The “Strategic Compass” of the European Union's defence. Common understanding and strategic negotiation

Abstract:
This paper deals with the European Union ("EU") Strategic Compass process. It is designed to refine the EU Global Strategy of June 2016 and the Implementation Plan of late 2016, as well as to guide the Common Security and Defence Policy and the strategic cultures of the 27 Member States (MS). A final document will emerge from the process, which will be presented to the European Council in 2022 by the High Representative for Foreign Policy and Vice-President of the Commission, Josep Borrell.

Keywords:
Strategic orientation, Strategic Compass, European Union, International negotiation.

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Strategic Guidance

In an "age of anarchy"¹, of global² and border³ risks, in a volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous environment (V.U.C.A.), framed in the great competition between countries, Europeans, from 2019⁴ onwards, need to learn the "language of power"⁵, in the words of Macron. Also, to act with a strategic purpose and goals, in the words of Josep Borrell⁶, to act with a strategic purpose and goals. In other words, they need to find their strategic orientation in defence. A true strategic course of action⁷ (hereafter "Strategic Orientation").

Nor is it surprising that in this geopolitical context the EU has adopted a foresight report⁸, to study possible scenarios and reduce uncertainty in the future.

Before us, a world where the weight of democracies is shrinking; where in 2050 only the European Germany will be one of the eight largest economies; an EU that was six times the size of China's economy, but whose current weight is 13.5 trillion euros, compared to China's 11.4 trillion euros (pre-Covid); hyperconnected (5g, 6g, Internet of Things⁹), and we add, quantum.

The so-called "Strategic Compass" is the EU's first intergovernmental institutional effort

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² WEF, “THE GLOBAL RISK REPORT”, January 2021, p. 12, 88 y 89.
³ Ibídem, p. 12 y 85.
⁶ Ibídem.
⁸ “Global Trends To 2030 Challenges And Choices For Europe™”, ESPAS (“European Strategy and Policy Analysis System”), Coord. by Florence Gaub. ESPAS is the framework for cooperation and consultation between the different EU institutions.
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to jointly assess security and defence threats.

Underlying this initiative is the need to flesh out, both, the concept of “strategic autonomy”11 and, the EU’s Global Strategy of June 2016 and its Security and Defence Implementation Plan of November 2016 (which sets the EU’s Level of Ambition). In three areas: 1) Responding to external conflicts and crises; 2) Building partner and allied capabilities; 3) Protecting Europeans and the EU.

This will provide the EU with the necessary guidance to achieve a set of military and civilian capabilities, appropriate and coherent to the agreed Level of Ambition, based on common risks and threats.

The "Strategic Guidance" is conceived in two phases (Phase I, Risk and Threat Analysis; Phase II, Outcome Document). At the same time, a negotiation process takes place in each of the phases, resulting in an understanding reflected in an agreement.

In the collaboration model between MS, the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS), as well as think tanks and universities, the following stages can be identified:

a) During Phase I, the problem (challenges, trends, threats, EU vulnerabilities) was identified through civilian and military intelligence from MS. As the External Service points out, this is the first time the EU has undertaken such an effort.

b) Likewise, the needs of the "other" MS was understood and sized, on the basis of "moving closer" to their interests (which explain their positions). It should not be forgotten that the success of any grouping of nations (the EU is an alliance, ex Article 42.7 TEU) is the existence of a common understanding of the same community of interests and beliefs,

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10 Launched at the informal European Council meeting in Zagreb in March 2020.


within a geopolitical framework\textsuperscript{13}.

In a communication, the Foreign Service itself reported that its intelligence directorate (SIAC)\textsuperscript{14} submitted a first draft of the threat analysis for evaluation by the MS, in a standardised and consensual process.

c) Consequently, in both Phase 1 and Phase 2, international negotiation (or strategic dialogue) arises as a search for a common understanding in a document of agreement on common solutions, either by redefining the complex "geopolitical question" facing the EU, in order to find winning alternatives, or by generating, ordering and prioritising (in this order) a long list of possible solutions to the European "geopolitical question". As a result, a solution emerges that, above all, is perceived by all as fair, respectful and balanced, based on the criteria of durability of the political-strategic agreement. Strategic negotiation is a balancing act.

\textbf{The strategic documents}

\textit{The first document}

This is a 360\textdegree; intelligence report, describing the risks and threats to the EU in 5-10 years, with a decisive intervention by the SIAC (it is, indeed, the final result of Phase I of the negotiation process, which took place from June 2020 to December 2020).

