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SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT:THE
INTERVENTION OF THE EUROPEAN
UNION IN SOMALIA

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Abstract:

The European Union has implemented a 'comprehensive approach' in Somalia, a country now considered as the paradigm of a failed state, that tries to assess the situation from different angles and perspectives. Two fundamental parts of that approach are the fields of security and development. This essay sheds light on how these grounds interact in the frame of the 'comprehensive approach' by analysing to what extent the European Union development aid contributes to enhance security in the country. In order to do so, this work studies the nature of the European Union 'comprehensive approach' and the specific programmes that are implemented in the region, including military missions, financial mechanisms and diverse development, as well as humanitarian aid. After that, the main part of the essay consists of an analysis of the improvements and shortcomings of this line of action for Somalia.

Keywords:

Security, Development, Comprehensive approach, European Union, Somalia.

***NOTA:** Las ideas contenidas en los **Documentos de Opinión** son de responsabilidad de sus autores, sin que reflejen, necesariamente, el pensamiento del IEEE o del Ministerio de Defensa.

INTRODUCTION

In 1991, after President Siad Barre was overthrown in Somalia, a struggle for power among clans led the country to chaos and destruction for over twenty years. The lack of a stable government able to enhance the rule of law during that time turned Somalia into what internationally has been known as the paradigm of a *failed state*. Corruption, violence, terrorism or piracy combined with frequent droughts and famine and caused deep humanitarian crises and a process of diaspora that resulted in 1.5 million exiled people as well as another 1.5 million of internally displaced persons¹. All these phenomena soon attracted the attention of the international community to a country which, due to its geographical situation in the Horn of Africa, became highly relevant for the global stability. The main challenge was how to finish with the spiral of insecurity, provoked above all by the presence of piracy and the jihadist group al-Shabaab, which prevented the creation of a firm government, the development of the country and the end of the humanitarian crises. International organisations and institutions, among them the European Union (EU), then started to contribute economically to support the securitisation, stabilisation and development of Somalia. But, considering all the different problems that have characterized the country during the last decades, is there a real solution? And if so, which is the correct approach? Is the international community able to tackle the constant security threats that impede the creation of a cohesive government? What is the role of the European Union? Where do the European funds and aid programmes go? Are development aid and security compatible? These are some of the questions that will be discussed throughout this essay.

However, before starting an in-depth view of the situation, it is necessary to briefly describe some of the concepts that will appear in this paper. Firstly, an ample concept of 'European Union' will be used, because part of the funds it provides is not directly managed by its agencies or missions in the field, but by third actors. Therefore, this paper will also focus on the performance of these actors to evaluate the results of the European investment in Somalia. The second concept refers precisely to 'Somalia'. This paper will put the spotlight on the European intervention in this country of the Horn of Africa. Nevertheless, some European missions, especially of military nature, are regional initiatives that include other countries of this area and that will be taken into consideration. Thirdly, the idea of 'security' covers the missions undertaken by the EU in Somalia under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), as well as third parties' efforts in the security field financed by the EU. The concept is viewed from a broad perspective, including not only the fight against any violent threat that endangers the stability of the country, especially piracy and terrorism, but also linked to the concept of 'securitization', which Buzan, Waeber and De Wilde 'assign to

¹ Joaquín Ferro Rodríguez: *Somalia: experiencias sobre el terreno de un Coronel español* [online], Granada, Spain: International Security Studies Group, 2014 [accessed 09 March 2015]. Available at: <http://www.seguridadinternacional.es/blog.mosaico/?q=es/content/somalia-experiencias-sobre-el-terreno-de-un-coronel-espa%C3%B1ol>, 09 March 2015.

the public policies which resort to extraordinary measures to face situations of exceptional risk². Fourthly, regarding the concept 'development', this paper will follow the line of the European Development Consensus, which establishes the objectives of the development cooperation of the EU. Therefore, development will stand here for the actions aimed at 'the eradication of poverty in the context of sustainable development, [...] [which] includes good governance, human rights and political, economic, social and environmental aspects'³. Last but not least, 'intervention' accounts here for all the actions, missions or operations in the field of security and development undertaken by the EU in Somalia.

