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THE 12th RESOLUTION OF THE IAEA  
ABOUT IRAN

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## THE 12th RESOLUTION OF THE IAEA ABOUT IRAN

### Abstract:

The IAEA Board of Governors concluded its meeting of the year on 14<sup>th</sup> September 2012 after adopting a resolution urging Iran to cooperate with the Agency. The resolution, binding on Iran, takes into account the latest report from the IAEA that collects the conclusions of the inspections carried out in 2012 in the nuclear facilities declared by Iran. This report concludes with the statement that the IAEA cannot confirm that Iran's nuclear program will not be diverted to military purposes. The IAEA calls for more cooperation from Iran and urges it to implement the Additional Protocol to allow inspectors to visit undeclared buildings as Parchin military base where, according to the latest satellite imagery, works on the structure of the building and its surroundings are being carried out.

### Keywords:


IAEA, Iran, NPT, nuclear, Parchin

## THE RESOLUTION BY THE IAEA'S BOARD OF GOVERNORS

On September 14<sup>th</sup> 2012, the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) adopted a new resolution concerning Iran's nuclear program. This is the twelfth resolution it adopts since 2003, when the first resolution was adopted. In that resolution, Iran was bound to remedy all the non-fulfillments pointed out by the Agency and it was urged to fully cooperate with the Agency in order to grant the verification of the Safeguards Agreement.

The 12th resolution was approved by 31 out of the 35 Members of the Board of Governors. Cuba voted against it and Ecuador, Egypt and Tunisia abstained. It has not been officially published yet, but it is known that the text expresses uncertainty and concern about Iran's nuclear activities. However, the text does not mention eventual sanctions, as China and Russia proposed. These two countries are making constant efforts to promote the path of negotiation.

The decisions expressed in the resolution take into account the last report by the Director General<sup>1</sup> on the implementation of Safeguards Agreement, related to the NPT which collects the results of the inspections carried out in 2012 in the nuclear facilities where inspectors have been allowed to access.



Source: [www.worldnews.nbcnews.com/](http://www.worldnews.nbcnews.com/)

Regarding the declared facilities<sup>2</sup> that the inspectors of IAES have been able to visit, the report points out that Iran has not suspended its uranium enriching activities in the nuclear plants of Natanz and Fordow. In addition, Iran has not provided any information about the

<sup>1</sup> GOV/2012/37

<sup>2</sup> GOV/2004/83

announcement made in 2010 on the building of new uranium enrichment facilities and the possession of technology to carry out this laser process.

With regard to reprocessing, the inspections in Tehran Nuclear Research Centre, in the facilities where the Agency has access, confirm that activities related to that process are not being carried out.

Regarding processes related to heavy water, Iran has not suspended its activity. It continues the construction of the IR-40 reactor in Arak, whose exploitation is projected to start in the third quarter of 2013. Furthermore, the heavy water production plant (HWPP) in Arak is currently working, as satellite imagery confirms; even though this facility is included in the Safeguards Agreement, the inspectors have not been allowed to have access to it.

With regard to Isfahan, Iran continues to produce nuclear fuel, despite the fact that it is bound to suspend this activity. Iran puts forward that the fuel is going to be used in research reactors.

The report also points out that there is no evidence about the diversion of nuclear material for military purposes, according to the inspections carried out in the declared facilities. However, there are doubts about what kind of the activities are carried out in the military base of Parchin, located near Teheran. The IAEA knows that there is a large explosives containment vessel in which to conduct hydrodynamic experiments, but its accurate location was not determined until March 2011. The latest satellite images of the area, taken in February 2012, prove that there is activity in the area. Buildings have been demolished and the part of the building where the containment vessel is located has been buried.

In order to dispel any doubts, the IAEA urges Iran to allow inspectors to have access to the Parchin military base; for that purpose, Iran would have to implement the Additional Protocol, which allows inspections in both declared and undeclared facilities.

The IAEA considers that the pieces of information from inspections, Member-States intelligence services and the ones given by Iran are reliable enough to conclude convincingly that Iran *“is failing to comply with its binding obligations and, as a consequence, the peacefulness of its nuclear program is not credible internationally”*.

## **IRAN’S RESPONSE: PATIENTE AND RESPECT**

Iran has responded to the IAEA’s report and the recent resolution by saying that its activities are peaceful and that they are only aimed to ensure energy supply for the country. Iran calls for patience regarding verification processes. It also calls for respect, as it is being continuously accused of lack of transparency. Iran accuses the IAEA of not being partial<sup>3</sup> anymore and it has proposed a more equitable composition of the group of members that

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<sup>3</sup> Declarations by Fereydon Abasi, Vice President of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), in the General Conference of the AEOI (50th Regular Session).

make decisions in the Agency. Moreover, Iran argues that the lack of information should not be related to the concealment of an eventual military program, but to national security reasons, as some pieces of sensitive information could happen to fall into the hands of terrorist infiltrators and this would be a serious threaten to the country.

### **SOLUTION: MORE NEGOTIATIONS**

Despite the clear and worrying conclusions of the IAEA's report, the path of negotiation is still considered a valid way.

As the IAEA points out, carrying on with negotiations seems to be the way that is going to be used in order to build confidence in Iran's nuclear program. Indeed, many negotiation frameworks have been proposed to reach a political solution. During the last years, Iran has been holding conversations with the United Nations, the P5+1, the EU, the IAEA and even the CICA<sup>4</sup> could take action on this matter.

At the same time, several countries, Spain among them, have implemented sanctions to reduce oil importations from Iran as a pressure measure to make the funding of the nuclear more difficult.

The International Community could also consider other alternatives, such as: imposing harder sanctions to which Iran could respond by blocking the Strait of Hormuz; retiring Iran from NPT, due to constant pressure and obtaining no benefit as Member State, as North Korea already did; a military intervention to destroy the facilities whose consequences could be unpredictable.

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<sup>4</sup> Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia.