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Are we facing the fifth  
international terrorist wave?

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## Are we facing the fifth international terrorist wave?

### Abstract:

After the death of Bin Laden, a clear decline of Al Qaeda and the emergence of a form of terrorism that reminds us, through its violence, to the worst moments of the decade of the nineties, is perceived. This new form of terrorism and the ineffective response of Western countries to it, could be indicative of a deeper change, the start of a new wave. Using the proposed cyclical analysis of terrorist violence represented through waves, provided by Rapoport,<sup>1</sup> an analytical study of the advantages and disadvantages of this statement is carried out, following Kaplan criteria,<sup>2</sup> to conclude that while not in its pure sense, we face a generational change with a new wave in international terrorism.

### Keywords:

International terrorism, fourth wave, fifth wave, Al Qaeda, DAESH, Boko Haram, authors, victims, audience.

<sup>1</sup> D. RAPOPORT, «The Four Waves of Rebel Terror and September 11 » *Anthropoetics - The Journal of Generative Anthropology* [en línea], VIII (I), 2002), [consulta 2015-01-10] ISSN 1083-7264 Available at: <http://www.anthropoetics.ucla.edu/>

<sup>2</sup> KAPLAN, J. «Terrorism's Fifth Wave: A Theory, a Conundrum and a Dilemma.» *Perspectives on Terrorism* Vol 2, No 2, (2008). ISSN 2334-3745

## Introduction

In recent years, especially after the elimination of Osama bin Laden, there has been a decline in Al Qaeda and a significant change in the modus operandi of many terrorist groups that we knew as Jihadist Salafist. Some of the new aspects of terrorism are: the extreme violence, the strategy on three different fronts, the occupation and control of the territory and the local exploitation as a means of financing, along with the overexploitation of propaganda (especially on social media). It seems as if it were a new phenomenon that terrifies the international community, leading to situations that verge on institutional panic.

While for many fledgling experts this is a totally new form of terrorism, others more experienced who have spent more time studying militant Islamism remember groups such as Al-Gama'a Al-Islamiyya or the bloodthirsty GIA in Algeria in terms of how they use terrorism. As in the case of the DAESH caliphate, these new groups tried to give birth to emirates that controlled territories where they could impose the Islamic law, applying the *hisba* (ordering the right and prohibiting the evil).

Some ideological principles common to all Islamic fundamentalist doctrinal lines can be identified:

- a) The desire to restore the original greatness of Islam in both the spiritual and temporal fields.
- b) The re-Islamisation of Muslim societies from what they define as orthodoxy.
- c) The aspiration for political structures to be Islamic and to ensure the creation of an environment consistent with the religious principles.
- d) The desire to achieve the union of all Muslims.
- e) The will to spread Islam around the whole planet.<sup>3</sup>

The hybridization between terrorist groups and transnational organized crime groups is an emerging issue. While certain terrorist groups such as the FARC or Hezbollah implement or benefit from various criminal activities ranging from trafficking to extortion or kidnapping to financing themselves, other transnational organized crime groups such as the Zeta or the Sinaloa cartel use terror to impose territorial control. Limits have become blurred and activities overlap.

Taking a look at the kidnapping of girls, the beheadings, and other horrors which are disseminated globally, in addition to the ease with which horrible attacks occur in the heart of Europe, it can be concluded that the current terrorist wave especially aims at the public. Other objectives include the skilful use of images to terrorize the global audience, along with the unconditional coverage of the western press and the ability

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<sup>3</sup> JORDÁN, J. (2005). El terrorismo islamista en España. En A. BLANCO, R. DEL AGUILA, & J. M. SABUCEDO, *Madrid 11-M: un análisis del mal y sus consecuencias* (pgs. 79-112). Madrid: Trotta, S.A.

to attract young third-generation Muslims with an unclear identity, combined sometimes with a weak integrity.

The fundamental questions to be answered are: Are we facing a fifth international terrorist wave? Is it a new phenomenon or a combination of the previous waves? If this was the case, what background do we have, and what methods have been used in the past to combat it?

In an interview in 1988, the director of the RAND Corporation's sub-national security and conflict program Brian Jenkins, stated the following: "terrorists prefer a lot of people carefully observing many dead people,"<sup>4</sup> which stresses the strong communicative character of terrorist violence and the existence of a broader trend.<sup>5</sup> Furthermore, James Woolsey, former head of the CIA stated in 1994:

"Today's terrorists do not want a place at the table, what they want is to destroy the table and everyone who sits at it."<sup>6</sup>

Nowadays we can say that groups such as DAESH want the whole table and to control everyone sitting at it. Something has changed.

### **But do we agree on what we understand by terrorism?**

It seems easier to point out the flaws of the existing uses of the term than to arrive at a definition that is both sufficiently broad and useful for academic research.<sup>7</sup> Comparing two different academic definitions, the first one (which is very long) seems more a description than a definition:

"Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby - in contrast to assassination - the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat- and violence-based communication processes between terrorist (organization), (imperilled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands,

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<sup>4</sup> <http://www.lib.uci.edu/quest/index.php?page=jenkins>

<sup>5</sup> RANSTORP, M. «Introduction: Mapping Terrorism Research – Challenges and Priorities.» En *Mapping Terrorism Research. State of the Art, Gaps and Future Direction*, de M. RANSTORP, (2006), 2-24. Estocolmo: Routledge,.

<sup>6</sup> The Newyorker, what terrorists want Nicholas Lemann october 29, 2001 [http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2001/10/29/011029fa\\_FACT1](http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2001/10/29/011029fa_FACT1)

<sup>7</sup> LIZARDO, O., «Defining and Theorizing Terrorism: A Global Actor-Centered Approach» *Journal of World-Systems Research*, 2008, Vol.XIV (2), pp. 91-118, ISSN 1076-156X, p.91.

or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought."<sup>8</sup>

This definition by Schmid was made following the answers he received from the academics to whom a questionnaire was given. Respondents had initially given 109 different definitions. The last ones consisted of twenty-two defining elements that Schmid classified by order of frequency with which they appeared in the questionnaires. The definition reflects sixteen of these twenty-two defining elements.

We can identify in the definition the three essential agents in terrorism: the perpetrators, the victims and the audience. The way in which these agents are considered, allows us to characterise a certain definition of terrorism.<sup>9</sup>

- In relation to the authors, definitions differ in whether they include or not the so-called state-terrorism or simply the one produced by sub-national actors, and whether the violence indirectly sponsored by the state could be considered as terrorism.
- In relation to the victims; while the definitions by certain investigators along with political actors and certain legal definitions consider that only the attacks against non-combatants constitute terrorism; others think they are only a general feature of terrorism; for certain others they include the attacks against the military depending on the context in which they occur, for example the armed forces that are not actively involved in combat or in peacetime; but most experts seem to accept that terrorism can imply attacks against all sorts of targets, regardless of their condition in combat.
- As for the third part of the definition (the audience), there is a widespread understanding that terrorism involves a psychological aspect, either by emphasising its role as an "anxiety trigger" that incites fear or its focus on certain types of direct victims as indirect messengers for a much broader public, (SANDLER 2014).<sup>10</sup>

The second definition was searched in the three main professional journals in the field of terrorism. The authors suggested an agreed definition based on the lowest common denominator:

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<sup>8</sup> SCHMID, A., JONGMAN, A. *Political Terrorism*. Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers., 2005, ISBN 9781412815666, p.28.

<sup>9</sup> For a study of the influence of the definition of terrorism look at: "Terrorism: A review of differences in definition" at <http://www.crisis.acleddata.com/a-review-of-tactics-by-officially-designated-terrorist-organisations/>

<sup>10</sup> SANDLER, T «The analytical study of terrorism: Taking stock» *Journal of Peace Research* (2014) 51 (2), 257-271, ISSN: 0022-3433

“Terrorism is a politically motivated tactic involving the threat or use of force or violence in which the pursuit of publicity plays a significant role.”<sup>11</sup> (WEINBERG, PEDAHZUR y HIRSCH-HOEFLER 2004).