Bearing these terms in mind, the question would be how to integrate development and security in order to build up a strong and stable Somalia. As a *failed state*, the country lacks the necessary cohesion and rule of law to enable a government to implement politics aimed at eliminating poverty and humanitarian disasters, as well as providing welfare. However, a prerequisite to achieve that is first to establish a secure environment upon which to start. No government can enjoy stability in a country where piracy is firmly settled as a mechanism to escape from poverty and where al-Shabaab, the jihadist group linked with al-Qaida, controlled, until recently, the main towns and currently carries out an average of 18 terrorist attacks weekly in Mogadishu⁴. Hence, the link between development and security has to be very tight in the approach of any international actor wishing to intervene in the conflict. The goal of this essay is to evaluate that link in the policies of the EU regarding Somalia. For this purpose, the research question that will be responded runs: To what extent does EU development aid contribute to security in Somalia? Here, the main hypothesis is that the EU development aid, being part of the EU 'comprehensive approach', has been an important element for the improvements in security in this country.

To demonstrate this, the 'comprehensive approach' followed by the EU in Somalia will be first assessed, together with the strategies in which it is present. Secondly, this paper will go through the specific programmes and missions aimed to implement those strategies. This will allow gaining an overview of the EU external action in Somalia for executing its 'comprehensive approach'. Once these elements have been outlined, a critical analysis the role of that action for the Somali security will be provided, identifying its achievements and shortcomings, which will enable to answer the research question and to see whether the hypothesis is correct or not. Finally, this paper will conclude with a recapitulation of the main arguments, giving a clear answer to the research question.

² Félix Arteaga; Enrique Fojón: *El planeamiento de la política de defensa y seguridad en España*, Instituto Universitario General Gutiérrez Mellado, Madrid, 2007.

³ European Union. Joint Statement by the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission, The European Consensus on Development, *Official Journal of the European Union*, 24 February 2006, C46, pp. 4-5.

⁴ J. Ferro Rodríguez, loc. cit.

THE EU 'COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH': A COMPLETE ANSWER TO A COMPLEX PROBLEM

To begin with, it is necessary to clarify the theoretical line in which the EU is inspired to combine its efforts in the field of Security and Development: the 'comprehensive approach'. There is no universal meaning of this concept, and it varies depending on the actor who applies it, but in general it can be defined as the use of 'numerous actions which themselves cover several fields. These actions are planned and carried out under the authority of several players and within the same global strategy which specifies the final goals'⁵. More concretely, according to the EU External Action Service's website,

'The EU favours a comprehensive approach, linking security with development, rule of law and respect for human rights, gender related aspects and international humanitarian law. The EU will give priority to activities that promote peace and recovery for the Somali people'.

Although the 'comprehensive approach' was not considered when the EU first decided to engage in Somalia through a Communication from the Commission of 2006, entitled 'Strategy for Africa: An EU regional political partnership for peace, security and development in the Horn of Africa', giving preference to a regional approach, this instrument had already previewed the complementarity of security and development. The tendency was finally corroborated three years later. In 2009, the Council signed the first document including specifically the 'comprehensive approach'. The strategy was called 'an EU policy on the Horn of Africa – towards a comprehensive strategy' and dealt with the coordination among EU instruments in the region, the priorities for development or the joint action with other international actors. Lastly, in 2011, the European Union Council approved the 'Strategy for the Horn of Africa', which establishes peace, stability and security as its main goals. In order to achieve them, the strategy calls for a greater coordination among the EU institutions intervening in Somalia and states five areas of action: development partnership, political dialogue, response to crises, management of crises and trade relationship⁶. Therefore, the 'comprehensive approach' is present to a greater or lesser extent in all the strategies defined by the EU to guide its action in Somalia, above all since the Council's 2009 document, which included specifically this method. For this reason, coming back to the research question, it can be argued that at least from a theoretical and strategic perspective, the EU acknowledges the importance of development to obtain security, and vice versa.

⁵ M. de Langlois (dir.): 'The comprehensive approach and the European Union: a case study of the Horn of Africa', *Institut de Recherche Stratégique de l'École Militaire*, Notes de Recherche Stratégique, no. 10, (2014). p. 2.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

THE EU PROGRAMMES IN SOMALIA: WHERE ALL THE RESOURCES GO

Now that the approach and strategies have been presented, it is time to analyse the concrete programmes aimed to develop them. Here, security operations will be differentiated from development programmes, including also how they are financed. In order to do so, this part is based on the work of De Langlois⁷, whose study on the EU 'comprehensive approach' contains a clear summary of the EU intervention in Somalia from where the following information is taken. The aim of this section is, however, to specifically show the correlation between both fields, which will demonstrate that development funds are very often linked with concrete security missions.