It cannot be understood as a product of a joint and agreed intelligence, but rather as a sort of understanding reached by the MS' intelligence services. It seems that the nuance may be due to the desire to respect the sovereignty of each and every MS in such a sensitive area, avoiding the "communitisation" of a matter that is still intergovernmental.

\textit{The second document}

The second agreement will have the nature of a legal-political document, as it will eventually be adopted by the EU Council\textsuperscript{15} (it is the expected final result of Phase II of the strategic negotiation process, from January 2021 to June 2022).

\textsuperscript{13} BAÑOS, Pedro. “Así se domina el mundo”, ARIEL, p. 88.

\textsuperscript{14} Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity, composed of the EU Intelligence Centre and military staff intelligence.

\textsuperscript{15} The Council of the European Union is the meeting of the EU Council of Ministers.
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This second document began to take shape with a first Scoping Paper, drafted by the EEAS in early 2021, outlining the skeleton, key issues and questions to be answered\(^\text{16}\).

The Foreign Service has briefly pointed out that, based on the “Scoping Paper”, the dialogue or strategic negotiation will take place through the organisation of thematic sessions on specific aspects to be specified in particular, within one of the four baskets proposed by the European Council\(^\text{17}\), with flexibility in the formats. The result will be the final document during the French Presidency of the Council in 2022, after being set during the German Presidency.

**The four baskets**

These four areas are: (1) Crisis and conflict management. To answer questions such as in which regions and which functions to prioritise (maritime security...); (2) Capacity building. For example, by asking about the EU's relationship with the Nato Defence Planning Process, or what "strategic autonomy" means in the field of military capabilities; (3) Resilience. For example, to draw lessons from Covid-19; or interpreting Article 222 TFEU (Solidarity), or 42.7 TEU (Mutual Assistance); (4) Partners. For example, prioritising different levels of engagement, such as what partnership we will have with the UK.

**Nature of the understanding**

It will share that nature of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), without prejudice to its eventual adoption by the unanimous\(^\text{18}\) decision of the EU Council.

The MoU thus serves then, as a soft law instrument of cooperation, "the creation of spaces for the sharing of experience and knowledge, where parts are subject themselves to policies in order to improve their implementation, in collaboration with all parties


\(^{17}\) European Council of 16 June 2020 in its "Conclusions on Security and Defence".

\(^{18}\) Art. 31 Treaty of EU, as it is a decision with military or defence implications.
involved\textsuperscript{19}. It is linked to international multilateral cooperation on highly specialised or complex issues.

The strategic questions

In these four baskets\textsuperscript{20}, strategic questions\textsuperscript{21} must be posed to help develop the "Strategic Orientation", so that it "can contribute to the development of a common European security and defence culture, based on our common values and objectives and respecting the specific character of the security and defence policies of the Member States"\textsuperscript{22}. In strategic thinking\textsuperscript{23}, the correct formulation of questions is vital to understanding and delimiting the issue to be negotiated.

To orient is to concretise

Strategic Guidance" is both concretisation and the search for coherence for the better training of armies, the optimisation of resources, and the improvement and optimisation of procedures and processes. It is the search for strategic superiority or advantage over the EU's rivals, thus avoiding a position of geopolitical disadvantage. The path embarked upon will introduce meaning to collaboration among Europeans.

The "Strategic Orientation", in the view of the EEAS\textsuperscript{24}, is called upon to:

1) Improve the EU's ability to act swiftly and decisively in our geopolitical neighbourhood.


\textsuperscript{21} KOENIG, Nicole. “The EU’S Strategic Compass For Security And Defence”, Policy Paper, Hertie School Jacques Delors Centre, 10th July 2020, p.4. Available at: https://hertieschool-f4e6.kxcdn.com/fileadmin/2_Research/1_About_our_research/2_Research_centres/6_Jacques_Delors_Centre/Publications/20200710_Strategic_Compass_Koenig.pdf

\textsuperscript{22} European Council of 16 June 2020 in its "Conclusions on Security and Defence".


\textsuperscript{24} FRIES, Charles. Ibidem, p. 28.
2) Protecting the EU and its citizens in the best way, deepening the concept of the EU as a military alliance (ex 42.7 TEU), which will mean projecting beyond our borders, and becoming proficient in space, cyberspace, maritime security and new technologies (5G, Artificial Intelligence, quantum...); in resilience (resistance plus learning and improvement); in security of supply; and information.

3) Strengthening our capabilities through cooperation. Of Europe’s total defence spending (2019) of 186 billion euros, just 7 billion euros is spent on cooperative programmes.

4) Working actively with EU partners. Promoting a more strategic partnership with partners and neighbours, with the UN, NATO, the African Union and ASEAN.

For another expert, Daniel Fiott\textsuperscript{25}, it is not a matter of rewriting the three main points of the EU’s Level of Ambition, nor the EU Global Strategy – which, by the way, is not an exhaustive strategic document\textsuperscript{26} - but of deepening or seeking concreteness, and coherence, in political-strategic guidelines that describe how the Level of Ambition can be achieved in terms of capabilities and operations.

For Fiott, for example, it should not attempt to regulate matters for which the EU does not have a mandate (“nuclear deterrence”) and anticipates tensions in the implementation of the Mutual Assistance (Article 42 TEU) and Solidarity (Article 222 TFEU) clauses, due to divergent national interests.

Other authors, such as Biscop, state that the final document is an opportunity to set out MS’ responsibilities in CSDP, its purpose, the type of operations (high or low intensity), at what scale, with which partners, etc.

Engberg\textsuperscript{27} and Nováky\textsuperscript{28}, conclude that after the new "Strategic Orientation", it will be necessary to raise a new "Level of Ambition" and review the current EU Global Strategy.

\textsuperscript{25} FIOTT, Daniel. “UNCHARTED TERRITORY? Towards a Common threat analysis and a Strategic Compass for EU security and defence”. Brief 16, EUISS, July 2020.


We agree with the researcher Arnout Molenaar\textsuperscript{29} that the "Orientation" is the development and realisation of a common vision, to define more specifically both what the EU needs to achieve - a common strategic culture - and how to achieve it, through the definition and realisation of strategic autonomy; of the possibilities for cooperation between MS; of the transatlantic relationship; of the EU as a more active security provider; to enhance the EU's resilience and its protection.

In other words, in the implementation of the "Strategic Orientation" we will witness a new struggle between "communitarianism" in European defence and the maintenance of the weight of the MS, despite the image that the "Strategic Orientation" is more a deepening of the community rather than the intergovernmental level.

The "Strategic Orientation" will therefore define policy orientations and specific goals and objectives in areas such as crisis management, resilience, capacity building and partnerships with partners and allies. Its concretisation leads to cooperation.

**Towards strategic cooperation and negotiation**

Cooperation for Harari is the ability to share a common “mythology”, which gives homo sapiens “the unprecedented ability to cooperate flexibly in large numbers”\textsuperscript{30}.

In the EU, MS have a strong determination and incentive to generate strong collaborative ties. Idealism is the driving force behind European defence construction, which does not exclude intense realist competition. In this cooperation, the shortcomings and weaknesses of all MS emerge. The destiny of the other comes to be seen as one's own\textsuperscript{31}.

Certainly, intense work needs to be done in areas where differences coexist, such as different strategic cultures, but "greater cooperation stimulates trust and transparency among allies (...), and can improve capability development and operations"\textsuperscript{32}.


\textsuperscript{32} “THE MILITARY BALANCE”, “Editor’s Introduction: Challenges to defence cooperation”, the Vol. 117, Opinion Paper 47/2021 8
In the "Strategic Orientation" the Commission and MS will deploy a set of negotiating techniques to achieve the largest experiment in European geopolitical negotiation since the establishment of the European Economic Community.

In 2021, the EU powers, far from seeking peace –something that has been widely achieved- or a balance of power among themselves, will be concretising a common vision to achieve a full orientation of the Common Security and Defence Policy towards a true Common Security and Defence Policy.

Strategic thinking

Strategic thinking consists of "deciding what are the best moves we can make to achieve our objectives, using the means at our disposal". It involves anticipating and creating future scenarios. A kind of planning aimed at gaining a sustainable competitive advantage over rivals.

Although each MS's commitment to its partners must be firm and cooperative, they also pursue their national interests and seek supremacy. And, also the negotiating one.

For its part, the EU acts strategically when it seeks to bring coherence to the different procedures, initiatives and actors, both at the intergovernmental level (CFSP and CSDP, PESCO) and at the EU level (EEAS, Area of Freedom, Security and Justice), guiding the EU's defence.
The process of strategic negotiation

MS will try to behave strategically in developing the "Strategic Orientation" until the final agreement is reached - it is not known whether or to what extent they will succeed-.

The organisational dimension of meetings

Gilbert Keith Chesterton said that "at the beginning of a discussion it is essential to agree both what is being discussed and what is not intended to be discussed at all".

