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*Raquel Esther Jorge Ricart**

Libya, on the complexity of and need for security sector reform

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Abstract:

Within the notion under discussion of 'failed State', Security Sector Reform is one of the key pillars for the management of de facto division of Libya. Following the fall of the Gaddafi regime in 2011, the over-centralised power framework was disrupted. A large set of non-state armed actors, including tribes, private military security companies and irregular armies, went into competition for control over territories, resources and critical infrastructures. Efforts to reconfigure and structure a more effective security provision, management and oversight setting have been undermined because of the lack of civil-military security forces capacities, confidence-building at a local level and the consequent gap with state-based policies, as well as due to the weak border management and the prevalence of organized crime. How Security Sector challenges are addressed will depend largely on local and regional stability, and their ripple effects.

Keywords:

Libya, Security Sector Reform, militias, organized crime, tribes, Private Military Security Companies, border management, political stability, critical infrastructure.

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Introduction. Security Sector hurdles in the aftermath of the fall of the Gaddafi regime

By 2017¹, defence spending from the internationally United Nations-recognised government within the *de facto* divided country of Libya², was 1,819 billion dollars, which represents 11.2% of the total GDP. However, despite having a significant importance in the country's economy, investments in defence have experienced a decline over previous years. Concretely: a 6.8% decrease from the previous year —1,953 billion dollars—, and 21.7% reduction from 2014. Forecast estimates that this downsizing will continue in a 5-year outlook: it is calculated that the figure for 2019 will be 1.67 billion dollars.

Unavailability of disaggregated financial information by defence-related sectors —such as investments in the upgrading of critical infrastructure protection, or expenditure per member of Armed Forces— also appears to be a crystallisation of the lack of a structured, integrated security sector framework. Control of this security sector turned into a core asset for the Libyan political ecosystem since 2011, as it was highly competitive and weakly institutionalised alike. Unlike other countries³ with an also flawed security sector —like Yemen, country which battled out to perpetuate elderly elites within politics—, the Libyan case is characterised by a highly fragmented picture and the deadlock of reform agendas which were raised after the revolution.

Apart from this, pro-Gaddafi militias as well as self-nicknamed 'revolutionary' groups benefited from the absence of any type of institutional control with the objective of suppressing restrictions and the monopoly on the use of force. Other groups organized themselves in parallel, such as tribal groups and non-state armed groups in certain

¹ Jane's By HIS Markit (2017): *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment – North Africa: Libya* (11 December 2017)

² After 42 years of authoritarian regime with Gaddafi, in February 2011 several revolts took place in Benghazi and other cities. In July, International Contact Group recognised the National Transition Council – NTC – as the legitimate government in Libya. Gaddafi was killed in October 2011, and from January 2012, hostilities were held between rebel forces and the NTC, which constituted the National Parliament several months after. In 2014, a civil war begins because of protests against National Congress. East of the country will be dominated by Khalifa Haftar, a self-proclaimed General of the Libyan National Army, which is not recognised. West of the country will be finally controlled by the new internationally- and UN-recognised government. To this day, Libya still remains divided between both areas, in a constant struggle over the control of the whole territory.

³ SAYIGH, Y. (2015): "Crumbling States: Security Sector Reform in Libya and Yemen", *Carnegie Middle East Center*

regions of the country. Other constraints for country stabilisation are the presence of the Islamic State, fights for control over oil terminals and energy assets, multiplicity of conflict settings between different groups in the area of the Gulf of Sidra - especially between the terrorist group and the army led by the General Khalifa Haftar.

Moreover, in this country under transition and construction, the restructuration⁴ of armed forces from the UN-recognised government has risen to the top of strategic pillars. Firstly, Gaddafi regime created⁵ a military doctrine based on a system of multiple allegiances, with guarantee of rewards or imposition of punishments. Throughout the 42-year regime, Gaddafi systematically dismantled public institutions. On his book, *The Green Book*⁶, he argued that bureaucratic institutions and political parties distorted the real will of the people. In order to strengthen the political system, he restructured at his discretion security services, with People's Committees including undercover agents for the purpose of detecting internal enemies. Ministry of Defence was dissolved, and Gaddafi created a self-protective and repressive security apparatus, in which he billed himself as the General Commander. Once the regime fell in 2011, a new Ministry of Defence was created. However, it has no public legitimacy to begin with⁷. Furthermore, the burst of a diversity of military groups became a limitation⁸ to the efforts of the recognised government to arrange a single framework for the integration of Armed Forces.