Starting with the security missions in Somalia, the EU is directly engaged in three operations. EUNAVFOR Atalanta 2008 is a counter-piracy operation which has succeeded to radically reduce the number of piracy attacks to date. EUTM Somalia 2010 is a training mission whose objective is to train the newly created Somali National Army (SNA), until now inexistent due to two-decades-long fragmentation of the country. Lastly, EUCAP Nestor 2012 is a regional EU maritime capacity-building mission aimed at enhancing the maritime capabilities of five countries, including Somalia, in the Western Indian Ocean and the Horn of Africa. These three operations lie under the CFSP, being Atalanta and EUTM Somalia of a military nature, while Nestor is a civilian mission. As such, operation Nestor gets its funds from the EU's general budget as part of the CFSP, but it is managed by the Foreign Policy Instrument (FPI) which, according to its webpage, is an independent body set up by the European Commission to ensure 'that CFSP operations use the allocated funds correctly'. As for Atalanta and EUTM Somalia military operations, their intergovernmental nature makes them dependent on the states for funding. In 2004, though, the *Athena* mechanism was created to face common costs.

These are the missions currently carried out by the EU in the field of security. However, the EU tries to enhance security in Somalia also by other means. That is the case of the financial sustain to the 'Critical Maritime Routes Programme' or to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The former aims at 'supporting the police, coast guards and penitential administration of the region's collaborating States'⁸ and is funded through the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), a financial mechanism for security and peace-building, which includes short-term elements for crisis response (under High Representative's responsibility but managed independently by the Foreign Policy Instrument) as well as long-term goals to face deeper challenges (administrated by DG Development and Cooperation [DG DEVCO], as it is stated in its webpage). AMISOM, on the other hand, is probably the most significant example of the EU financial assistance to third actors. The EU covers the payment of AMISOM troop's stipends via its African Peace Facility

⁷ Ibid., p. 2-13.

⁸ Ibid., p. 6.

(APF), a specific aid programme belonging to the European Development Fund (EDF). The EDF is an extra-budgetary instrument whose burden is shared among the member states. The APF has contributed with over €600 million since 2007 to the AMISOM fight against al-Shabaab. Both the IcSP and the EDF are part of the EU International Cooperation and Development Aid, being the former a thematic instrument and the latter a geographical one, according to DG DEVCO's website, and they show the commitment of the EU to integrate development and security.

Apart from them, the EU also supplies development and humanitarian aid specifically, 'based on governance, education, economic growth and food security'⁹. On the one hand, the humanitarian action falls under the Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (DG ECHO), hence receiving its funds from the EU budget, whose priorities are to provide humanitarian aid, to strengthen the resilience of the population to emergencies, to rebuild infrastructures and to support the refugees in the long run. Furthermore, DG ECHO's action contributes to programmes managed by other international actors such as United Nations. For instance, it is the largest donor of direct financial aid to the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP), whose ships are moreover escorted by Atalanta, showing one more time the narrow link between development and security. However, the humanitarian aid cannot be considered as part of the 'comprehensive approach', because it is guided by the principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence. On the other hand, development action is managed and funded by DG DEVCO as a long-term initiative. A partnership exists between Somalia (as a member of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States) and DG DEVCO for development, and in 2013, a New Deal was approved in a conference in Brussels to set new rules for donations in the country¹⁰, ceding the coordination of the aid to the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS).

Having described the particular instruments used by the EU to implement its 'comprehensive approach' in Somalia, it can be argued that Brussels does not see the necessity to combine development and security from a solely theoretical viewpoint, but on the contrary, big efforts have been made to apply it. The concrete examples of the funding of AMISOM forces or the naval protection of the WFP illustrate that, apart from the specific military missions undertaken by the EU within the CFDP, security and development are intimately interrelated.

⁹ Ibid., p. 5.

¹⁰ J. Daemers: 'The EU in Somalia – beyond Atalanta', *EU Institute for Security Studies*, Alert Issue, no. 3, (2014). p. 1.

WHAT IS NEW UNDER THE HORN'S SUN? ACHIEVEMENTS AND SHORTCOMINGS OF THE APPROACH

The fact that the EU is trying to link these two fields of action using concrete programmes does not mean that rotund breakthroughs have been achieved *per se*. Therefore, the next part of this work aims at evaluating the achievements and shortcomings of these policies. This part will first focus on the positive effects of European intervention towards security in Somalia, moving on to the deficiencies of the approach afterwards. This procedure will help answer the research question by shedding light on the real contribution of development aid to security in Somalia.

To begin with, it is necessary to have a look at the achievements reached by the CFSP operations conducted in Somalia, which in general are considered as a success. From an operational perspective, Atalanta has decisively contributed to a spectacular decrease of pirate attacks on vessels in the Horn of Africa. Since the operation was launched in 2008, an initial increase of the attacks in the first two years was followed by a continuous decline by the end of 2011. In 2013, Somali pirates had practically disappeared, having launched only eight attacks until 30 June 2013, while in 2011 they had already acted 163 times and 69 in 2012¹¹. Thus, Atalanta has succeeded in creating a more secure off-shore environment, deterring pirate attacks and effectively responding to the few that are actually carried out. These results are complemented by the Operation EUCAP Nestor, a mission that started in summer 2013 in Seychelles and Djibouti and that has gradually expanded to enhance security in Somalia, concretely in the regions of Puntland and Somaliland¹². As it has already been mentioned, this is a capacity-building operation that tries to create local solutions for maritime surveillance and the fight against piracy, which has contributed decisively to the improvement of the situation. Added to this, the third CFSP operation that takes place in the country, EUTM Somalia, has served to train over 3,600 Somali soldiers –a third of the SNA– previously recruited by AMISOM, showing one more time that an efficient collaboration between actors in the zone comes into being, especially with players being funded by European development aid such as AMISOM, which reflects the positive consequences of the 'comprehensive approach'. EUTM Somalia has been determinant supporting the transfer of power from the Transitional Federal Government to the FGS and serves as example for other European training missions such as EUTM Mali¹³.

Turning now to the security tasks not carried out by the EU but funded with its development aid, the role of AMISOM is particularly important. Together with the SNA, whose troops are partly trained by the EUTM Somalia as has just been mentioned, AMISOM has effectively

¹¹ H-G. Ehrhart; K. Petretto: 'Stabilizing Somalia: can the EU's comprehensive approach work?', *European Security*, vol. 23, no. 2 (2014). p. 185.

¹² M. de Langlois, op. cit., p.5.

¹³ J. Daemers, op. cit., p. 2.

fought against the jihadist group of al-Shabaab and recovered the main cities of the country since 2011, including the capital Mogadishu as well as the vital seaport of Kismayo¹⁴. This triumph has been possible thanks to a contribution by the EU of €579.3 million at the end of 2013 via its EDF-APF mechanisms¹⁵. Moreover, the international community is committed to support these accomplishments as it was shown in November 2013 when ‘the UN Security Council unanimously approved Resolution 2124 requesting a 20% increase in AMISOM troops (from 17,331 to 22,126 uniformed personnel) and allowing the SNA to have access to the UN logistical support package for joint SNA-AMISOM operations’¹⁶. This will render it necessary for the EU to keep supporting AMISOM economically. Besides this, the ‘Critical Maritime Routes Programme’ financed by the IcSP also contributes to the improvements achieved by the CFSP missions described above.

Lastly, regarding the EU intervention dealing exclusively with development and humanitarian aid, it is worth mentioning that the European action in Somalia has this kind of aid at its very roots. During decades, the EU has been the largest donor of humanitarian aid, decisively contributing to solve crises such as the famine of 2011. Furthermore, the operation Atalanta has fruitfully protected the vessels belonging to the WFP mission while respecting the principles of neutrality and independence that rule the humanitarian aid¹⁷. As for the development aid, the EU managed to force a compromise between international donors and the FGS in the New Deal signed in September 2013, under which those actors pledged to contribute with €1.3 billion of development aid to Somalia¹⁸. Apart from this, the EU has directly donated approximately €415 million during the period of 2008-2013 in a wide variety of development programmes. These planes are aimed at building up long-term conditions of sustainability upon which to base the political process and the humanitarian aid in the country, and have achieved concrete goals such as the training of 6,300 police officers and 170 law officials in 2011, the schooling of more than 40,000 students since 2010, the rehabilitation of irrigation and flood control infrastructure which benefited more than 50,000 farming and agro-pastoral households in 2010, etc.¹⁹.