During negotiation, the greater the number of parties, the greater the complexity and mistrust. Processes, which are already iterative, tend to slow down to 27, depending a lot on whether a correct agenda is respected, graduating the relevance of the issues, the time to deal with them, whether there is a roadmap with time milestones to be achieved, etc.

In addition, MS will agree on the rules and processes for negotiation, voting, modification of the rules themselves, as well as an adequate structure of working panels, a calendar and even timetables.

In this dimension, it is important to know that decisions are taken unanimously and that vetoing (or just suggesting it) is an exceptional possibility, as it is not without its difficulties to do so.

All this will conspire for the success or failure of the meeting.

The procedural dimension of meetings

Negotiations begin with the drawing up of a first draft, as we have already seen, by the European Commission ("Scoping Paper"). This draft is discussed and revised by the 27. It takes between 6 to 8 months to have an international agreement in place. Each version agreed in the working meetings will be submitted to each MS for a report. It is desirable that, during this time, there should be permanent telematic contacts. In addition, counter-intelligence measures are key to guaranteeing the final result.

The human dimension of negotiating teams

An experienced chairperson of the meeting, with diplomatic skills, leadership and a command of English, is essential. Only exceptionally should he or she rotate, always reporting to the High Representative in order to convey the intangible part of all negotiations, the "feelings".
The team of each MS will be multidisciplinary and elite, in the diplomatic, intelligence, military, technical, industrial, legal and financial areas. Clearly, the best team will be the one that integrates all this civilian and military know-how, under the leadership of an experienced person. With negotiating skills and languages. Connected to sources of information, as well as to the industrial needs and capabilities of their country, and with the highest possible level of decision making.

A successful model calls for "a more effective organization with a highly decentralised" - and specialised - "goal-oriented and high value-added managerial control", rather than direct orders, with the aim of harnessing the mental capacity and creative skills of individual managers at each level.37

**The strategy of a good international strategic negotiation**

The "Strategic Orientation" must be approached with absolute respect for the negotiators, their Nations and their legitimate interests. Successful negotiation of the "Strategic Orientation" will be to achieve the highest possible realisation of the Level of Ambition.

There are commonly accepted good practices38 applicable to the "Strategic Orientation":

1) Attending all meetings;
2) Knowing the industrial returns, from decisions on the "four baskets";
3) Appointment of appropriate profiles;
4) Appointment of a lead negotiator;
5) Contacting stakeholders;
6) Assisting the negotiating team;
7) Being aware that there is shadow manoeuvring;
8) Know that negotiators solve, not elevate problems;
9) Don't try to maliciously surprise and be constructive;
10) Socialise and create an atmosphere of trust;

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38 Based on the final work of Cte EA ITA Angel Satué Seisdedos (+). Air Force Staff promotion course.
11) Working on sincere personal relationships and supported by a high degree of seriousness at work. Good negotiators are preceded by their reputation and predispose others favourably to listen to them attentively and respectfully;

12) As far as possible, do not leave issues finished on the negotiation table, and wait for confirmation from the respective authorities;

13) Keep the necessary data in mind;

In this line, negotiators may apply the principles of the International Chamber of Commerce39.

In the two phases of the “Strategic Orientation” referred to above, MS can apply multiple strategies. It is in the possibility of choice that the essence of strategy lies (Beaufre). In fact, it must be borne in mind that every strategic negotiator, at the most tactical level, must adapt to each specific moment, to opt for one formula or another, depending on the changing conditions of any negotiation, using the different types of strategies that he or she can deploy (or try to deploy). “The strategist's weapons are tactical thinking, consistency and coherence”40.

Types of negotiation strategy

We identify five negotiation strategies: collaborative, compromise, competitive, adaptive and avoidance. These will be influenced by two key vectors: the importance of the relationship with the counterpart, and the importance of the outcome41. Which ones will come together in the "Strategic Orientation"?

39 Available at: https://iccwbo.org/publication/icc-principles-to-facilitate-commercial-negotiation/ Access date: 03.18.2021.
40 OHMAE, Kenichi. Ibídem.
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Table 1. LEWICKI, Roy. J, HIAM, Alexander; WISE OLANDER, Karen. Ibid, p.79

**Adaptation**

Or of "losing (in the outcome) in order to gain (in the relationship)". One is thus willing to sacrifice the outcome for the sake of the relationship. The search for "Strategic Orientation", then, is essential for the survival of the EU. Tim Marshall\(^{42}\) goes so far as to say that if the EU were to falter “it would mean a return to a Europe of sovereign nation-states with each hunting for alliances in the balance of power game”. Reaching a common understanding does not seem unimportant.

**Of Avoidance**

Or of "losing (in the outcome) to lose (in the relationship)". It is clear that, in the EU, in the framework of the relaunch of all defence initiatives such as PESCO, CARD or the European Defence Fund (unimaginable only five years ago), there will be a relationship between the parties on a wide variety of projects and initiatives, in the medium and long term. Avoiding any kind of negotiation, or terminating it, on the grounds that all or most aspects of the negotiation are irrelevant, does not seem credible. Perhaps the UK would have gone for this strategy, as the party pursuing it usually has a strong alternative.

**Of compromise**

Or of ceding, in whole or in part, some of its claims. This strategy would be the one to

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which the MS would be forced if they do not move fast enough. It is a secondary one. It may bring reasonable benefits if the collaboration is not satisfactory, but MS are aware that they do not want to worsen a relationship. Within the EU, it would not be out of the question that countries with less defence industrial capabilities - in the centre and east - or with alternative visions to traditional Western European alliance politics, could move towards this kind of strategy. The Commission could well compromise because a bad agreement is usually better than a conflict, prioritising time over quality and perhaps postponing the negotiation itself for a later date.

**Competitive**

Or winning (in the result), but losing (in the relationship). In this strategy, the party that executes it wants to maximise the expected results at the expense of the relationship. It considers that a win-win situation is not possible, for many reasons, such as complexity.

**Collaborative**

This strategy has more similarities with the EU’s grand strategy, and that of its MS, although at a tactical level, ultra-competitive strategies are also very common, happily overshadowed by the need for cooperation in a V.U.C.A. world. At times, it will coexist with the adoption of compromise solutions, where everyone wins some and everyone loses some. The Commission will challenge all competitive and unfair behaviour, so that even the usual compromise strategy must be measured against the need for concreteness.

In this strategy of partnership, the Commission must ensure for a year and a half that each side understands the needs of the others; that no country entente (North-South, rich-poor, ...) is created; that it remembers that the defence of the EU is at stake, not one or another national interest; that it must remove all obstacles and find solutions. It will try to anticipate those areas where there would be scope for cooperation\(^{43}\).

It should be borne in mind that 27 countries and many people are involved, handling very sensitive information, in a short period of time, and with strong external pressures. Also, in the framework of a complex organisational and rules system\(^{44}\).

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\(^{43}\) KOENIG, Nicole. Ibídem, p. 4.

Conclusions

Negotiating the "Strategic Orientation" the EU has a golden opportunity to emancipate itself from compromise solutions and national interests, seeking the European interest, but let us not forget that the 27 member states and not the EU institutions will be deciding. We are still at the intergovernmental level and, accordingly, unanimity, rules.

It is time to introduce changes in the EU's decision-making system, so that endless negotiations do not leave us on the sidelines of the world chessboard, either because they are slow or because they reach insufficient compromise formulas.

We face the challenge of converging the strategic cultures of the MS.

Negotiating is an art, and negotiating between partners and allies, neighbours marked by the same geography, history and values, can sometimes be more of a hindrance than an advantage. Only friends are betrayed, not enemies.

And we must return to the questions inherent in any search for strategic guidance for the realisation of the EU's Global Strategy and its Level of Ambition.

The understanding on risks for the EU of December 2020 and that of the "Strategic Orientation" that we will see in March 2022 seek to answer these questions, seeking to give cohesion and direction to all defence initiatives launched over the last five years (CARD, PESCO, EDF, ...). Once the risks have been identified, the Member States must agree on the means and capabilities, as well as who the EU's strategic partners will be.

During the negotiation of the "Strategic Orientation", the difficulties of any international multiparty negotiation are therefore present, such as the number of parties, their heterogeneity and the dynamics of a pluralistic group with diverse interests.

In this highly complex strategic framework, the MS will tend to behave more competitively, but collaborative strategic negotiation is the only "win-win" in the long term. The MS and the Commission are doomed to a permanent dialogue.

We are at a moment in history when countries seem reluctant to cooperate through institutions or agreements to manage problems that go beyond their borders.

At this time, the success or failure of the EU will rest on the degree of unity and support for its actions as a bloc, which requires commitment to building a common vision,
including in defence and security.

Thus, the sovereignty of the MS can no longer be conceived without a new global dimension, so that, in defence, it requires climbing the supranational rung of European integration. To deny this is to deny reality, and to deny Europeans a chance of survival as a culture and civilisation.

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