This definition certainly identifies the audience as the main actor.

### The four waves of terrorism

As we said, terrorism is not a new phenomenon. Although the history of modern terrorism must not necessarily affect the future development of the phenomenon, many of the patterns that groups such as Boko Haram or DAESH follow, have been used in the past, hence their study is essential to know their development and identify possible anti-terrorist policies. In my opinion, the cyclical analysis of terrorist violence proposed by Rapoport is a good starting point.

Rapoport's proposed cyclical analysis of terrorist violence is inseparable from the major changes in state organisations and the socioeconomic structures of human communities. Cyclical dynamic—which undertakes phases of mobilisation and demobilisation— would be the result of the interaction between organisations, authorities, movements and interest groups.<sup>12</sup>

Sydney Tarrow considers a collective mobilisation cyclical dynamic with three stages. The first one, a rising phase, which occurs when people who have been suffering grievances for a long time face the imposition of new injustices, or when the opportunities for action increase due to a less coercive political climate. Then, an accelerated increase of the initial demands takes place, which has three effects in the political field:

- By showing the vulnerability of the authorities to these demands, it generates new opportunities for protest.
- It fosters collective action by reducing its costs for other actors, which in turn allows an increased response.
- All this threatens the interests of both the State and the competing groups for the same political territory.<sup>13</sup>

In this stage, violence considerably increases, since the entry of a new member in the political community tends to lead to confrontation due to several reasons: the competitors for the same resources will be willing to fight with all their means,

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<sup>11</sup> WEINBERG, LEONARD, AMI PEDAHZUR, y SIVAN HIRSCH-HOEFLER. *Op. Cit.*

<sup>12</sup>E. GONZALEZ CALLEJA, «Las oleadas históricas de la violencia terrorista», *Revista de Psicología Social*, Vol. 24 (2), 2009, p. 119-137, ISSN0213-4748

<sup>13</sup> TARROW, S. (1989). *Democracy and Disorder: Protest and Politics in Italy, 1965-1975*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, ISBN-978-0198275619

contenders will tend to use force to strengthen their demands, and each actor will label others' actions as illegitimate, and therefore in need of justified and extraordinary means of coercion,<sup>14</sup> (TARROW 1989).

In the intermediate stage, the highlight of mobilisation, which seems to be contagious to society as a whole, is reached. Conflict between groups becomes intense and widespread: the elite's instability increases, objective or explicit coalitions are formed between the various actors, but at the same time resentment and antagonism increase as a result of getting popular support or other power resources.<sup>15</sup>

In the descendant stage of the cycle, the tactical innovations proposed to extend the protest dynamic lead to new outbreaks of violent clashes and repression, which in turn lead to discouragement. People start to dissent, not only from the content of collective action but also from its legitimacy. All this discourages action, and forces the movements that have remained in the protest outside of the social movements of reference, to adopt more and more extreme and violent militant attitudes.<sup>16</sup>

For David C. Rapoport, the "Anarchist Wave" represents the first global or truly international terrorist experience in history. They were followed by three similar, consecutive and sometimes even overlapping periods: the "Anticolonial Wave" — which started in the 1920s and lasted almost forty years—, the "New Left Wave" —that started to fade significantly at the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, just leaving a certain number of active groups—, and finally the "Religious Wave"—that emerged in 1979 and will disappear in 2025 if we apply the pattern of the three precedent waves, giving way to a new wave—.<sup>17</sup>

Rapaport asks rhetorically what a wave is:

"It is a cycle of activity of activity situated in different time periods and is characterised by having both expansion and contraction phases. A defining feature of a wave is that it is international in character: similar activities would occur in several countries in a specific time period, all with a predominating 'energy' that shapes the groups' characteristics and relationships with each other."