The previous facts show the undeniable improvements made in Somalia through the EU’s ‘comprehensive approach’. The situation has changed substantially over the years, and that has allowed the creation of a reconciliation process among the Somalis which has been translated into the election of both the National Parliament and the FGS. However, those

¹⁴ H-G. Ehrhart; K. Petretto, op. cit., p. 184.

¹⁵ European Commission. *African Peace Facility – Annual Report 2013*. [Luxemburg]: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014. p. 18.

¹⁶ J. Daemers, op. cit., p. 1.

¹⁷ H-G. Ehrhart; K. Petretto, op. cit., pp. 184-185.

¹⁸ European Commission, op. cit. p. 18.

¹⁹ European Commission. *The EU's Development Work in Somalia* [online]. European Commission, memo 7 May 2013 [accessed 18 March 2015]. Available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-407_en.htm?locale=en#PR_metaPressRelease_bottom.

achievements are extremely fragile and the circumstances can be easily reversed. The country is not stable enough, and the continuous activity of al-Shabaab renders it enormously complicated to create the necessary conditions to take the country out of the poverty, destruction and vulnerability that have characterized it throughout the last two decades. Consequently, the following lines will be devoted to the analysis of the shortcomings of the 'comprehensive approach', which will complete the assessment of the contribution of development aid to a real state of security in Somalia. These limitations can be summarized in one word: coordination. As it will be shown below, coordination within the EU, but above all between the EU and third actors operating in the country is the main weakness of the intervention and its consequences put all the achievements at risk.

Firstly, regarding the CFSP operations, it is worth mentioning that even though the pirates have lately been controlled on the shores of Somalia thanks to Atalanta and Nestor missions, they show resilience either by sending mother ships to the coast of India to operate from that part of the Indian Ocean²⁰ or by momentarily changing their source of income while waiting for a reduction of the international pressure²¹. Moreover, 'many of the pirates' foot soldiers who were arrested by naval forces had to be released immediately due to the lack of capacities for prosecution and the unwillingness of EU member states to prosecute them in their own courts'²². As for the third mission, EUTM Somalia, the task of creating a brand new Somali army has its intrinsic difficulties, such as the lack of intermediate commands, product of the existence of old soviet training generals from the dictatorship times, on the one hand, as well as of new troops whose men are good combatants but bad soldiers, on the other. On top of that, until recently, the FSG only had budget availability to pay the stipends of 11.000 soldiers of the SNA, those belonging to Sector One which protects Mogadishu. The four other Sectors were paid by local chiefs or warlords allied with the government, and, hence, the troops were loyal to those persons. The FSG is now willing to pay directly all the units composing its SNA, but it remains to be seen whether by doing so -because of its yet scarce popular support- the FSG can actually gain military faithfulness²³. In addition, all the efforts of the EUTM Somalia will be of no use if the country is unable to complement the training of troops with the consolidation of new basic security structures²⁴.

Secondly, the success of AMISOM and the finance mechanism of the EU also need to be qualified. In 2013, AMISOM reached the limit of its capacities in its struggle against al-Shabaab. Notwithstanding its great achievements such as the mentioned release of Mogadishu and Kismayo, AMISOM started showing signs of incapacity to further hit al-Shabaab, which remained under control of the main rural areas and had adopted an

²⁰ J. Ferro Rodríguez, loc. cit.

²¹ H-G. Ehrhart; K. Petretto, op. cit., p. 185.

²² Ibid., p. 186.

²³ J. Ferro Rodríguez, loc. cit.

²⁴ H-G. Ehrhart; K. Petretto, op. cit., p. 184.

asymmetric warfare²⁵. That was the reason why the UN Security Council approved the Resolution 2124 to increase the number of troops deployed by AMISOM by 20 percent. This Resolution has, however, two problematic consequences, despite the fact that it was meant to boost AMISOM's action against al-Shabaab. On the one hand, some African Union countries such as Ethiopia decided to 're-hat' their already deployed troops and integrate them into AMISOM, which does not increase the total amount of soldiers in the country. On the other hand, the EU is expected to keep financing the enlargement of AMISOM despite the fact that its APF is also committed to other missions in Mali or Central African Republic²⁶. The result of these two consequences would be that the EU is now 'obliged' to pay for extra troops that in reality were already deployed in the country, with no real increase of the number of forces as required by the Security Council Resolution.

