1996, NATO launched the 'European Security and Defence Identity' (ESDI) in order to achieve a balance of roles and responsibilities of Europe and North America. The Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI) was an essential part of the ESDI: the first initiative with the specific purpose of improving European military capabilities. In addition, the Alliance's availability of means for crisis management operations led by the EU was decided, coining the term 'Berlin Plus'.

In April 1998, after the joint French-British declaration which confirmed the decision of creating the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP, December 1998), during the Washington Summit of Heads of State, NATO decided to develop the mechanisms of the 'Berlin Plus' agreements. In the same year, in the Cologne and Helsinki European Councils, the EU decided to make the necessary resources and capabilities available to assume the responsibilities formalized by the ESDP. The first meeting between the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and the interim Political and Security Committee took place in September 2000 to evaluate the progress in the relations NATO-EU.

² Speech of the Secretary General for Defence Policy: 'NATO's new Strategic Concept: the transatlantic view on Security and Defence' in the 1st Spanish-Canadian conference 'a common commitment towards peace and security', organized by the Embassy of Canada and the Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies (IEEE), held in the Centre for Higher National Defence Studies (CESEDEN) on March 8, 2011. The conference document can be downloaded in the following link: http://www.ieeee.es/2011_03_08.pdf

³ The WEU acted in the area of security for the EU from the Treaty of Maastricht to 1999, the year during which the crisis management was transferred to the EU and this organization ceased to exist on 30 June 2011. A detailed view of the WEU role in the context of the European defence can be downloaded in the following link: http://www.ieeee.es/Galerias/fichero/docs_marco/2011/DIEEEM07-2011EIPapelDeUEO.pdf

⁴ 'Petersberg' tasks: humanitarian and rescue tasks; peace keeping tasks; crisis management, including peacemaking and environmental protection.

Immediately after and in line with the progressive development of the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy, the Treaty of Nice was signed, although it came into force in 2003, and the relations NATO-EU were institutionalized in January 2001. The first meeting of Ministries of Foreign Affairs was held in Budapest in May 2001, with a final communiqué by the NATO's Secretary-General (SECGEN) and the EU Presidency on the Balkans.

During the Prague Summit in November 2002, given the lack of practical results of the DCI and the deep conflict with Afghanistan, a new initiative was launched: the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC), aiming to make the actual objectives of military capabilities more specific and measurable, especially in the European division and in the so-called theatre strategic capabilities, which would need a practical cooperation due to their characteristics and cost. For this purpose, the first meeting of the NATO-EU Capability Group was held in May 2003 and the European Defence Agency (EDA) was established in July 2004.

In December 2010, following the announcement of the French-British cooperation treaty on Defence, in a landscape of deep economic crisis and after continuous debates on the implementation of the Permanent Structured Cooperation (the new mechanism introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon which should make possible a more coherent and efficient development of capabilities), the EU launches a new initiative, officially 'Ghent Framework' but best known as 'pooling and sharing', since its goal is to systematically analyse the national military capabilities to increase interoperability for capabilities to be maintained on a national level and to explore which capabilities offer potential for pooling; in order to obtain synergies and reduce costs, intensifying cooperation based on roles-and-tasks sharing.

NATO reacted immediately and the SECGEN announced in the Munich Security Conference, in February 2011, the new concept of 'Smart Defence' as a renewed cooperation culture based on the idea of 'pooling and sharing'.

2. NATO-EU. A NECESSARY COOPERATION

'The May 2012 NATO Summit in Chicago will see the first results of the new attempt to make Europeans more militarily capable. Having decided last December on projects addressing some of the key shortfalls⁵, the EU has a unique opportunity to deliver a strong message –if the projects become reality. The European Council can be the tool, and its President the voice of a strong collective effort'⁶.

With more than 60 countries and accredited bodies in the summit, the largest in history and the third held in the United States and in which the SECGEN highlighted the invitation to the

⁵ See http://www.ieeee.es/12.03.23_3157FACouncilMeeting_PoolingandSharingMILCAP.pdf

⁶ Sven Biscop, 'As the EU Said at the NATO Summit', no. 33, February 2012. Security Policy Brief

EU and the United Nations, the opportunity is unique. The messages delivered from the United States are clear during the Defence Secretary's taking over, the Libya campaign and its revision of the national strategy for Defence 'Sustaining US Global Leadership. Priorities for 21st Century Defense'⁷. Cooperation between both organizations becomes a necessary condition if they want to maintain their relevant role in global security in the new geopolitical and geostrategic context.

Theatre cooperation has been and still is a reality. On 31 March 2003, the military operation 'Concordia' led by the EU relieved the NATO operation 'Allied Harmony' in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. This mission ended in December 2003 and was the first one to apply the 'Berlin Plus' mechanism.