As their own name suggests, each wave, the "anarchist," "anticolonial," "from new left," and "religious"; has a "different energy."<sup>18</sup>

The first three waves lasted around 40 to 50 years, even though the "new left" wave would be slightly shorter. The pattern seems to adapt to the human life cycle, in which the dreams that inspired fathers are not as appealing to their children. Usually, the terrorist

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<sup>14</sup> Ibid

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

<sup>16</sup> TARROW, S., Ibid

<sup>17</sup> RAPOPORT, C.D. Op. Cit. p 47

<sup>18</sup> Ibíd.

organisations wear out before the wave does, although an organisation can sometimes survive its associated wave.<sup>19</sup>

Each wave has given rise to notorious works that reflect the special qualities of the wave itself, and contribute to the modern common effort of drawing up a terror “science.” If one compares Nechaev’s “Revolutionary Catechism” with the “instructions manual” that Bin Laden wrote for Al Qaeda, a major thrust is found in both: to learn both from own and friends’ and enemies’ experiences. Apart from the works of Nechaev and Bin Laden, we can find Georgios Grivas’ “Guerrilla Warfare” or Carlos Marighella’s “Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla,” corresponding to the second and third wave, respectively.<sup>20</sup>

### First wave

Anarchist terrorism contributed the most to the spread of Western fear as a whole new terrorist phenomenon. In 1898, an international conference called “anti-anarchist” — since back then, both anarchism and terrorism were almost identical for the governments and public opinion that shared the concern about the succession of attacks inspired by the anarchist ideology—,<sup>21</sup> was held in Rome to address it.

The culmination of the first wave came in the 1890s, in the so-called “golden age of murder,” when monarchs and prime ministers were incessantly assassinated, generally by murderers who moved nimbly across international borders.<sup>22</sup> Theodore Roosevelt took the opportunity to launch the first international effort against terrorism:

“Anarchy is a crime against the whole human race; and all mankind should band against the anarchist. His crime should be made an offense against the law of nations, like piracy and that form of man-stealing known as the slave trade; for it is of far blacker infamy than either. It should be so declared by treaties among all civilized powers. Such treaties would give to the Federal Government the power of dealing with the crime.”

Theodore Roosevelt, First Annual Message, December 3, 1901.

The first main wave of terrorism was not exclusively anarchist: The Russian narodniki and some nationalist groups such as the Irish, played a significant role in it.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> D. RAPOPORT, «The Four Waves of Rebel Terror and September 11 » *Anthropoetics - The Journal of Generative Anthropology* [en línea], VIII (I), 2002), [consulta 2015-01-10] ISSN 1083-7264 Available at : <http://www.anthropoetics.ucla.edu/>

<sup>20</sup>D. RAPOPORT, The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism, *Ibid*, p.49.

<sup>21</sup> AVILÉS, J. Nacimiento del terrorismo en occidente. Anarquía nihilismo y violencia revolucionaria. Madrid: Siglo XXI de España, 2009 , ISBN 978-8432313103, p.ix

<sup>22</sup>D. RAPOPORT, The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism, *op. cit.*p.52.

<sup>23</sup> AVILÉS, J. *Op. Cit.* p.ix

## The second wave

The second wave started in the 1920s, although it originated in the aftermath of World War II, and was driven by the aim of national liberation. Terrorism was sometimes used in the context of the guerrilla warfare (such as in the Viet Minh's fight against French domination), and other times as the dominant form of violence (such as in Algeria or the Palestine controlled by the British).<sup>24</sup> The aim of terrorism during the second wave was to obtain national independence from the European colonial powers.<sup>25</sup>

After the end of World War I, the Versailles Peace Treaty unleashed the "anticolonial" hope. The defeated states' empires (mostly in Europe), divided after the implementation of the principle of self-determination. When independence was not possible immediately, territories would become "mandates," with the long-term goal of becoming independent. However, the victors could not defend these principles without raising doubts about their own empires' legitimacy. IRA was born in 1920, and the terrorist groups developed after World War II in all the imperial regions except the Soviet Union. New states such as Ireland, Israel, Cyprus, Yemen and Algeria were born.<sup>26</sup>

The tactics employed during the second wave are different to those of the first in some aspects. Bank robberies were less common, partly because this second time, the economic contributions from the diaspora were greater. A new lesson was learnt, that the assassination of prominent political figures was sometimes counterproductive. As a result, only a few attacks occurred against such people. Martyrdom, often linked to the assassination of prominent figures too, also lost importance. The new strategy consisted firstly in eliminating the police through systematic murders, since they were the governments' eyes and ears. The military would replace them, not without leading to atrocities in their response as a consequence of their inexperience to deal with terrorists, and this would in turn increase the social support for terrorists. If the process of atrocities and counter-atrocities was well planned, it almost always played into the hands of those perceived as weak and without alternatives.<sup>27</sup>

The second wave organizations understood they had to change the denomination they used to describe themselves, as "terrorist" had so many negative connotations that those who identified themselves in such terms had to bear a political burden. The Israeli group Lehi was the last one to identify itself as a terrorist. Begin, the leader of Irgun (the Zionist rival group of Lehi), described its people as "freedom fighters," fighting against "government's terror."<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> ARON, R. Paix et guerre entre las naciones. Paris: Calmann Levi, 1962.

<sup>25</sup>WEINBERG, L.; EUBANK, W. «An End to the Fourth Wave of Terrorism?», *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 33: 7, 2010, 594 — 602, ISSN: 1057-610X, p.595

<sup>26</sup>D. RAPOPORT, The Four Waves of Rebel Terror and September 11, *Op. Cit.*

<sup>27</sup>D. RAPOPORT, The Four Waves of Rebel Terror and September 11, *Ibid.* (D. C. RAPOPORT 2002)

<sup>28</sup>D. RAPOPORT, The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism, *op. cit.*p.54.

### Third wave

The third wave emerged during the 1960s and continued until the 1980s. Those who carried out terrorist violence acts during this period, used it for social revolution and natural self-determination. The “urban guerrillas” in Uruguay, Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela, tried to overthrow the ruling capitalist system. Simultaneously, relatively small revolutionary groups (such as the German Red Army Faction, the Italian Red Brigades, the Japanese Red Army or the Weather Underground) carried out attempts to overthrow capitalism in the prosperous industrialized democracies of Western Europe, Japan and the United States.<sup>29</sup>

National separatism had not disappeared, as shown by its evolution in Northern Ireland and the Basque Country. Between 1960 and 1980, the groups under the scope of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), often justified their efforts to destroy the State of Israel in terms of national or pan-Arab liberation, or as a third-world revolutionary broader international fight to destroy the remains of Western imperialism.<sup>30</sup>

The main event that fostered the “new left” wave was the atrocious Vietnam War. The effectiveness of the Vietcong’s “primitive weapons” against the modern North American technology revived the radicals’ hope of the contemporary system’s vulnerability. After the end of the Vietnam War in 1975, the PLO replaced the Vietcong as a heroic model. The PLO originated after the Arab armies’ collapse, in 1967, during the Six Day War. Its existence and persistence brought credibility to those who argued that Israel could only be expelled through terror.<sup>31</sup>

The first and third wave had certain similarities:

- Women recovered the role they had lost during the second wave, either as leaders or combatants.
- Sensational targets, comparable to the first wave ones, replaced the “military” targets (such as international kidnappings) preferred during the second wave.
- Proliferation of kidnappings to finance or obtain certain demands. The most sensational was the kidnapping and murder of Aldo Moro by the Red Brigades in 1979.
- The abandoned practice of murdering prominent figures was recovered. An example was the murder of Carrero Blanco in 1973.<sup>32</sup>

However, the logic behind the first and third waves was different. Victims during the first wave of terrorism were murdered because they held a public service position. The murders during the “new left” wave were often “punishments.” The assassination of the

<sup>29</sup>WEINBERG, L.; EUBANK, W. An End to the Fourth Wave of Terrorism?, op. cit., p. 595

<sup>30</sup> D. RAPOPORT, The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism, Ibid.