Finally, concerning development and humanitarian aid, the main critiques have dealt with the lack of coordination among programmes and with local and international actors. A clear example is the famine of 2011, which showed a preoccupant incapacity of the EU to cooperate with local partners to prevent the crisis. This obliged the EU to act only when the disaster was already taking place. The same can be seen considering development aid, whose programmes have been monitored from Nairobi due to the lack of security conditions in Somalia, which has impeded a fluent cooperation with the Somalis to build up sustainable long-term solutions for the development of the country²⁷. Intimately linked with this argument is the criticism of the protection which Atalanta offers to WFP vessels. Some argue that apart from the fact that the economic resources assigned to Atalanta could be better devoted to promote local economies in the coast, the kind of aid provided by WFP is not beneficial to economically foster the country, as it is based on food coming from outside rather than creating home markets²⁸ (Hagström Frisell et al. 2012, 4).

The three aspects of the European intervention in which this analysis has been divided show some type of lack of coordination, especially between the EU and other actors. In the first aspect, where the military intervention is analysed, the EU has failed to make its own member states responsible and force them to judge the captured pirates. For the moment, it has also proven to be unable to coordinate both with the Somali army and the FSG, to end with the lack of intermediate commands, firstly, and to ensure the faithfulness of the soldiers by paying their allowances, secondly. Regarding the second aspect, the EU has been

²⁵ J. Ferro Rodríguez, loc. cit.

²⁶ J. Daemers, op. cit., pp. 1-2.

²⁷ H-G. Ehrhart; K. Petretto, op. cit., p. 184.

²⁸ E. Hagström Frisell; M. Tham Lindell; E. Skeppström: 'The EU Comprehensive Approach towards Somalia', FOI, FOI Memo, no. 4067 (2012). p. 4.

incapable of harmonizing its efforts with those of the African Union countries, giving rise to unacceptable behaviours such as the “re-hatting” of troops with the consequent increase of the EU’s economic burden. Finally, concerning the analysis of the development and humanitarian aid, the problems of coordination refer to local agents and NGOs, in the case of the famine, as well as to UN regarding the protection of the WFP vessels.

CONCLUSION

Throughout this work, it has been analysed how the EU bases its development and security policies towards Somalia on a ‘comprehensive approach’ which is materialized through concrete strategies, operations, financial mechanisms and programmes. In the first section after the introduction, this study has shown the nature of the ‘comprehensive approach’, analyzing the concept and stating the documents that serve as legal basis for its application in Somalia. The second section has been devoted to the concrete programmes that try to implement the former strategies, including military missions, financial mechanisms and diverse development and humanitarian aid. For the sake of clarity, a division was made between EU military intervention, third actor’s efforts funded by the EU and EU development and humanitarian aid. The third part has shown that all these instruments have, indeed, created a more secure and stable environment in the country upon which to base a political process aimed at bringing development to the Somalis. However, due to the multiple threats that the country faces, the current improvements are very fragile and there is room for greater progress. Regarding the nature of the stated weaknesses and shortcomings, which is mainly based on an insufficient coordination among programmes and actors, this progress could be provided by enhancing a real and coherent leadership from the European institutions. Here, the role of the High Representative Federica Mogherini is of paramount importance, due to the fact that she can coordinate the CFSP operations as well as the development and humanitarian missions as Vice President of the European Commission.

To conclude, as a result of all what has been mentioned and to give a clear answer to the research question, it is possible to argue that the hypothesis has been demonstrated and that, therefore, the EU development aid, being part of the EU ‘comprehensive approach’, has been an important element for the improvements in security in this country, despite its coordinating limitations. As it has been demonstrated throughout the body of this study, development and security are intimately linked and both efforts go in the same direction, complementing each other. Development aid is directly responsible for financing several operations of a military nature, such as the ‘Critical Maritime Routes Programme’ (via the IcSP and partly administrated by DG DEVCO) or AMISOM (via APF-EDF). Besides,

development or humanitarian aid is very often the step following the securitization of any area, without which any prior move would have been in vain. This bond can be easily understood when analyzing the protection offered by Atalanta to the WFP ships. To bring this paper to a close, therefore, a big deal of the improvements made in Somalia is due to the tie between security and development, being the latter a fundamental part of the former in many occasions.

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