Secondly, vis-à-vis parallel and informal security structures, the police and the army were ill equipped, understaffed, and with a high ratio of senior ranks over other categories.

In third place, the severity of the economic situation led the recognised government to the prioritisation of a set of strategic sectors. If it is true that infrastructure and transport areas

⁴ Ibidem, p. 7

⁵ PERITO, R. (2016): *Libya: A Post-Arab Spring Test for Security Sector Reform*, CSG Papers, Centre for Security Governance.

⁶ *El Libro Verde* is a political philosophy book which was written by Gaddafi between 1975 and 1981. On it, he shows his political ideas. He enacts a "third way", namely, a direct democracy based on People's Committees, aspiring to a regional Pan-Arabism comprised of socialism, Arab nationalism and the Islam. By creating a "State without state" as the purest way of democracy, he allowed people to manage their own life and resources. However, to that end, he abolished private sector and nationalised companies. Available in: https://web.archive.org/web/20121114182152/http://free-news.org/PDFs/El_libro_Verde_de_Gadafi.pdf

⁷ Op. Cit. 5, p. 13

⁸ LOSCHI, C., RAINERI, L., STRAZZARI, F. (2018): *Working Paper: The implementation of EU Crisis Response in Libya: Bridging theory and practice* (enero de 2018), EUNPACK.

are one of them, other sectors have been overlooked and this represents a counterweight. Concretely, to this day, there is no system of guarantee of stable, regular and appropriate salaries. Consequences are that there are no incentives for people to join armed forces, and many of potential candidates turn to non-state armed groups to speed up their life conditions, by carrying out illicit activities.

Moreover, as Youssef Mohammad Sawani⁹ remarks, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration – DDR – efforts have been insufficient. According to Omar Ashour¹⁰, this is due to a sharp political polarization, internal resistance by anti-reformist factions to disarmament pillar, low-level capabilities, and killings of security officers. DDR framework is not a sequential process, but a multi-sector one which combines overlapping activities, which require coordination. However, “without a political engagement, no matter how well integration programs are planned or implemented; these will not be successful”¹¹.

Other of the challenges is civil-military relation, which is related to the local/national gap. Due to scepticism towards national government, security management is arranged on a local basis. Police is the most trusted¹² security force—in this case, civilian—and it is, indeed, the actor, which carries out the functions of mediation and peacekeeping to attain local stability.

In that way, if trust and confidence is set to micro level, but militia institutionalisation is a policy that corresponds to a national strategy, there is a disconnect in the management of the two main risks within the country that hinders the Security Sector Reform: organized crime and border management.

⁹ Lecturer at the University of Tripoli. Sawani, Y.H. (2017): “Security sector reform, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of militias: the challenges for state building in Libya”, *Contemporary Arab Affairs*, 10(2), pp. 171-186

¹⁰ Non-Resident Fellow in Brookings Doha Center, interviewed by: Filipkova, Kuzvart (2013): *Security Sector Reform (SSR) in Libya: Assessment of the Situation and Evaluation of Perspectives for the Czech Republic and NATO*, Prague Security Studies Institute

¹¹ ÖZERDEM, A. (2010): “Insurgency, militias and DDR as part of Security Sector Reconstruction in Iraq: How not to do it”, *Disasters*, 34(1), pp. 340-359.

¹² Op. Cit. 5, p. 23

Organized crime as constraining factor towards integration

Among all modalities of organized crime¹³, those which affect the most to the security sector in Libya are¹⁴ the participation in organized criminal groups, money laundering, migrant smuggling, drugs trafficking, maritime crimes and arms trafficking.

At state level, under the UN-recognised government, and in coordination with UNSMIL¹⁵, two Working Groups have been set up¹⁶: the Criminal Justice Improvement Round Table, and the Organized Crime Panel. The aim of both is dual. First, the harmonisation and consolidation of gathered data; in this way, they provide increasingly greater effective responses, in the phases of prevention, early warning and rapid response. On the other side, to pull together voices from different sources: police, civil society, and rural and urban leaders, overcoming uncertainties and barriers towards a national dialogue.

Well-developed legislation¹⁷ has been established. Libya ratified in June 2004 the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime¹⁸, as well as the three Protocols¹⁹. However, this is not enough. One of the main challenges for Libya is to ensure a good performance of security management – both economically and in terms of

¹³ The internationally standardised and recognised categorisation of organized crime's modalities is carried out by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). For further information on guidelines, technical assistance, emergent transnational crimes and modalities, please consult: <https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/organized-crime/intro.html>

¹⁴ Eaton, T. (2018): *Libya's War Economy: Predation, Profiteering and State Weakness*, Research Paper, Chatham House. Available in: <https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2018-04-12-libyas-war-economy-eaton-final.pdf>

¹⁵ United Nations Support Mission in Libya.

¹⁶ Varvelli, A. (2014): "Europe and the Libyan crisis: a failed State in the backyard?", *ISPI*, Analysis No. 237.

¹⁷ In 2013, Law No.10 was agreed upon, on the criminalisation of torture, forced disappearance and discrimination. Any political, executive, administrative or military leader is hold responsible, with a prison sentence, if any of their staff under control and command commits one of these crimes, does not prevent it or hides it. In 2014, Law No.11 was issued for the establishment of a National Anti-Corruption Commission. Available in: <https://security-legislation.ly/taxonomy/term/98837?page=0>

¹⁸ Documents available in: <https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNTOC/Publications/TOC%20Convention/TOCebook-s.pdf>

¹⁹ Three Protocols are: 1st Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children; 2nd Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air; and the 3rd Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and Components and Ammunition.

infrastructure – in a country in which illicit freight traffic is deeply dominated by tribal groups.

Libya is a patchwork of tribes —Arab-Berber, Tuareg and Tubu— which managed them autonomously during the Gaddafi period. They established their own marketplaces and led some economic niches. After regime fall, centralised control of some economic sectors —licit or illicit alike— slipped away, and tribes seized the opportunity to acquire new financial gains. *Arms trafficking* was the first. When Gaddafi was deposed, weapons stockpiles in the Southwest of the country, located by the own Gaddafi due to his mistrust towards army, were easily accessible to members of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Sudanese and Chadian mercenaries, and tribes, especially Tuareg. Traffic has increased to Tunisia, Algeria and the Sahel. Egypt also receives this arms pack, and it is an especial case: transport route to this country takes place through conflict settings, as it must go through the East of Libya, a non-controlled area by the UN-recognised government, and under domination of the General Khalifa Haftar.

Rivalries over the control and monitoring of illicit activities have increased violent conflicts between tribal militias in the South of Libya. Alongside arms trafficking, *illegal tobacco trafficking*²⁰ speeds up, especially from the Sahara. This activity began in the eighties and it has produced a large-scale business conglomerate, which has turned into a regional problem, leading to the ever-increasing creation of networks and practices of *drugs trafficking*²¹, especially cocaine and cannabis. This has led to fights for the control of the Libyan-Tunisian frontier, as well as decisions to seal off borders²² by the Tunisian

²⁰ BAKRANIA, S. (2014): “Libya: Border security and regional cooperation”, GSDRC, Applied Knowledge Services.

²¹ LACHER, W. (2012): *Organized Crime and Conflict in the Sahel-Sahara Region*. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Available in: http://carnegieendowment.org/files/sahel_sahara.pdf

²² MCGREGOR, A. (2013): “Tribes and Terrorists: The Emerging Security Threat from Libya’s Lawless South”, *Jamestown Terrorism Monitor*, 11(2). Available in: http://www.jamestown.org/programs/tm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=40367&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=684&no_cache=1#.UheDDmShIVd

authorities at several times from 2012. Furthermore, *human trafficking*²³ has risen substantially, highlighting the routes²⁴ from the north of Niger and Sudan.

However, tribal groups do not only perform activities related to organized crime. They also work on two types of activities, which are legal: protection of persons —especially foreigners which work in critical oil terminals or energy assets—, to face blackmailing and kidnapping risks; and as private security guards at these sites. There is an *intertribal competition for the achievement of contracts*²⁵, particularly between Tuareg, Tubu and Berber tribes, in the regions of Sebha, Kufra and Awjala/Jalu respectively.

Considering this, foreign companies, at an operational level, assume high risks for their personnel and proprieties when entering into the country. In order to protect their infrastructures, when they do not trust tribes, they resort to the conglomerate of *Private and Military Security Companies* (PMSCs).

As has been verified by the Libyan Security Sector Observatory at DCAF²⁶, a great part of militias, which are scattered through the country, use mercenaries or invoke this type of corporations. Larger presence is located in the East of Libya, with the Libyan National Army – LNA – controlled by the General Khalifa Haftar. Concretely, in March 2019 *The Telegraph* checked that nearly 300²⁷ mercenaries from Russia, linked to the Russian military intelligence, assisted and supported him. Furthermore, some contracts have been arranged with private companies, such as the contractor Wagner²⁸, non-official arm of the Russian Ministry of Defence. However, Russian government has denied²⁹ allegations, despite evidence-based reports, which certify the provision of artillery, tanks and drones

²³ The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (2018): *Responding to the Human Trafficking-Migrant Smuggling Nexus: with a focus on the situation in Libya*, Policy Note. Available in: <https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Reitano-McCormack-Trafficking-Smuggling-Nexus-in-Libya-July-2018.pdf>

²⁴ EL-KATIRI, M. (2017): “State-building challenges in a post-revolution Libya”, *US Army War College*

²⁵ Op. Cit. 1, p. 35

²⁶ From the Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF, in Geneva, Switzerland), a daily follow-up is carried out through *Marsad* platform. For further information, consult:

https://www.marsad.ly/marsad_actors/private-military-security-companies/

²⁷ Available in: <https://www.marsad.ly/en/2019/03/04/300-russian-mercenaries-fighting-haftar-libya-western-news-reports-say/>

²⁸ Available in: <https://www.marsad.ly/en/2018/11/11/russian-businessman-linked-sending-mercenaries-syria-attends-meeting-haftar-moscow/>

²⁹ Online: <https://www.marsad.ly/en/2019/03/07/russia-denies-presence-benghazi/>

to Haftar in the Dignity Operation³⁰. It is also said that Haftar receives mercenaries from the Iraqi Kurdish battle through private company *Frontier Services Group*³¹, chaired by Erik Prince, former *Blackwater* CEO.

With respect to the controlled area by the UN-recognised government, there is not a great deal of information regarding their use of PMSCs or mercenaries. If it is true that UNSMIL has issued reports³² in which is reported that Haftar uses mercenaries, there has been little discussion on the presence of these actors in the West of the country. The United States-based company of solutions for technology, logistics and international security, *Culmen International*, announced that it will be responsible³³ of the improvement of airport security and safety in the country, by improving capabilities and capacities to monitor terrorist threats, by doing screening and tracking of potential of in-transit suspects, and by developing standardised operational procedures in order to mitigate such threats through the main three airports in the country by means of assessments, equipment purchasing, training and education, and the setting-up of a National Security Strategic for Aviation.

Border management as fragmentation variable

Cross-border terrestrial security is usually channelled through bilateral agreements with neighbour countries. The first case is Tunisia: there were initially resistances due to the lack of will to share equipment and intelligence information with Libyan forces. What is more, local population which live near the frontier stated, through an on-the-ground survey, that reinforcement of borders made up a threat which was even greater³⁴ than jihadism, because their main revenue sources come from smuggling and informal commerce. Even if challenges still remain, Chambers of Commerce from both countries

³⁰ In February 2014, General Haftar announced the dissolution of General National Congress, the democratically elected Parliament in Libya which had extended unilaterally its mandate. Haftar was accused of coup attempt, and he launched several attacks to the Parliament as well as pro-Tripoli militias in Benghazi, and the international Airport of Tripoli in November 2014.

³¹ Available in: <https://www.marsad.ly/en/2019/04/29/mercenaries-sent-fight-alongside-haftar-libya/>

³² Available in: <https://www.marsad.ly/en/2018/04/10/libyas-foreign-militias/>

³³ Available in: <https://www.marsad.ly/en/2019/03/09/us-company-begin-overseeing-libyas-airport-aviation-security/>

³⁴ International Alert (2016): *Marginalisation, insecurity and uncertainty on the Tunisian-Libyan border: Ben Guerdane and Dhehiba from the perspective of their inhabitants*, International Alert.

have agreed upon tariff policies and progressive symmetric subsidies³⁵. The second case is Niger, a scenario that is mainly related to human trafficking. Despite Italian Interior Ministry call to tribal local leaders to agree on a joint management contract, there was no positive outcome. Furthermore, Frontex³⁶ priority, with a specific agreement with Niger, is to negotiate border management between both countries.

In terms of *security maritime*, there are three driving risks³⁷: the threat of induced sinking, collateral damages due to fights against the Islamic State in oil terminals around the Gulf of Sidra, and the risk for foreign fishing vessels and small boats in maritime frontiers with Egypt and Tunisia. This endangers the provision of humanitarian assistance when destroying supply chains and the modification of traditional routes of custody, procedure and distribution rules³⁸. Libya benefits from technical cooperation, strategic planning support and financial possibilities follow-up, as well as intelligence services for training and maritime information, and risk prevention, from the African Maritime Safety & Security Agency³⁹.

With respect to *air security*, airports from the West and East face differentiated risks. While those from the West are more vulnerable to combats on the ground or air strikes, those, which are located in the East, are targets from SVBIEDs from jihadist groups.

Guidelines drawn up on the Security Sector Reform

In order to synergise efforts and resources towards these obstacles, the Libyan government has launched a set of international Ministerial Rounds since February 2013. Six priority areas were set up: the building of architecture for national security, and its coordination; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration; arms and ammunition

³⁵ African Union (2013): *Concept Note: Enhancing Operational Land Border Security Cooperation in the Sahelo-Saharan Region*, African Union.

³⁶ ZANDONINI, G. (2018): "The new European border between Niger and Libya" (11 de mayo de 2018), *OpenMigration*. Available in: <https://openmigration.org/en/analyses/the-new-european-border-between-niger-and-libya/>

³⁷ Op. Cit. 1, p. 47

³⁸ POTHECARY, J. (2017): "Contested seas: maritime security in Libya" (20 June 2017), CIMSEC. Available in: <http://cimsec.org/contested-seas-maritime-security-libya/32740>

³⁹ Available in: <http://www.amssa.net/>

control; border management; defence reform and development; and police reform and development.

Opportunities for Libya are the reestablishment of a healthy, sound economy, through an effective performance of oil sector to build capacities for a better distribution of funds raised. Other essential requisite is the attainment of a functional transitional justice. Temporary use of local customs for conflict resolution and mediation allowed during initial years to prevent internal clashes, even if this does not guarantee that tribal militias will stop their illicit activities.

This raises the dichotomy *hybrid security vs. alternative security*. After an interim government, which opted for the hybridization of security apparatus, through their support to revolutionary militias, this security sector was disturbed by its own hybrid nature. In this way, an alternative security model would be a more optimal framework. Main challenge to provide cross-border security is to fulfil an inclusive, accountable security sector, winding down confusing chains of command, rivalries between groups and leaders, duplicative and overlapping missions, and bureaucratic competition over resources⁴⁰.

In 2013, a great part of militias was incorporated into two umbrella coalitions: Supreme Security Committees —SSC— and *Libya Shield* established by the transitional gendarmerie. An important minority of these groups entered into Preventive Security Apparatus, a counter-intelligence force. Theoretically, first two umbrella coalitions were made up to increase and strengthen regular army and police. However, they possessed a high level of autonomy, with political ideologically agendas, and on a local basis. This is related to the *baby vs. bathwater* dilemma⁴¹: the first ones are those soldiers professionally trained since 2011, and the second group represent those, which gained experience under the Gaddafi regime. Even if in 2015 the *Political Isolation Law* was revoked and this second group was no longer isolated, and they had the opportunity to participate politically and military, the challenge of *bathwater* integration and pacified relations between both groups still remains.

⁴⁰ WEHREY, F., Cole, P. (2013): *Building Libya's Security Sector*. Washington D.C.: Carnegie International Endowment for Peace. URL: http://carnegieendowment.org/files/building_libya_security.pdf

⁴¹ Op. Cit. 4, p. 7

Under discussion there is another debate: *centralisation vs. decentralisation outlook*. On 17 December 2015, Skhirat Agreement was signed upon the adoption of the National Government Agreement, by which Presidential Council and Military Council were created – with different responsibilities. Military Council would be in charge of division and reintegration of forces through several specialisations. Since 2011, efforts to create centralised security institutions have failed. Considering this, a solution-driven option is the *resolution of this structuring dilemma through a dual system*: leadership centralisation—as a way to prevent risks and fragmentations—, alongside specialisations decentralisation. Special units would acquire greater autonomy to comply with their duties: security in borders, sea, and critical infrastructures of hydrocarbons, local police, and supervision of irregular immigration. With respect to tribal groups, Ziad Akl⁴² considers that they should not acquire full autonomy because of the risks, which have been indicated before. The creation of a Warriors Commission is of interest as it is aimed at recording aspirations and intentions of groups. Hence was born the Libyan Plan for Reintegration and Development.

In the face of these challenges, three possible scenarios⁴³ are set forth, according to the Political Framework for a Crisis Approach, by the Political and Security Committee of the European Union. A scenario of stagnation or deadlock, without any clear winner; a further escalation of violence, with a high level of hostilities; or a ceasefire and a political process reform. In either case, and in what is related to Security Sector Reform, a national dialogue is necessary as long as security is thought as a national strategic issue, alongside local idiosyncrasies.

⁴² AKL, Z. (2017): “Military Institutionalisation and Security Sector Reform in Libya”, 35 Papers IEMed., EuroMesco, p. 9

⁴³ European Union Council (2014): *Libya, a Political Framework for a Crisis Approach* (1 October 2014). Doc. 13829/14

Conclusions

It has been seen that political will and mediation are both important. However, other factors related to strategic planning require consideration. To that end, when dealing with the *dilemma of a model of Reform or Reconstruction of the security sector*, the first one seems a better option. Assimilation of militias within state-based structures is the most convenient approach to cope with a weak structure and the absence of a dominant military force. Alongside this macro-proposal, some recommendations are proposed to be applied:

Measure	Expected outcome
DRAWING UP OF A NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY:	Restructuring, training and re-equipment of agencies of intelligence, police and armed forces
Inclusion of a constitutional clause in the 2011 Constitution ⁴⁴ on executive control of Armed Forces through a Military Council which coordinates in parallel with the Presidential Council	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Due diligence in government-led military actions - Centralisation of leadership to create legitimacy
Creation of a National Security Council or Department	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Drawing-up of a security policy with legislative oversight
Prioritisation of capacity building and institutional development—Interior and Justice sectors— prior to the reinforcement of recruiting, training and equipment of operational forces.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Confidence-building measures by new-enrolled soldiers towards chains of command and doctrine which must comply with.
Strengthening of logistics and resource transport capacity in critical infrastructures: oil industry and energy assets.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Attraction of suitable strategic investors - Sustainability of National Treasury for the development of new areas: doctrine and discipline of Armed Forces, regular and appropriate salaries endowment.
Restructuring of intelligence community.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Monitoring and oversight of activities through enforceability of performance reporting.

⁴⁴ Document available in: https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Libya_2011.pdf

ROAD MAP DRAWING-UP	Goals and indicators for operational and institutional units (aforementioned)
Facilitation of Guidelines drawing-up for each specialised unit.	- To guarantee autonomy and decentralisation of specialisation.
Creation of Ministerial-level plans for the authorization and implementation of institutional reform and capacity building	- Legitimacy of the new Ministry of Defence (under Gaddafi, inexistent) and of a new Central Intelligence Agency (under Gaddafi, scattered across People's Committees informally).
Key infrastructures updating	- Through electronic systems for the administration, the modernisation of management practices, a new way of acquisition contracts.
Legislation with a clear definition of chains of command within every Ministry.	- To avoid overlapping and inter-Ministerial competition.
Reinforcement of civilian role within civil-military relations.	- To ensure civilian oversight of Ministerial actions related to security - Improvement of civil-military relations
SPECIFIC CHALLENGES:	
Due to the high level of dependency on politically designated senior ranks and the discretionary, informal decision with armed groups, it is necessary:	- Rationalised acquisition system - Development of training and deployment - Clear and defined strategic direction - Transparency in resources allocation
Due to dysfunction, delay or stoppage of processes:	- To speed up high-level coordination, learning from police practices ⁴⁵ (even if they lack of sufficient equipment to fight against drug trafficking). - To level up internal coordination among groups.

⁴⁵ Op. Cit. 5, p. 24

Security sector in Libya remains a threat for the stability of the deep complexity of the country, and for the rest of the region. Cumulative effect of threats, multiplicity or responses to risks, overlapping of effective-ineffective actions, and the greater relative impact of critical junctures within the Libyan territory with respect to other countries with a higher level of governance produce what it has been called *snowball effect* on the assumption of the management of the Security Sector Reform: the high-speed exponential growth of challenges it copes.

The importance of constant working on Security Sector is essential. On the one hand, because a Reform guarantees a political and technical process oriented to the improvement of human security, within a framework of democratic civilian control and good governance, and defines roles and responsibilities across the nexus security-justice. On the other hand, because the Security Sector Governance provides with security institutions which are more transparent, stable and appropriate for public services addressed to society. Regardless of whether such a complex framework may give a whole-of-country solution, now the main challenge for Libya will be to guarantee a balance between state-based policies aimed at structuring, alongside a local-based coordination whose citizenship's interest and confidence relies on.

*Raquel Esther Jorge Ricart**

Master's in International Relations and African Studies
Intern Analyst at IEEE