<sup>31</sup>D. RAPOPORT, The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism, Op. Cit.p.56.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid., p.56-7.

Prime Minister of Jordan and the assassination attempt on King Hussein by Black September occurred because the King and the Prime Minister had expelled the PLO from their country after a violent battle.<sup>33</sup>

During the 1980s and early 1990s, there was a general decline in terrorist acts. Left-wing and right-wing extremist groups disappeared almost completely from the European political landscape, and the nationalist-separatist terrorist fury was moderated after the peace negotiations in Ireland and the Basque Country, and the Oslo peace process.<sup>34</sup>

#### Fourth wave, the religious wave

Two major events encouraged the fourth wave of modern terrorism in the late 1970s. First, the Iranian Revolution during 1979-1980, culminating with the establishment of an Islamist theocracy under the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini. Second, the Soviet decision in 1979 to provide the secular and communist regime of Afghanistan with military aid, which would lead to a violent resistance against the Soviets. In both cases, religious radicalism or the cited radicalism combined with nationalist claims justified the use of violence.<sup>35</sup>

The year 1979, according to the Muslim calendar, was the beginning of a new century; and according to tradition (which had regularly unleashed uprisings during the previous centuries), during this year a redeemer would arrive. More than 400 armed fundamentalists, led by Juhayman Al Oteibi and a man named “the Mahdi” (the awaited Messiah), occupied for 14 days the Great Mosque in Mecca (Islam’s main holy place). The Iranian Revolution occurred during the expected year and marked the beginning of the 15<sup>th</sup> century in the Muslim calendar. Subsequently, the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan occurred in February 1988; and the collapse of the communist regime during 1989-91, coinciding with the first Persian Gulf War in 1990-1991.<sup>36</sup>

A new subversive myth emerged from these crises: the imposition of religious fundamentalism over the secular revolutionary ethos, especially the one represented by a declining Marxism-Leninism, but also a potential threat against the liberal-capitalist order, which was more vulnerable due to the process of globalization.<sup>37</sup> As González Calleja states:

“The diffusion of religious fundamentalism facilitated the emergence of the great tactical innovation of the time: a sacred and fundamental terrorism with strong martyrdom and self-immolation components, which took root mainly in the

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<sup>33</sup>Ibid., p.57.

<sup>34</sup>E. GONZALEZ CALLEJA, *Las oleadas históricas de la violencia terrorista*, *Op.Cit.*

<sup>35</sup>WEINBERG, L.; EUBANK, W. *An End to the Fourth Wave of Terrorism?*, *op. cit.*, p. 595

<sup>36</sup>E. GONZALEZ CALLEJA, *Op. Cit.*

<sup>37</sup>O’BALLANCE, E.. *Islamic Fundamentalist Terrorism, 1979-95: The Iranian Connection*, Nueva York: New YorkUniversity Press., (1997) ISBN 9780333654729

Islamic sectors less inclined to change (in the sense of modernizing), and more severely punished either by the economic crisis or by Western-led political repression.”<sup>38</sup>

Apart from the specific local causes, Sunni terrorism soon appeared in states with large Islamic populations, such as: Egypt, Syria, Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, the Philippines or Indonesia. Certain Sunni groups followed the PLO's attacks against Israel, particularly when veterans of the Afghan war who had come from all parts of the Islamic world returned to their countries of origin with the will, confidence and training, to carry out terrorist operations against their weak governments.<sup>39</sup>