Also in the Balkans, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, on 2 December 2004, the EU deployed the operation 'Althea' on the results of the allied operation 'Concordia' and to take over NATO's Stabilization Force (SFOR). The operation commander is the European Deputy Officer in the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, whose operational headquarters are located in the Supreme Headquarter Allied Powers in Europe. It has currently a contingent of 1400 men and women, and a common budget of 23 million Euros⁸. In Kosovo, where NATO has been leading the peacekeeping force (KFOR) since 1999, the EU has contributed to the United Nations' mission (UNMIK) through civil means. It also implemented the Rule of Law mission (EULEX) in December 2008, covering justice, police and custom areas. The mission has nowadays an international contingent of 1359 people and a local contingent of 1148, with a budget of 73 million Euros from December 2011 to June 2012. The United States, Norway, Switzerland and Turkey also contribute to this mission⁹. There is excellent coordination and cooperation between KFOR and EULEX, as is to be expected.


NATO and the EU hold the main role to permanently settling peace and stability in Afghanistan through the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) led by NATO and the police mission (EUPOL Afghanistan) since June 2007¹⁰.

⁷ It can be downloaded at: http://www.ieeee.es/USA_Defense_Strategic_Guidance_2012.pdf

⁸ See: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/april2012_Factsheet_EUFOR_Althea

⁹ See: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/120306_Factsheet_EULEX

¹⁰ See: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/APRIL_2012_FACTSHEET_EUPOL_Afghanistan



Both organizations also play key roles in Darfur, providing support especially in terms of air transport of personnel rotations, to the hybrid mission United Nations-African Union (UNAMID), which involves more than 28000 people and with an annual budget of nearly 1700 million dollars.

Finally, since September 2008, NATO and EU naval forces are deployed in the coast of Somalia on the missions 'Ocean Shield' and 'Atalanta' respectively, along with other international actors. 'Atalanta' keeps from 5 to 9 ships and 2 or 3 maritime patrol aircraft in the area, which requires a contingent of nearly 1400 soldiers with an annual budget of about 8 million Euros.

As the NATO SECGEN recently declared, on 12 March 2012, in the Foreign Affairs Committee of the EU: 'In the end, we must be pragmatic. The European Union and NATO have 21 members in common. But each of those nations has only one set of taxpayers, one set of armed forces and one set of capabilities. We need to get the most out of those forces and capabilities. That will benefit our organisations, our taxpayers, and our security.' Two keywords: avoid duplication and search for complementarity.

Going back to the times of the Clinton administration and the conditioned support which Madeleine Albright, Secretary of State, coined as the 'three Ds': no 'Discrimination' against the Allies which are not members of the EU, no 'Diminution' of European and North American security and no 'Duplication' of NATO's operational planning system and command structure. The SECGEN stated: 'To achieve these goals, I suggested a two-way street approach. On the one hand, all EU members should be able to participate in NATO-EU cooperation. And on the other hand, the EU should reinforce its political and military relations with those NATO Allies who are not members of the EU. This would include an overall security agreement between the EU and Turkey. And an arrangement between Turkey and the EDA'.

Thus the process of 'Pooling and Sharing' and 'Smart Defence' cannot be a mere preservation of capabilities European have, it must be much more. Political support of the highest level is required for the new cooperation system, which is becoming really promising due to the informal contacts and work by the personnel in the bodies in charge of applying this system, the EDA and the Allied Command Transformation (ACT).

As Sven Biscop says: 'Europe must ensure through quick and concrete follow-up that the momentum is not lost... Only the top political leaders of the Member States have the authority to order their defence establishments to make this happen, by reorienting both investments and cuts in function of the need to participate in collective projects. Perhaps the time has come to lift defence up to the level of the European Council, which until now has never taken charge of the CSDP. Under its President, Herman Van Rompuy, the European Council has started the practice of preparing the key summits between the EU and the great powers. Is not the NATO Summit such an occasion?. Even if not all of the 27 would be able and willing to join in now, it could create the critical mass for each individual project to start for real'.

3. CONCLUSIONS

It seems to be clear that in order to reach a European autonomy in terms of capabilities, autonomous strategic thinking and defence industry are also necessary.

Financial crisis has been able to achieve what time, constant dialogues, changing geopolitical frameworks and the different operation theatres could not. Political leaders and both public and private bodies and entities are called into question, and the different electoral processes confirm this aspect, to produce goods and services effectively and efficiently.

International bodies are requested higher effectiveness, although they are not called into question periodically through sensitive matters or binding referenda. NATO and CSDP have an important challenge in the upcoming times of austerity and cannot let down the nearly 1000 million people they work for with dedication, enthusiasm and commitment. As the

SECGEN said: ‘...we need to work together. And to do this successfully, we need a stronger NATO-EU relationship. A relationship that matches what we are already doing together on the ground. And that will help to preserve our freedom, our security, and our prosperity’.

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