The last two decades of the twentieth century also saw a series of violent incidents due to different religious reasons which were not related with the Iranian revolution and the invasion of Afghanistan. In India, Sikhs launched a terrorist campaign against Hindus, in an effort to secure an independent state at Punjab. Moreover, the Hindus launched a violent campaign in the country against Muslims, while the Muslims carried out, in turn, terrorist attacks against the Hindus in the disputed state of Jammu/Kashmir (WEINBERG y EUBANK 2010).<sup>40</sup> Doubtlessly these events must be taken into account, even though the fourth wave of modern terrorism has clearly been dominated by Islamic radicalism.<sup>41</sup>

In terms of lethality, (number of dead and wounded people) and reach (global), along with the relative longevity of the organisations involved, the Fourth Wave appears to be much more dangerous than any of the former ones. 35 years have passed, if we accept the Iranian Revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as the incidents that marked the beginning of the fourth wave.

### Could we be at the threshold of a fifth wave?

Sceptics use two arguments to reject the arrival of a fifth wave. First, unlike the previous terrorist waves, the current one originated with a broad mass protest movement and the resentment throughout the whole Muslim world, and its therefore very unlikely for it to cease or even diminish. Second, terrorist acts based on religion unleash deep human emotions, and it is quite unlikely for them to disappear as quick as events based on ideological abstractions.<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>38</sup>E. GONZALEZ CALLEJA, *Las oleadas históricas de la violencia terrorista*, *op.cit.*

<sup>39</sup>D. RAPOPORT, *The Four Waves of Rebel Terror and September 11*, *op. cit*

<sup>40</sup>WEINBERG, L.; EUBANK, W., *Ibíd.*

<sup>41</sup>*Ibíd.*

<sup>42</sup>WEINBERG, L.; EUBANK, W. *An End to the Fourth Wave of Terrorism?*, *op. cit.*, p. 595

Kaplan defends the existence of a “fifth wave”, that has a precise origin and a catalyst event like the four that preceded it.<sup>43</sup> Even though its precursors were the Khmer Rouge, it materialised with the emergence of the Lord’s Resistance Army in northern Uganda, the first full-fledged movement of the fifth wave of modern terrorism and one of the movements that continues to be closer to a pure case of the cited wave of terrorism.

### The cases of Daesh and Boko Haram

DAESH has three components. First, as a proto-state defined as the Islamic State, it controls territories whose borders are diffuse, some are highly-controlled while other are not. Daesh also is a network of radical groups operating in and outside the Muslim world. Finally, it is also a psychological state that inspires young foreigners with deep social problems.

For J-Kaplan, a pure case of the fifth wave would have the following characteristics:

*It radicalizes and breaks away from the established terrorist wave.* While the main force during the fourth wave was Al Qaeda, this organization and its branches have been divided and some of the groups have sworn loyalty to the Islamic State. Daesh separated from Al Qaeda, and is currently fighting the organization’s branch, the Al-Nusra front, in Syria. Boko Haram, which never was an Al Qaeda branch, has sworn loyalty to the self-proclaimed caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

*It is born of hope expressed at the extremes: some emerge after all hope has been lost, others because the dream has been realized.* With the elimination of both Al Qaeda’s earlier emir in Iraq (Abu Musab al Zarqawi) and Osama Bin Laden, everything seemed to be lost; but the withdrawal of North American forces from Iraq led to a strong comeback of the group.

*It promotes physical withdrawal into wilderness areas.* The presence of havens is important. Daesh occupies the Syrian desert, far from the large urban concentrations both from Syria and Iraq. The only important occupied city is Mosul. Likewise, Boko Haram also moves more easily in areas near Lake Chad, on the periphery, and beyond the control of the capitals and major cities of the countries in the area.

*Claim to establish some form of a new calendar (‘Year Zero’).* Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s self-proclamation as caliph represents the emergence of a new “Mahdi,” and the beginning of a new era. Its recognition by other groups such as Boko Haram, through the homage rendered, reinforces the sense of the new calendar.

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<sup>43</sup> KAPLAN, J. «Terrorism’s Fifth Wave: A Theory, a Conundrum and a Dilemma.» *Perspectives on Terrorism* Vol 2, No 2, (2008). ISSN 2334-3745

*There is a radical search for racial, tribal and religious purity.* This occurs in the case of Daesh, which rejects and wants to eliminate Christians, Jews and various Shiite branches. Boko Haram is another case that proves this; with its killings of Christians (especially in churches) and its forced conversions.

*The impossible internal compromise results in deadly schisms and constant internal violence.* We have already examined the division which is taking place in Al Qaeda's branches, resulting in a real schism in Jihadist Salafism.

*The emphasis on creating new men and women makes old models expendable; thus the logic of genocidal violence.* This genocidal violence is one of the elements that defines, to the same extent, Daesh and Boko Haram. The violent destruction of the enemy is part of their DNA.

*The obsession with creating a new race, places tremendous emphasis on women, who are both subject and object of fifth wave violence.* Women are subject of certain attacks, especially in Europe, but at the same time they are a preferred object of violence.

*Children are the vanguard of the fifth wave as they are the least contaminated by the old society.* Media coverage of children executing enemies is symbolic: the model of war children has been refined and exacerbated.

*Rape is the signature tactic of the fifth wave.* Reality in this sense is so cruel that it is enough to mention it without further comments, both in the case of Daesh and especially Boko Haram.

*Violence is so pervasive in the fifth wave, that it loses its message content.* Both in Daesh's and Boko Haram's cases, high-level violence is used to terrorise local enemies, and in a greater extent, a western audience which is terrified—including its authorities— due to the extreme violence employed

*The effects of ritualized acts of rape and killing, especially for newly abducted 'recruits',* has the liminal effect of binding the killers to the group while closing the doors for all group members to a return to family, the old society, and previous ways of life.

*Fifth wave groups are localistic and particularistic, having turned their backs on the international waves from which they emerged.* This is true for Boko Haram, but not so much for Daesh, which combines a local agenda for the caliphate with an international and global strategy.

*Authoritarian in nature, with charismatic leadership patterns:* it is the essence of the caliphate.

*Chiliastic in nature, deeply religious with eclectic or syncretic religious tropes assembled and interpreted by the leaders in support of a millenarian dream to be realized through a campaign of violence.*<sup>44</sup> This condition is thoroughly fulfilled by both groups, (KAPLAN 2008).

## Conclusions

Different stages or waves can be identified in international terrorism. The first four waves are well defined, even though they sometimes overlap temporally or geographically.

Regarding a final fifth wave, ideal cases are difficult to find and the same value cannot be attributed to all the variables. However, from a global point of view, some terrorist groups such as the Lord's Resistance Army, Boko Haram, or especially the self-proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (Daesh), largely respond to Kaplan's fifth wave characteristics. Following these criteria, we would now be at the gates of a fifth wave.

But not all experts give the same value to the stages or waves of terrorism. For Luigi Bonanate:

"We have no good reason to think that the 21<sup>st</sup> century will pass without having to face both domestic and international terrorism. But if one takes into account the empirical data, this apparently indisputable claim requires a further deepening, as the terrorism "stages" cannot be reduced to regularity or inevitability patterns. Consequently, the past does not necessarily have to be, in itself, a good guide for the future, nor does it have to give us a useful indication about it,"<sup>45</sup> (BONANATE 2007, 2).

Even though it is not new phenomena, we now identify changes in the way terrorism is practiced, the use of strategies at various levels and adapted to the environment, the possibility of coordinating and promoting foreign actions to soften internal pressure, and the ability to successfully organise coordinated attacks in countries that have a well-developed intelligence such as France. In my opinion, we now face an evil problem, for which the Western countries do not have a clear answer, but a high uncertainty level.

Or maybe not!

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<sup>44</sup> KAPLAN, J., *Op. Cit.*

<sup>45</sup> BONANATE, L.. *Democracia italiana y terrorismo internacional: ¿quién vencerá el desafío?* Madrid: Real Instituto Elcano (2007),

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